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Abstract

With the increasing importance of the world-wide telecommunication and computer
networks, agent technologies and multi-agent systems are attracting more and more
attention. Agent technologies aim at the design of agents that perform well in environments, which are not necessarily stable and well-structured. In this context,
specifying the organisation of a multi-agent system at design time becomes a difficult task. If the structure of a multi-agent system needs to adapt to changes in the
environment, the difficult task turns to be a virtually impractical task. Therefore,
the self-organising behaviour of multi-agent systems is one of the most interesting
phenomena. This thesis mainly aims at investigating the challenging issues of selforganisation in multi-agent systems. In addition, this thesis also uses the notion
of self-organisation in other research fields in order to achieve better results compared to those studies, which did not take self-organisation into consideration. The
contributions of this thesis consist of the following five aspects.
1. A composite relation adaptation mechanism is proposed, which is used to
adapt relations between agents in a multi-agent system, to achieve efficient
task allocation. This mechanism integrates a trust model, and takes both
multiple and crisp relations into account.
2. An integrative self-organisation mechanism is developed. This mechanism
combines the three principles of self-organisation, i.e., cloning/spawning, resource exchange and relation adaptation. It can outperform those mechanisms,
which consider only one principle of self-organisation, in various aspects, e.g.,
efficiency of task allocation and load-balancing.
3. A self-adaption based dynamic coalition formation mechanism is presented.
This mechanism enables agents to autonomously and dynamically adjust their
degrees of involvement in different coalitions to join new coalitions.
v

4. A self-organisation based strategy for the evolution of cooperation in networks
is devised. This strategy embodies current developed strategies as agents’
knowledge. Then, each agent can autonomously select a strategy from its
knowledge base to adapt its behaviour.
5. A self-organisation mechanism for packeting routing in wireless sensor networks is introduced. This mechanism is not a concrete packeting routing
mechanism, but is an assistant tool, which is independent of current routing
approaches and can be employed to enhance many current routing approaches.
In summary, this thesis includes both theory and application of self-organsing
multi-agent systems. Experimental results demonstrate the efficiency, effectiveness
and potential applicability of the work done in this thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The spread of the Internet and the evolution of mobile computing have created
new possibilities for software applications such as ubiquitous computing, dynamic
supply chain management and medical home care. Such systems need to operate
in dynamic and heterogeneous environments, and face the challenge of handling
frequently changing requirements. In addition, with the ever-growing exponential
complexity in deployment, operation, management and maintenance, these systems
have high desirability to be autonomic, so as to be capable of self-management.
Therefore, these systems have to be flexible, robust and capable of adapting to open
and dynamic circumstances. It is widely believed that using Multi-Agent Systems
(MASs), coordinated by self-organisation mechanisms, to design these systems is an
effective way [SGK05, SG06]. Much work has been devoted to formalising and devising architectures for agents’ cooperative behaviour, for coordinating the behaviour
of individual agents within groups and for designing agent societies by using social laws [VSDD05, SCL08, DOM08]. However, it is very challenging to provide
agents with abilities to automatically devise societies so as to form coherent selforganising groups that could coordinate their behaviour via social laws [BCHM06].
The main aim of this thesis is to provide self-organisation mechanisms in MASs.
Through these mechanisms, each agent in a MAS is able to autonomously adapt its
behaviour to suit changes in open and dynamic environments. Moreover, the notion
of self-organisation can also be used in other research fields and many application
domains, which will be described in this thesis as well. This chapter firstly gives
an overview of self-organisation and MASs, and then outlines the contributions and
structure of this thesis.

1

1.1. Self-organisation

1.1

2

Self-organisation

Natural self-organising systems can function without central control and operate
based on contextual local interactions. The particularity of self-organising systems
is their capacity to spontaneously (without external control) produce a new organisation in the case of environmental changes. These systems are particularly robust, as they can adapt to environmental changes and are able to ensure their own
survivability [SG06]. The term, self-organisation, is actually used in various disciplines, such as mathematics, physics, biology and philosophy [SGK05]. It is now
increasingly used in computer science and in particular, it is widely employed by the
MAS research community. A Technical Forum Group (TFG) on self-organisation
for MASs1 , hosted by the AgentLink III NoE European project2 , aims to provide
commonly agreed definitions of self-organisation and its related properties.

1.1.1

Concepts of self-organisation

Based on the work of TFG, self-organisation here is defined as a mechanism or
a process, which enables a system to change its organisation without any explicit
external command during its execution time. Self-organisation often results in emergent behaviour that can be either desirable or undesirable. It is also necessary to
distinguish between systems where there is no internal and external explicit control
from those where there is an internal control. For example, in a termite society,
the different arches are all located at the same distance from the queen due to a
pheromone gradient. The queen broadcasts the information about the arches to
the entire termite society, and this action is an internal control. Consequently, the
following concepts have to be elaborated.
Strong self-organising systems are those systems where there is no explicit central control either internal or external.
Weak self-organising systems are those systems where, from an internal point
of view, there is re-organisation under an internal control or planning. This
kind of systems can be illustrated by the example of the termites putting the
bullet in a circle under the control of the queen.
1
2

http://www.irit.fr/TFGSO
http://www.agentlink.org
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Serugendo et al. [SGK05] summarised the properties, characteristics and measures of self-organising behaviour and self-organising systems from the work of TFG.

1.1.2

Properties of self-organising behaviour

There are three properties, which can characterise slef-organising behaviour of a
self-organising system.
1. Absence of explicit external control
This is a mandatory property, which states that the system is autonomous.
The system imposes and changes its organisation based only on internal decisions without following any explicit external re-organisation command. This
property refers to the self- part of the self-organisation definition.
2. Decentralised control
A self-organising system can work under decentralised control. In this case,
there is neither an internal central authority or a centralised information flow.
As a result, access to global information is limited by the locality of interactions, which is governed by some rules. This property is generally not mandatory,
since internal central control can be oberserved in many natural self-organising
systems, such as termite systems. However, according to the efforts of TFG,
the existence of decentralised control is also considered as a mandatory property of self-organising behaviour.
3. Dynamic operation
This mandatory property is linked to the system evolution in time. As an organisation evolves independently of any external control, this property implies
continuity in the self-organisation process.

1.1.3

Characteristics of self-organising systems

In addition to the aforementioned properties, which enable one to determine if a
system is actually self-organising, there are several characteristics that can appear
in self-organising systems. These characteristics are natural or artificial, and they
need to be used together to justify the existence of self-organisation.
1. Endogenous global order

1.1. Self-organisation

4

The system reaches some stable global state that is produced within the system. This is also related to the notion of emergent phenomenon.
2. Emergence
This characteristic refers to having emergent phenomena arising from local
interactions. Such phenomena can be observed at the global level but they
cannot be precisely deduced from examining individual behaviour. Emergent
behaviour arises from local interactions occurring among the individual components, thus allowing the system to operate without any central control.
3. Simple local rules
The overall complex system behaviour can be based on simple individual behavioural rules. In this case, the information associated with rule descriptions
is less than the information needed to describe global behavioural patterns.
Local information is used to describe the mechanism for producing the global
behavioural pattern instead of the pattern itself.
4. Dissipation
In the absence of external perturbation, the system is expected to stabilise in
some states, in which emergent properties can be observed. This implies a kind
of dissipation of some “energy”. Otherwise, the system would be continuously
changing.
5. Instability
Systems showing instability are mainly characterised by nonlinear dynamics,
which have the effect of small fluctuations in environmental conditions that
result in significant variations in the overall system behaviour. Furthermore,
such systems exhibit increased sensitivity to initial conditions and parameter
values, resulting in small changes to parameters and produces different overall
behaviour patterns. Therefore, the overall system properties cannot be understood by simply examining the individual component behaviour separately.
6. Multiple equilibria
Multiple equilibria are observed when many possible attractors for stable states
are present in the system.
7. Criticality
This characteristic is related to the presence of threshold effects or phase
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changes.
8. Redundancy
A system presents redundancy when it demonstrates insensitivity to damage
due to replication of components.
9. Self-maintenance
A system is self-maintained if it has the capacity to reproduce or repair itself,
essentially by reproducing or repairing its components.
10. Adaptivity
The re-organisation capability of self-organising systems implies adaptation to
external (environmental) variations.
11. Complexity
This characteristic usually arises from the irreducibility of the global properties
to a combination of local behaviour.
12. Hierarchies
Hierarchies are present in a system when multiple nested self-organised levels
can be observed.

1.1.4

Measures for self-organisation

Based on the suggestion of Serugendo et al. [SGK05, SG06], three measures should
be concerned to derive quantitative criteria for measuring self-organisation effectiveness, which include (i) an observed organisational structure, (ii) a process that
produces and maintains that structure, and (iii) a function or global goal that the
system aims to fulfill at maximum using self-organisation.
Moreover, a self-organising system can be investigated from either local or global perspectives and more perspectives can be considered if self-organisation spans
multiple nested hierarchical levels. In all cases, measurements, which concern the
system structures, processes or functions, can be taken at each level.
Structure based measurement focuses on assessing a system structure after it has
been stabilised following a series of self-organising changes. Measures focusing on
a self-organisation process are related to the system’s dynamics and its evolution
over time. Finally, measurements focusing on a function that must be delivered by
self-organisation are related to how well the self-organising system is able to fulfill
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its purpose. Therefore, measures concern the characteristics of the problem, which
the system is dedicated to solve, and these measures are similar to those, which are
used for performance assessment in classical systems.
Examples of typical self-organisation measures include:
• the capacity to reach an organisation, which is able to fulfill the goal of the
system as a whole once the system is started;
• the capacity to reach a re-organisation after a perturbing event;
• the degree of decentralised control;
• the capacity to withstand perturbations.

1.2

Multi-Agent Systems

Most researchers in artificial intelligence to date have dealt with developing theories,
techniques and systems to study and understand the behaviour and reasoning properties of a single cognitive entity, i.e., agent [Syc98]. In addition, agent-based systems
technology has generated much excitement in recent years because of its promise as
a new paradigm for conceptualising, designing and implementing software systems.
The capacity of a single agent is limited by its knowledge, its computing resources
and its perspectives. This bounded rationality [Sim57] is one of the underlying
reasons for creating problem-solving organisations, which consist of more than one
agents, namely Multi-Agent Systems (MASs). If a problem domain is quite complex, large, or unpredictable, then the only way it can reasonably be addressed is to
develop a number of functionally specific and modular components (agents), which
are specialised at solving a particular problem aspect. This decomposition allows
each agent to use the most appropriate paradigm for solving its particular problems.
When interdependent problems arise, the agents in the system must coordinate with
one another to ensure that interdependencies are properly managed.
In the MAS research field, the key problem is the definition of agent. There is
still an ongoing debate, and little consensus, about the definition of “agent”. An
increasing number of researchers and industrial practitioners have found that the
following definition could be widely acceptable:
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“An agent is an encapsulated computational system that is situated in some
environment and that is capable of flexible, autonomous action in that environment in order to meet its design objectives.” [WJ95]
This definition implies that an agent should exhibit pro-active, reactive and social
behaviour. Thus, the following key properties of an agent are required [Woo97,
Woo99].
Autonomy: agents are entities, which are clearly identifiable and problem solving.
In addition, agents are with well-defined boundaries and interfaces, which have
control both over their internal states and over their own behaviour.
Reactivity: agents are situated (or embedded) in a particular environment. They
receive inputs related to the states of their environment through sensors. Agents then respond in a timely fashion, and act on the environment through
effectors to satisfy their design objectives.
Pro-activeness: agents do not simply act in response to their environment. They
are designed to fulfill specific purposes, namely that they have particular objectives (goals) to achieve. Agents are therefore able to exhibit goal-directed
behaviour by taking the initiative and opportunistically adopting new goals.
Social Ability: agents are able to cooperate with humans and other agents in order
to achieve their design objectives.
To intuitively understand what an agent is, it is worth to consider some examples
of agents [WJ95].
• Any control system can be viewed as an agent. A simple example of such a
system is a thermostat. A thermostat has a sensor for detecting room temperature. This sensor is directly embedded within the environment (i.e., the room),
and it outputs one of two signals: one indicates that the temperature is too
low and another indicates that the temperature is OK. The actions available to
the thermostat are “heating on” or “heating off”. The action “heating on” will
generally have the effect of raising the room temperature. The decision making
component of the thermostat implements (usually in electro-mechanical hardware) the following two rules: if the room temperature is too low, the action
“heating on” is taken; if the room temperature is OK, the action “heating off”
is taken.
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• Most software daemons, (such as background processes in the UNIX operating
system), which monitor a software environment and perform actions to modify it, can be viewed as agents. An example is the X Windows program xbiff.
This program continually monitors a user’s incoming emails, and indicates via
a GUI icon whether the user has unread messages. Whereas the thermostat
agent in the previous example inhabits in a physical environment (the physical world), the xbiff program inhabits in a software environment. The xbiff
program agent obtains information about this environment by carrying out
software functions (e.g., by executing system programs), and the actions it
performs are software actions (changing an icon on the screen, or executing a
program). The decision making component is just as simple as the thermostat
example.
MASs have been used in many industrial applications. The first MAS applications appeared in the mid-1980s [Syc98]. Up to now, MAS applications have increasingly covered a variety of domains, which range from manufacturing to process
control [Cd95], air-traffic control and information management [JSW98]. Several
representative examples are presented here.
• One of the earliest MAS applications was distributed vehicle monitoring (DVMT) [Dur87, DL89, Dur96]. A set of geographically distributed agents monitor vehicles, attempt to come up with interpretations of what vehicles are
passing through the global area, and track vehicle movements.
• Parunak [Par87] developed the YAMS (Yet Another Manufacturing System),
which applied the contract net protocol [Smi80] to manufacturing control.
The basic problem can be described as follows. A manufacturing enterprise is
modeled as a hierarchy of functionally specific work cells. These work cells are
further grouped into flexible manufacturing systems that collectively constitute
a factory. The goal of YAMS is to efficiently manage the production process
of these factories. To achieve this complex task, YAMS adopts a multi-agent
approach, where each factory is represented as an agent and each factory
component is represented as an agent as well. Each agent has a collection of
plans representing its capabilities. The contract net protocol allows tasks (i.e.,
production orders) to be delegated to individual factories, and from individual
factories, these tasks are further allocated to flexible manufacturing systems
and then to individual work cells.
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• The best-known MAS for process control is ARCHON [JCL95], which is a software platform for building MASs and an associated methodology for building
applications with this platform. ARCHON has been applied in several process control applications, including electricity transportation management and
particle accelerator control. ARCHON also has the distinction of being one of
the world’s earliest field tested MASs.
• Ljunberg and Lucas [LL92] described a sophisticated agent-based air-traffic
control system known as OASIS. In this system, agents are used to represent
both aircraft and the various air-traffic control systems in operation. The agent metaphor thus provides a useful and natural way of modeling real-world
autonomous components. As an aircraft enters airspace, an agent is allocated
to it, and the agent is instantiated with the information and goals corresponding to the real-world aircraft. For example, an aircraft might have a goal to
land on a certain runway at a certain time.
• The WARREN financial portfolio management system [SDP+ 96] is a MAS
that integrates information finding and filtering from the Internet in the context of supporting a user to manage his/her financial portfolio. The system
consists of agents that cooperatively self-organise to monitor and track stock
quotes, financial news, financial analyst reports and company earnings reports
to appraise the portfolio owner of the evolving financial picture. The agents
not only answer relevant queries but also continuously monitor Internet information sources for the occurrence of interesting events and alert the portfolio
manager agent or the user. WARREN also includes agents that can analyse
users’ buy and sell decisions with respect to asset allocations and risk [SDZ98].

1.3

Self-organising Multi-Agent Systems

As described above, MASs have attracted much attention as a means of developing
applications where it is beneficial to define functions through many autonomous
elements. As MASs become more complex, questions arise about the best way
to control agent activities and application performance. Centralised control is an
approach in many previous MASs, but is of limited use because of the risk of dependency on the controlling element and the consequential lack of robustness. Partially
or completely decentralised control is an alternative, but a means of implementing
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this without disrupting agent performance in support of applications are important.
Self-organisation mechanisms are thus useful, because agents can be organised into
configurations for useful application without imposing external centralised controls.

1.3.1

Classifications of self-organisation mechanisms

Several researchers have classified self-organisation mechanisms based on different
criteria.
Serugendo et al. [SG06] divided self-organisation mechanisms into five classes.
1. Direct interactions between agents using basic principles such as
broadcast and localisation
Typical examples of such mechanisms are those applied in the areas of selfassembly and distributed self-localisation, where the formation of regular spatial patterns in mobile objects is required. For example, Mamei et al. [MVZ05]
used a leader election algorithm to determine the center of gravity of the objects and propagate this information to all objects, which keep moving until a
specific distance from the center is reached.
2. Indirect interactions between agents, i.e., stigmergy, which means
indirect coordination through traces left in the environment
Such mechanisms, based on the idea of stigmergy, have been applied to manufacturing control [KVSG+ 05], supply network management [RBK+ 04], and so
on.
3. Reinforcement of agent behaviour
These reinforcement self-organisation mechanisms are based on the capabilities of the agents to dynamically modify their behaviour according to some
perceived states of the environment. For instance, Weyns et al. [WSHG04]
presented a model that focused on dynamically adapting logical relations between different behaviours, represented by roles. An agent, starting from its
current state, can successively follow this model to complete its tasks.
4. Cooperation behaviour of individual agents
A typical example of these mechanisms is organisational self-design, which
uses the primitives of agents composition and decomposition, e.g., Kamboj
and Decker [KD07] developed an organisational self-design mechanism in semidynamic environments, which enables an agent to be divided into two agents
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to respond to overwhelming environmental demands and enables two agents
to merge into one agent if communication overhead between the two agents is
too high.
5. Generic architectures or meta-models
The self-organisation mechanisms, based on generic architectures or meta models of the agents organisation, are instantiated and subsequently dynamically
modified as needed according to the requirements of a particular application.
A typical example is PROSA [Bon98], which is based on a holonic hierarchy
model. Self-organisation here refers to altering the holonic hierarchy following perturbations of the agent environment by using a known decision making
technique.
Similarly, Bernon et al. [BCHM06] discussed three mechanisms for generating
self-organisation in MASs.
1. Self-organisation by reactive MASs
Reactive MASs [Par97] are systems that are made up of simply behaving
agents with decentralised control. Agents are situated in a dynamic environment through which they interact. Agents are characterised by limited
representation of themselves, of others and of the environment. Their behaviours are based on stimulus-response rules. Decision making is based on
limited information about the environment as well as on limited internal states, and does not refer to explicit deliberation. The individuals do not have
an explicit representation of the collective task to be achieved because of their
simplicity. Therefore, the solution of the problem is a consequence of successive interactions between agents and the environment. Their characteristics
enable them to dynamically adapt their functions or structures to changing
conditions without external intervention. In reactive MASs, agents can dynamically form connections with each other through which messages can be
passed. An agent is initially created with only four possible actions: creation
(of other agents), destruction (of itself), communication (with other agents),
migration (between environments).
2. Self-organisation by cooperation in multi-agent systems
Cooperation in this context is defined by three meta-rules: (i) perceived signals are understood without ambiguity, (ii) received information is useful for
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the agent’s reasoning, and (iii) reasoning leads to useful actions toward other
agents [GCG99, SG06]. Interactions between agents of the system depend only on the local view they have and their ability to cooperate with each other.
At the agent level, cooperation is described in a proscriptive way: an agent
knows how to detect situations it judges being non-cooperative, from its point
of view, and acts for always trying to remain cooperative toward others and
also toward itself.
3. Self-organisation by holons
According to Koestler [Koe89], the word holon is derived from the Greek holos
(whole) and the suffix on, which means a particle or a part. A holon is a natural
or artificial structure that is stable, coherent, and consists of several holons as
substructures. No natural structure is either a whole or a part in an absolute
sense. A holon is a complex whole that consists of substructures, and it is a
part of a larger entity. In a holonic MAS, autonomous agents group together
to form holons, but agents do not lose their autonomy completely. The agents
can leave a holon again and act autonomously or rearrange themselves as new
holons. According to this view, a holonic agent consists of sub-agents, which
can separate and rearrange themselves and which may themselves be holons
[Fis05]. Bernon et al. [BCHM06] described the behaviour of the members of
a holon and their interactions in terms of roles and organisation. The roles
represent the status of the holon inside a specific holon. Each holon may
play four roles: StandAlone, Head, Part and MultiPart. As a holon joins a
holonic MAS, it has no special bindings and does not collaborate with any
other holons. This situation represents a StandAlone behaviour. In this state,
the agent’s decisions are not attached to any restriction but its own goals and
objectives. When a holon plays the Head role, its responsibility and rights may
range from merely administrative tasks to be able to take decisions concerning
all members. After a holon starts performing the Head role, it will be the
representative of the members of the holonic MAS and therefore will be able
to engage the system in new tasks. Members not playing the Head role are
considered as Parts of the system. Once a holon is accepted in a system as a
part, its autonomy is reduced because of its obligations with the system. The
MultiPart role is a special case of the Part role. This role is played by holons,
which belong to more than one systems. Each holon tries to be self-satisfied.
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If it cannot reach a satisfaction threshold, it attempts to change its role.
Mathieu et al. [MRS02] also pointed out that a self-organising system should
include the following three principles.
1. Agents in a self-organising system will generate new agents to take
part of their work load once they are overloaded.
2. Agents can exchange skills or resources, if necessary, between each
other to increase autonomy.
3. Agents should be able to create new specific relations between agents
in order to remove the middle-agents.
The discussion of Mathieu et al. [MRS02] is similar to that of Bernon et al.
[BCHM06], but the discussion of Mathieu et al. is more concise and is easier to
understand. The discussion of Mathieu et al. does not embody the holonic selforganising multi-agent systems. However, there is another research field in MASs,
i.e., dynamic coalition formation, whose process is akin to that of forming holons in
MASs.

1.3.2

Applications of self-organising multi-agent systems

Self-organising MASs have the potential to support a variety of applications. Bernon
et al. [BCHM06] provided some example applications, which used self-organising
MASs to make the applications more effective.
• Self-organisation of user communities by using middle agents
MASs can be used to support information exchange with user communities
by providing each user with a user agent that represents his/her interests.
The self-organising communities application [Wan02] assigns each user a user
agent. There are also multiple middle agents in the system. Each user agent
registers with at least one middle agent. Each middle agent receives queries
from multiple user agents. Given these queries, the middle agent carries out a
search of the pool of information it holds from user agents, which are already
registered with it. If the middle agent can respond to the query by using this
information then the information is dispatched to the user agent that issued the
original query and the search is completed. If not, the middle agent interacts
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with other middle agents to try to obtain information from them. Once the
middle agent obtains the required information, it relays the result to the user
agent. If the information provision is unsuccessful, the middle agent requests
another middle agent, with which the provider agent is currently registered,
to transfer the provider agent to the group of the requester agent. In this way,
user communities can be built up by using user agents and middle agents,
without any central control on agent behaviour.
• Self-organisation for flood forecasting
Flood forecasting is a complex dynamic problem, parameters that can explain
this phenomenon are numerous and heterogeneous, which include hygrometry,
declivity, surface, nature and permeability of the ground, rain heights, etc..
The STAFF real-time simulator [GGGR03] uses an adaptive model for flood
forecasting, which is composed of two levels of self-organising MASs. Each
agent in the lower level represent each physical sensor. The goal of each upper
level agent is to compute the water level variation during a unitary period.
For the computation, an upper level agent uses a weighted sum of agents in
the lower level. The weights can be dynamically adjusted through cooperation
between the upper level agents. The self-organisation by cooperation between
agents defines how the weights have to be adjusted according to the input data,
the results coming from other agents and the errors made on the forecast.
• Self-organisation for land use allocation
Self-organisation was applied to simulate the assignment of land-use categories
in a farming territory in the north-east of France [DLC98]. The farming territory is divided into a set of available zones. Each zone is featured by its
surface, its distance to the village, the kind of soil, and so on. Agents are
gathered into groups, and each group is associated to a land-use category. A
group has a goal to satisfy by conquering spatial zones in the farming territory while respecting some constraints. An agent can conquer a zone in the
territory and then contribute to the satisfaction of its group. When searching
for a zone, an agent chooses the most attractive one. If the zone is free, the
agent occupies it. If it is already occupied, the two agents have to fight, and
the outcome is determined by the respective strengths of their groups. Finally,
the strength of a group decreases while its satisfaction increases, in order to
ensure that groups, which are farther from their objectives, gain an advantage
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over those groups, which are closer to their objectives. The model exhibits
self-adaptation properties: at runtime, zones and land-use categories can be
added or removed, and the system can stabilise again to a solution.

1.4

Research Concerns and Contributions of This
Thesis

In this thesis, the research focuses on self-organisation in cooperative MASs as most
other self-organisation studies did [BCHM06, SG06, MBLG06], where agents collaboratively achieve their goals. The research concerns regarding self-organisation
in MASs and the contributions include:
1. A composite relation adaptation mechanism
As described in the previous section, a self-organising system includes three
principles [MRS02], which are relation adaptation, resource exchange, and
cloning/spawning. In this thesis, a relation adaptation mechanism is proposed. This mechanism enables agents to dynamically adapt relations with
other agents so as to achieve efficient task allocation. This mechanism consists of three elements. The mechanism utilises a trust model to assist agents in
reasoning with whom to adapt relations, while in related work, such candidate
selection process is oversimplified. The mechanism employs a multi-agent Qlearning algorithm for agents to independently learn how to adapt relations,
which can overcome the flaws of the most efficient relation adaptation approach [KGJ10]. Moreover, in this mechanism, it is considered that the agents
are connected by weighted relations, instead of crisp relations which are widely
used in current related research. The introduction of weighted relations can
improve the performance of the mechanism and make the mechanism more
suitable in dynamic environments.
2. An integrative self-organisation mechanism
Current studies on self-organisation considered only a single principle of selforganisation. An integrative self-organisation mechanism is devised in this
thesis, which synthesises the three principles of self-organisation. Based on
this mechanism, an agent can autonomously generate new agents when it
is overloaded, exchange resources with other agents if necessary, and adapt

1.4. Research Concerns and Contributions of This Thesis

16

relations with other agents to achieve a better agent network structure. In
this way, agents can adapt to dynamic environments.
3. A self-adaptation based dynamic coalition formation mechanism
The holonic self-organising MASs are not addressed in this thesis, but its related research field, namely dynamic coalition formation, is investigated. A selfadaptation based dynamic coalition formation mechanism is then developed.
The mechanism operates in a neighbourhood agent network, whereas most related work did not consider such a neighbourhood structure but assumed that
any agent can directly interact with all other agents in the network. Based
on the self-adaptation principles, this mechanism enables agents to dynamically adjust their degrees of involvement in multiple coalitions and to join
new coalitions at any time. The self-adaptation process, i.e., agents adjusting
their degrees of involvement in multiple coalitions, is realised by exploiting a
negotiation protocol.
4. A self-organisation based strategy for the evolution of cooperation
The notion of self-organisation is also employed to handle a traditional research topic, i.e, evolution of cooperation. In this thesis, the study on the
evolution of cooperation is done in distributed networks. Currently, many
researchers have developed strategies for the evolution of cooperation in distributed networks in order to increase the proportion of cooperators. However,
experimental results, reported in current literature, demonstrated that each of
these strategies has advantages and disadvantages. Against this background,
in this thesis, a self-organisation based strategy is presented for the evolution
of cooperation in distributed networks, which can utilise the strengths and
avoid the limitations of current strategies. Moreover, we theoretically find a
phenomenon that is, in static networks, the final proportion of cooperators
evolved by any deterministic strategies fluctuates cyclically irrespective of the
initial proportion of cooperators.
5. A self-organisation mechanism for packet routing in Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs)
Part of the aforementioned theoretical work is employed in WSNs. One of the
fundamental issues in WSNs is packet routing, because in many application
domains, packets have to be routed from source nodes to destination nodes as
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soon and energy efficient as possible. To address this issue, a large number of
routing approaches have been proposed. Although every current routing approach has advantages, it is inevitable that they will have some disadvantages.
Against this background, in this thesis, a self-organisation mechanism is proposed, which can assist current routing approaches to improve their routing
performance. This mechanism enables each sensor node to build a cooperation
neighbour set based on past routing experience, and such cooperation neighbours in turn can help the sensor to effectively relay packets in the future.
In addition, this self-organisation mechanism is independent of current routing approaches, so it can be used to incorporate with many current routing
approaches.

1.5

The Structure of The Thesis

This thesis starts with an overview of the general concepts of self-organisation and
MASs, and then introduces self-organising MASs and their applications. The remaining chapters of this thesis are organised as follows.
Chapter 2 reviews current related studies on self-organisation, coalition formation, evolution of cooperation, and packet routing in wireless sensor networks, which
are the research concerns of this thesis.
Chapter 3 introduces an integrative self-organisation mechanism. This mechanism integrates the three principles of self-organisation, i.e., relation adaptation,
resource exchange and cloning/spawning. In addition, for relation adaptation, three
components are incorporated, which can overcome the drawbacks of current mechanisms.
Chapter 4 presents a self-adaptation based dynamic coalition formation mechanism. This mechanism does not only enable agents to join multiple coalitions, but
also allow agents to adjust their degrees of involvement in different coalitions and
join new coalitions.
Chapter 5 proposes a self-organisation based strategy for evolution of cooperation. This strategy embodies current developed strategies as agents’ knowledge,
and then at each round, each agent can autonomously select a strategy from its
knowledge base to play with its neighbours. Moreover, a theoretical finding is also
given, which is about the final proportion of cooperators derived by deterministic
strategies.
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Chapter 6 describes a self-organisation mechanism for packet routing in WSNs.
This mechanism is an assistant tool and is independent of current routing approaches. Therefore, it can be used to enhance many current routing approaches.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis, with a summary of the advantages and limitations of this study, and presents the future work.

Chapter 2
Literature Review
As introduced in Chapter 1, there are five research concerns in this thesis, which
are a relation adaptation mechanism, an integrative self-organisation mechanism,
a self-adaptation based dynamic coalition formation mechanism, a self-organisation
based strategy for the evolution of cooperation, and a self-organisation mechanism
for packet routing in wireless sensor networks. In this chapter, the related research
work regarding the five research concerns is reviewed in detail.

2.1

Self-organisation Mechanisms in Multi-Agent
Systems

In Chapter 1, it was stated that a self-organising system should include the following three principles [MRS02], which are cloning/spawning, resource exchange
and relation adaptation. In this section, related studies about each principle are
reviewed.

2.1.1

Related work on cloning/spawning

The research about generating new agents usually includes two aspects. One is
cloning and the other is spawning. The difference between the two aspects is that
for cloning, the cloned agents are perfect replicas of the original agents and fulfill
the same roles and responsibilities as the original agents, while for spawning, the
spawned agents can be considered apprentices of the original agents and are specialised for some specific tasks. There are some studies focusing on each of the two
aspects.
1. Cloning
19
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Decker et al. [DSW96] developed a multi-agent financial management system,
in which agents can adapt at organisational, planning, scheduling and execution levels. Specifically, their work focused on agent cloning for executiontime adaptation towards load-balancing, when an agent recognises, via selfreflection, that it is becoming overloaded. Shehory et al. [SSCJ98] proposed
an agent cloning mechanism, which subsumes task transfer and agent mobility. To perform cloning, an agent has to reason about its current and future
load and its hosts load, as well as capabilities and loads of other machines and
agents. Then, the agent may decide to create a clone or transfer tasks to other
agents or migrate to another host.
2. Spawning
In [IGY92], Ishida et al. studied organisational self-design as an adaptive
approach to work allocation and load-balancing. Their approach allows two
agents to compose to one agent if these two agents are idle, and allows one
agent to decompose to two agents if that agent is overloaded. Kamboj and
Decker [KD07] extended Ishida et al.s work by including worth-oriented domains, modeling other resources in addition to only processor resources and
incorporating robustness into the organisational structures. Later, Kamboj
[Kam09] analysed the tradeoffs between cloning and spawning in the context
of organisational self-design and found that it could generate more suitable
organisations to combine both cloning and spawning aspects compared with
those mechanisms, which use only a single approach.

2.1.2

Related work on resource exchange

There are very few studies directly focusing on resource exchange. The most related
work we could find is that in [RMS01], Routier et al. depicted how to use a programming language, e.g., Java, to realise resource exchange between two agents. Their
work, however, did not provide a definite approach for efficiently exchanging resources among agents in a multiagent environment. Nevertheless, a related research
field, resource allocation, has attracted many researchers. Fatima and Wooldridge
[FW01] presented an adaptive organisational approach called TRACE for MASs.
The resource allocation protocol in their approach is used to dynamically change
the allocation of resources in the organisation so as to balance the resource distribution. Schlegel and Kowalczyk [SK07] devised a distributed algorithm to solve the
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resource allocation problem in distributed MASs based on self-organisation of the
resource consumers. In their algorithm, each resource consumer has several predictors to predict the resource consumption of each server, and uses this predictive
result to allocate tasks to servers. Then, based on servers feedback, each resource
consumer evaluates the performance of its predictors and adjusts its predictors against each server. Zhang et al. [ZLS09] proposed a multi-agent learning algorithm
for optimising online resource allocation in cluster networks. The learning is based
on heuristic strategies and is divided into two problems, namely a local allocation
problem and a routing problem. In addition, the learning is distributed to each
cluster, which uses only local information to finish the learning process. An et al.
[ALIZ] developed a resource allocation algorithm in a dynamic environment based
on automated and distributed negotiation. The approach developed by An et al. enables resource providers and consumers to automatically and dynamically negotiate
resource leasing contracts, each of which includes a contract price and a decommitment penalty. It should be noted that not every resource allocation approach can
be used for resource exchange in this research, because (i) some resource allocation
approaches focused on selfish agents while this research concentrates on cooperative
agents; (ii) some approaches, in fact, dealt with the resource leasing problem where
the consumer will return the resource to the provider once the consumer finishes
using the resource, while in this research, after a resource is transfered from an agent to another agent, the latter does not necessarily give the resource back to the
former. For example, the work done by An et al. is not suitable for the resource
exchange problem in this research, as they focused on resource leasing among selfish
agents.

2.1.3

Related work on relation adaptation

Relation adaptation, also known as agent network structure adaptation, has been
thoroughly researched as well. Gaston and desJardins [Gd05] developed two network
structural adaptation strategies for dynamic team formation. Their first strategy is
a structure based approach, where an agent prefers to select another agent to form a
connection, which has more neighbors. Their second strategy is a performance-based
approach, where an agent prefers to form a connection with the agent who has better
performance. The two strategies are suitable in different situations. Glinton et al.
[GSS08] empirically analysed the drawback of the structure based strategy proposed
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in [Gd05], and then designed a new network adaptation strategy, which limits the
maximum number of links that an agent can have. Abdallah and Lesser [AL07] did
further research in self-organization of agent networks and creatively used reinforcement learning to adapt the network structure. Their method enables agents to not
only adapt the underlying network structure during the learning process but also
use information from learning to guide the adaptation process. Griffiths and Luck
[GL10] presented a tag-based mechanism for supporting cooperation in the presence of cheaters by enabling individual agents to change their neighborhoods. Their
mechanism is very suitable in some special dynamic environments where trust or
reputation among agents is difficult to build up. However, these network structural
adaptation methods, proposed in [Gd05, AL07, GSS08, GL10], assumed that only
one type of relation exists in the network and the number of neighbors possessed
by an agent has no effect on its local load. These assumptions are impractical in
some cases where multiple relations exist among agents in a network and agents
have to expend resources to manage their relations with other agents. To overcome
this disadvantage, Kota et al. [KGJ09, KGJ10] devised a network structural adaptation mechanism, which took multiple relations and relation management load into
account. The relation adaptation algorithm adopted in their mechanism lets agents
take actions, which can maximise the utility at each step. Nevertheless, as stated
by Kaelbling et al. [KLM96], these algorithms, which always take the highest utility
action, overlook the tradeoff between exploitation and exploration and may finally
converge to a sub-optimal state. Furthermore, Kota et al.’s mechanism is somewhat
biased from the agent, which initialises the relation adaptation process, towards the
agent, which is requested to adapt a relation, as the initialising agent evaluates most
attributes of the reward of changing a relation. This bias might cause agents to be
a little subjective when making decisions.
According to the above review, it can be found that many studies have been
done on each of the three self-organisation principles. In this thesis, an integrative
self-organisation mechanism is proposed in Chapter 3, which combines the three
principles together in order to achieve better performance compared with the current related research, which considered only a single principle. Particularly, in this
mechanism, a composite relation adaptation mechanism is developed, which consists
of a trust model, a multi-agent Q-learning algorithm and weighted relations.

2.2. Coalition Formation in Multi-Agent Systems

2.2

23

Coalition Formation in Multi-Agent Systems

Coalition formation has attracted many researchers’ attention and thus, there are a
large number of published prominent studies. We first classify these studies into four
categories according to the primary emphasis of each related work and then present
a review for each category. It should be noted that the coalition formation problem
is not concerned with how agents in a coalition cooperate to actually execute the
assigned task. Instead, the problem is concerned with how agents can efficiently
form coalitions for complex tasks. Such collaboration with regard to actually executing assigned tasks can be achieved by other complementing frameworks such as
teamwork [Tam97]. It should be noted that although some studies used the two
terms, “team” and “coalition”, interchangeably, e.g., [Gd05], the two terms have
different meanings [HL05]. According to Horling and Lesser’s definitions [HL05], a
“coalition” is goal-directed and short-lived, while a “team” indicates a long-term
collaboration among agents. A coalition is formed with a purpose in mind and is
dissolved when the purpose no longer exists. A team is usually formed in a longterm to complete a set of tasks. In comparison with a coalition, a team attempts to
maximise the utility of the team itself, rather than that of the individual members
[HL05]. In this thesis, we use the term “coalition” instead of “team”, because the
issue we address in this thesis is how to efficiently form a group to complete a task.
When the task is completed, the group for this task no longer necessarily exists and
the agents, which constitute the group, are freed. Thus, the term “coalition” is more
suitable for our problem than the term “team”.

2.2.1

Coalition structure generation

Coalition structure generation is the main research stream of coalition formation.
Its purpose is that “given a characteristic function that assigns a coalition value
to every possible coalition (i.e., subset of agents), the coalition structure generation
problem involves finding a coalition structure (i.e., a collection of pair-wise disjoint
coalitions whose union yields the entire set of agents) that is optimal (i.e., in which
the sum of coalition values is maximised)” [MSR+ 10].
In [SL97], Sandholm and Lesser analysed coalitions among self-interested agents
and extended the normative approach of game theory, where agents had perfect rationality, e.g., flawless and costless deduction, to new settings, where agents lacked
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the full rationality. They assumed that agents could not enumerate or evaluate all
alternative solutions to a coalition’s optimisation problem due to computational limits. Later, Sandholm et al. [SLA+ 99] presented an algorithm for coalition structure
generation, which could guarantee to reach a coalition structure with nearly the
optimal quality. As the assumption in [SL97], Sandholm et al., in [SLA+ 99], also
assumed that there were too many coalition structures to enumerate and evaluate
due to computation and time limits, so agents had to select a subset of coalition
structures, on which to focus their search.
Caillou et al. [CAP02] presented a coalition formation method for MASs, which
could find a Pareto optimal solution without aggregating the preferences of the
agents. The advantage of their method is that it does not need an agreement
among agents on a common utility function. They then extended their method by
enabling dynamically restructuring coalitions when changes occurred in the system.
Their restructuring method can employ information obtained from previous coalition
formation processes and thus does not need to recompute all calculations once a
condition changes. Hence, the computational complexity can be reduced.
Soh and Li [SL03] developed an integrated multi-level approach for multi-agent
coalition formation in a dynamic, real-time, uncertain, and noisy environment, which
was a typical real-world environment. Their approach contains two stages, i.e.,
initialisation stage and finalisation stage. In the initialisation stage, an initiating
agent discovers candidates of coalition members, while in the finalisation stage, the
initiating agent negotiates with these candidates to determine whether they are
willing to help. Moreover, in their approach, reinforcement learning and case based
reasoning are used in both the tactical level and strategical level.
Rahwan et al. [RRGJ09] developed an anytime algorithm for coalition structure
generation. Their algorithm uses a novel representation of the search space, which
partitions the space of possible solutions into sub-spaces based on the sizes of the
coalitions they contain. Thus, their algorithm is possible to compute upper and lower
bounds on the values of the best coalition structures in these possible solutions. They
also proved that their algorithm could enumerate all possible coalition structures
efficiently by avoiding redundant and invalid solutions automatically.
Michalak et al. [MSR+ 10] advanced the state of the art by developing the first
decentralised algorithm for solving the coalition structure generation problem optimally1 , which distributed the necessary calculations among the agents. Specifically,
1

Although Shehory and Kraus’s algorithm [SK98] is also decentralised, it provides no guarantees
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Michalak et al.’s algorithm is built upon other two famous algorithms, where one
is for distributing the coalition value calculations among the agents [RJ07] and the
other is for dividing coalition structures into sub-spaces [RRGJ09].

2.2.2

Payoff distribution and stability of coalitions

Having determined which coalitions should be formed, it is also important to determine how to distribute the rewards to each agent in order for the coalitions to be
stable. Here, stability refers to a state, in which once a solution is found, agents have
no incentive to deviate from the coalitions to which they belong (or little incentive
in weaker types of stability) [SK99]. Many years ago, the stability problem within
game theory was researched by Shapley [Sha53, Sha67, Sha71], and Shapley’s work
had become the fundamental of current research on stable profit distribution among
coalition members.
Shehory and Kraus [SK99] developed two algorithms for coalition formation and
payoff distribution in non-superadditive environments. Their first algorithm is a
computation-oriented approach, which leads to the formation of stable coalitions and
to the maximisation of the individual payoffs of the agents. Their second algorithm
is a negotiation-oriented approach, which leads to stability of the coalitions and
efficiency of the coalition formation process, and it is also an anytime algorithm.
Tohme and Sandholm [TS99] analysed the problem of coalition formation in
games with belief revision and without sidepayments. In addition, they found that
(1) a solution is in the α-core [Aum61] if an individual utility can not be improved
without diminishing the utility of another agent; (2) any solution, which is stable
according to the α-core, corresponds to a Strong Nash equilibrium. These two
findings provided a guidance for future related research. Here, a core refers to a set
of coalition structures, which satisfy the condition that no agents are motivated to
break off the current coalitions and to form a new coalition [Aum61].
Kraus et al. [KST04] presented three strategies for revenue distributions among
coalition members, which are equal distribution, proportional distribution and kernel
distribution. Their study creatively considered that agents may compromise and
agree to a payoff, which is lower than their estimated equal share. In addition, they
experimentally proved that the compromise strategy is stable and can increase the
social welfare compared to non-compromise strategies.
on finding an optimal coalition structure.
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In addition to the above crisp coalitions, where each agent is a full member of
exactly one coalition, several studies are based on fuzzy or overlapping coalitions,
where each agent can participate in multiple coalitions with varying participation
levels.
Mares [Mar00] presented a model of coalition game allowing to derive the vagueness of the coalitional cooperativity and to derive the possibilities of the appearance
of particular coalitions from the vagueness of the expected pay-offs. In Mares’ model, the fuzziness mainly reflects the vague expectation of achievable pay-offs. Mares
then studied the effectivity and stability of coalitions formed under such a vague
circumstance, and found that the fuzzy core of a fuzzy coalition game is also with
some degree of uncertainty.
Sheremetov and Cortes [SC03] extended Mares’ model by including the fuzzy
individual payments and the binary values in the fuzzy core to form the structure
of effective coalitions. According to this extension, the fuzzy core, yielded in their
model, automatically involves the effectivity component and their model can avoid
side payments. They then used genetic algorithms to derive the solution of the fuzzy
coalition game, and applied the model to the context of supply chain networks.
Blankenburg et al. [BHKJ06] described an approach to the risk-bounded fuzzy
coalition formation. A significant aspect of their approach is that the agents can
control and bound the risk caused by the possible failure or default of some partner
agents by spreading their involvement in diverse coalitions. They first studied the
risk of fuzzy coalition structures based on the assumption that agents are able to
assess other agent’s risk of failure in a coalition. Then, they also investigated the
stability of fuzzy coalition structures by considering the non-linear relationship of
the membership and coalition values.
Chalkiadakis et al.’s work [CEM+ 10] was the first one that introduced a model for
cooperative games with overlapping coalitions. They then studied in depth the issue
of stability of coalitions by introducing a notion of the core, which generalised the
corresponding notion in a non-overlapping scenario. Specifically, authors gave three
different definitions of the core, i.e., conservative, refined and optimistic, which are
substantially different from each other about the characterisation of these definitions
and about the computational complexity of these definitions. In addition, the three
definitions span a wide range of beliefs that the deviators may hold about payoffs
from coalitions with non-deviators.
Based on Chalkiadakis et al.’s work [CEM+ 10], Zick and Elkind [ZE11] proposed
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a unified framework for the study of stability in an overlapping coalition formation
setting. Their framework not only encompasses the concepts of the core described
in [CEM+ 10], but also contains a wide variety of alternative stability concepts by
introducing the notion of an arbitrator, which is an external party and determines
payoff to deviators.
Fuzzy coalition formation is similar to overlapping coalition formation, as both
handle the issue that agents can join multiple coalitions with different participation levels (or degrees of involvement). However, based on Chalkiadakis et al.’s
description in [CEM+ 10], there are two main differences between them. First, in
overlapping coalition formation, an outcome is an (overlapping) coalition structure
together with a list of payoff vectors, while in fuzzy coalition formation, the only
allowable outcome is the formation of the grand coalition. Second, an outcome of
an overlapping coalition formation core needs to be stable against any deviation
of a set to a (possibly overlapping) coalition structure, whereas in fuzzy coalition
formation, outcomes need only be stable against a deviation to a partial (“fuzzy”)
coalition, but need not be necessarily against deviations to a coalition structure.

2.2.3

Complexity analysis

Complexity is an important property of an algorithm, and many researchers analysed the complexity of their algorithms after they developed them. The following
studies are those, which concentrated on analysing the complexity of the proposed
algorithms or the complexity of the existing decision problems.
Shehory and Kraus [SK95] devised two algorithms, i.e., a computation-oriented
algorithm and a communication-oriented algorithm, for coalition formation and payoff distribution in a superadditive environment. They then analysed the complexity of computation and the complexity of communication of each algorithm. The
computation-oriented algorithm is best used in instances, where communication is
expensive. If the calculation is stopped in the middle, the computation-oriented algorithm will not lead to any formed coalitions. On the contrary, the communicationoriented algorithm can distribute computation to different agents and thus it is best
for instances where computation is expensive. If the calculation is halted in the
middle, the communication-oriented algorithm can still provide agents with a set of
formed coalitions.
Wooldridge and Dunne [WD04] studied qualitative coalitional games, where each
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agent was assumed to have a goal to be achieved and each coalition was a set of
choices, each of which denoted a set of goals. They systematically formulated fourteen natural decision problems, such as the problem that whether a feasible choice
is available to the coalition that will satisfy all its members. They then determined
the computational complexity of these fourteen problems. Later, Wooldridge and
Dunne [WD06] investigated a variation of qualitative coalitional games, i.e., coalitional resource games, where each agent has a set of resources and the ability of
a coalition to a set of goals depending on whether the coalition has necessary resources. Again, they analysed the computational complexity of ten natural decision
problems for coalitional resource games, e.g., whether conflict is inevitable between
two coalitions with respect to some stated resource bound. In addition, they studied the relationships between coalitional resource games and qualitative coalitional
games, and the possibility of translation between the two types of games. Based on
the studies in [WD04] and [WD06], Dunne et al. [DKMW10] first investigated the
complexity of several questions in coalitional resource games, such as determining
the non-emptiness of the core, and then provided a negotiation protocol to construct
solutions for coalitional resource games. The solutions, created by the negotiation
protocol, can satisfy several desirable properties.
Conitzer and Sandholm [CS06] defined a representation for coalitional games in
a characteristic form in a superadditive environment. This representation enables
efficient checking of whether a given outcome is in the core, i.e., whether a set of
solutions is stable. In addition, they proved that it is a NP-complete problem to
determine whether the core is nonempty. They also analysed that how to determine
the collaborative possibilities is a difficult problem.
Recently, several researchers attempted to impose some constrains on the input elements of algorithms when analysing their complexity, and found that some
previously hard problems became polynomial.
Shrot et al. [SAK09] demonstrated that when the number of goals and the
combination of the number of agents and resources are bounded in coalitional games,
an efficient algorithm for coalition formation can be obtained. However, if only the
number of resources is bounded, the problem is still hard. Likewise, in [SAK10],
Shrot et al. assumed that while the number of agents grows, the number of different
types of agents remains small. Based on this assumption, they showed that most of
the previously hard problems became polynomial, e.g., stability, core emptiness and
Shapley value.
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Aziz and Keijzer [AdK11] restricted some input elements of coalition formation
algorithms. They first devised a general polynomial-time algorithm to solve the
problem for all coalitional games based on the assumption that agent types were
known and the number of agent types was bounded by a constant. In addition,
they also developed a general polynomial-time algorithm for coalition formation in
weighted voting games with a constant number of weight values and in coalitional
skill games with a constant number of skills.

2.2.4

Within explicitly modeled task allocation protocol

Several coalition formation mechanisms were provided based on an explicitly modeled task allocation protocol or focused on some specific application domains. The
essence of designing such a kind of coalition formation mechanisms is the same as
that of those general coalition formation mechanisms. However, due to considering
specific task allocation protocols or application domains, there are several constraints
when devising such a kind of coalition formation mechanisms, and these constraints
usually make the designing tasks very difficult.
Shehory and Kraus [SSCJ98] presented distributed coalition formation algorithms to the problem of task allocation among autonomous agents. Their algorithms have low ratio bounds and low computational complexities. In addition, they
took into account both overlapping and non-overlapping coalitions, and proceeded
with a discussion of the domain where tasks had a precedence order.
Kraus et al. [KST03] developed a coalition formation protocol, which enables
agents to negotiate and form coalitions. The protocol also provides agents with
simple heuristics for choosing coalition partners. The agents are situated in an
environment where time is constrained and the information is incomplete with regard
to other agents’ costs to perform a task.
Sims et al. [SGL03] modeled a vehicle-tracking sensor network by using disjoint
coalitions formed via a negotiation process. In particular, the coalition formation
process uses negotiation iteratively to enable managers of coalitions to refine the
set of coalitions in the system to achieve efficient allocations of sensors and adapt
dynamically to environmental changes.
Abdallah and Lesser [AL04] presented a distributed algorithm for coalition formation, which could return a solution in polynomial time. Specifically, they first
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organised an agent network in a hierarchical structure with clusters, and then assigned a manager to each cluster. A manager has relatively full knowledge of its
corresponding cluster, and it can use the knowledge to form coalitions for tasks. In
addition, as the algorithm is based on learning, managers can work more efficiently when they gain more experience. Therefore, the overall quality of a returned
solution can be increased as agents gain more and more experience.
Dang et al. [DDRJ06] developed two algorithms for overlapping coalition formation within multi-sensor networks, which aimed at performing wide-area surveillance.
One algorithm is in polynomial time, which has a calculated bound to the optimum,
and the other algorithm is an optimal branch-and-bound method, which uses a novel
pruning procedure in order to reduce the required number of searches.
Manisterski et al. [MDKJ06] produced algorithms for a task allocation problem,
which had to be solved by a group of agents. Their work was the first to consider
both cooperative and non-cooperative settings. They proved that a solution, which
is efficient in a cooperative setting, is usually not applicable in a non-cooperative
setting. They also proved that, in a non-cooperative setting, no general protocol
exists for their problem to achieve an efficient solution.
Ramchurn et al. [RPF+ 10] designed a Mixed Integer Program to optimally solve
small-scale instances of the coalition formation problem with spatial and temporal
constraints. They also developed new anytime heuristics, which could achieve very
good results for large problems. Their work can be employed in many real world
applications, such as coordination of emergency responders in major disasters and
surveillance and patrolling of wide geographical areas.
In addition to the above theoretical studies, coalition formation has also been
widely employed in several industrial applications. Three examples are given as
follows. Saad et al. [SHB+ 11] used a coalition formation game to model wireless
agents collecting data from arbitrarily located sources and transmitting the data to
a central receiver. Khan et al. [KGDL11] utilised a dynamic coalition formation
game, based on a Markovian model, to tackle the spectrum sharing problem in an
interference channel. Liang and Xiao [LX10] studied coalition formation in a group
of three robots that detect and capture intrusions in a closed curve loop.
After reviewing the current related studies, we surprisingly found that most of
the studies did not consider underlying network structures existing among agents.
However, in some real world situations, e.g., supply chains and sensor networks, due
to communication or computation constrains, it is infeasible for agents to directly
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interact with all other agents to form coalitions. Thus, it is necessary to impose a
neighbourhood network structure between agents, where an agent can directly interact only with its neighbours. In addition, due to the lack of underlying network
structures, most of the aforementioned studies are operated in a centralised manner,
including the fuzzy and overlapping coalition formation studies. Apparently, using
centralised manner can limit their application in distributed environments. The
studies, which did consider the agent network structures for coalition formation, include [Gd05, Gd08, BGd07, GSS08]. In [Gd05] and [Gd08], Gaston and desJardins
originally studied the effect of network structures for agents coalition formation
and showed that the network structure did have a significant impact on the performance of coalitions formed among agents. In addition, they also developed network
adaptation mechanisms for discovering effective network structures. Later, based
on Gaston and desJardin’s studies, Glinton et al. [GSS08] did further research and
observed that organisational performance was not affected by limiting the number
of neighbours of each agent. This observation implied that bandwidth was wasted
by Gaston and desJardins’ approaches, because the communication overhead would
become very heavy when each agent had many neighbours and such communication had to consume bandwidth. However, in these studies [Gd05, Gd08, GSS08],
an agent can join only one coalition and once a coalition is formed for a task, the
coalition is fixed and agents cannot leave the coalition before the task is finished.
Bulka et al. [BGd07] presented a learning algorithm for agents making decisions
with regard to initiating and joining teams. The aim of Bulka et al.’s research was
to provide an effective and efficient strategy for agents team formation based on
Gaston and desJardin’s agent network model. Nevertheless, Bulka et al.’s work still
has the same limitations as those studies in [Gd05, Gd08, GSS08].
In this thesis, a self-adaptation dynamic coalition formation mechanism is developed in Chapter 4, which can overcome the limitations of the above mechanisms or
approaches .

2.3

Evolution of Cooperation

The evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals is a fundamental issue in
a number of disciplines, such as artificial intelligence [HCS11], physics [GWW07,
SP11], biology [Ham64, AH81], sociology [WM00, FF03] and economics [KR95]. It
has also been employed in industrial applications. For example, Wang and Nakao
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[WN10] used the evolution of cooperation to drive an overlay network structure to
a given topology; Lin et al. [LXV+ 11] adopted the evolution of cooperation for
data-aggregation in wireless sensor networks.
Theoretically, it is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection
favours defectors over cooperators [Daw80]. However, in the real-world, who-meetswhom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks
[HCM94, AK01, SV04, LHN05]. Recently, there has been much interest in studying
the evolution of cooperation in structured populations or on graphs [NM92, NMI97,
IKD04, SP05]. In these studies, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game is the leading
metaphor for the evolution of cooperation in populations of selfish players, especially
since Axelrod’s well known computer tournaments [Axe84]. In each round, two
players engaged in an iterated PD game have to choose their behaviours between
cooperation and defection. If both cooperate, both earn as payoff a Reward R, which
is larger than the payoff P , the Punishment that they receive if they both defect.
However, if one player opts for defection and the other for cooperation, the defector
receives a payoff T (the Temptation), which is larger than R, while the cooperator’s
payoff S (for Sucker ) is even smaller than P . It is often furthermore assumed that
the two players earn more if both cooperate than if they choose different options and
then share the total payoff, which implies that 2R > T + S. Thus, in a single round,
it is always the best option to defect, but in an iterated PD game, cooperation may
be a better choice [NM92].
Currently, several strategies have been proposed towards increasing the proportion of cooperators in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The most famous
strategy is the Tit-For-Tat (T F T ) [AH81], where each player cooperates in the first
round and then adopts the behaviour used by its opponent in the former round. A
T F T player concurs with cooperators and retaliates against defectors, but a T F T
player also forgives those defectors that switch to be cooperators. Thus, although
T F T is quite simple, it does encourage cooperation among players. However, T F T
suffers from a stochastic perturbation, namely that occasional mistakes between two T F T players cause long runs of mutual retaliation. In order to overcome this
drawback of T F T , two revised versions of T F T were developed, which are Tit-ForTwo-Tats (T F 2T ) [AD88] and Generous TFT (GT F T ) [NS92]. A T F 2T player
allows two consecutive defections before retaliating. A GT F T player chooses cooperation after an opponent’s cooperation but still uses cooperation, with a certain probability, after an opponent’s defection. Later, Nowak and Sigmund [MS93]
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claimed that their strategy, Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (W SLS), outperformed T F T in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. A W SLS player maintains its action (which is cooperation or defection), only if its current payoff is at least as high as in the former
round. Frean [Fre94] devised a strategy called Firm But Fair (FBF ). A FBF player
is ‘firm’ in that it retaliates by defecting if it was a sucker in the previous round.
A FBF player is also ‘fair’ in that it does not retaliate against a defector if it defected in the previous round as well, and it cooperates with suckers rather than
continues to exploit them. In [NM92], Nowak and May presented a strategy, called
Imitate-Best-Neighbour (IBN ), where each player imitates the action of the player
(including itself), which achieves the most payoff in the former round. Another strategy, devised by Tang et al. [TWWW06], is that in each round, a player selects
a neighbour, based on the “degree” of each neighbour, and then probabilistically adopts the selected neighbour’s action, based on the payoff difference between
itself and the selected neighbour. Here, the term “degree” means the number of
neighbours of a player. Santos et al.’s strategy [SPL06] is similar to Tang et al’s
strategy. In Santos et al.’s strategy, named Stochastic Imitate-Random-Neighbour
(StIRN ), in each round, a player randomly selects a neighbour. The player imitates
the selected neighbour’s action, with a probability based on their payoff difference,
only if, in the former round, the payoff of the selected neighbour is greater than
the player’s payoff. Recently, Hofmann et al. [HCS11] developed a strategy, named
Imitate-Best-Strategy (IBS), where each player sums the payoffs of all cooperating
neighbours and the payoffs of all defecting neighbours (including itself) in the former
round, and copies the action, which achieves the greater total payoff. Hofmann et
al. also experimentally studied some of the current strategies in the simultaneous
PD game, and analysed their advantages and limitations. Based on Hofmann et al.’s
analysis, it can be found that the results of evolution of cooperation, i.e., the final
proportions of cooperators, derived by different strategies depend heavily on the
initial proportion of cooperators and the network type. For example, the strategy
IBS can increase the proportion of cooperators only when the initial proportion of
cooperators is greater than 0.6; the strategy W SLS can augment the proportion of
cooperators only when the initial proportion of cooperators is less than 0.5; Santos et
al.’s strategy can advance the proportion of cooperators only in a scale-free network.
These dependency relationships can limit the applicability of these strategies.
In order to overcome these dependency relationships of current strategies, in this
thesis, a self-organisation based strategy is proposed in Chapter 5, which aims to
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provide a good result for the evolution of cooperation and can be independent of
the initial proportion of cooperators, the variety of the PD game, and the network
type.

2.4

Packet Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks

In addition to theoretical study, a part of the theoretical study results is employed
to solve a real-world problem. In this thesis, the integrative self-organisation mechanism, described in Chapter 3, is used to address the packet routing issue in WSNs,
which is a very suitable and important application domain of self-organisation. As
the routing issue is one of the most significant issues in WSNs, there are a large
number of published prominent studies, which focused on this issue. Akkaya and
Younis [AY05], and Al-Karaki and Kamal [Kam04] provided a thorough survey on
routing approaches nearly at the same time. In this section, our review mainly focuses on the routing approaches developed after their survey papers were published.
Based on the work in [Kam04, AY05], almost all of the routing approaches can be
classified into three major categories, i.e., flat routing approaches, hierarchical routing approaches and location-based (also known as geographic) routing approaches,
although there are few exceptional ones based on network flow or Quality of Services
(QoS) awareness.

2.4.1

Flat routing approaches

The first category of routing approaches is multi-hop flat routing. In such routing approaches, each sensor node typically plays the same role and sensor nodes
collaborate to perform sensing tasks.
Flooding and gossiping [HL88] are two classical approaches to relay packets in
sensor networks without the need for any routing algorithms and topology maintenance. In flooding, each sensor, which receives a packet, broadcasts the packet
to all of its neighbours and this process continues until the packet arrives at the
destination or the maximum number of hops for the packet is reached. On the other
hand, gossiping is a slightly enhanced version of flooding where the receiving node
sends the packet to a randomly selected neighbour, which picks another random
neighbour to forward the packet to and so on, until the destination or the maximum
hop is reached.
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Heinzelman et al. [HKB99, KHB02] proposed a family of adaptive protocols,
called Sensor Protocols for Information via Negotiation (SPIN). The SPIN family is
designed to address the deficiencies of classical routing approaches, such as flooding
and gossiping, which waste much energy and bandwidth when sending extra and
unnecessary copies of packets by sensors that cover overlapping areas. SPIN consists
of three steps. First, when a sensor has a data packet to transfer, it broadcasts a
meta data of the data packet to its neighbours. The size of the meta packets is much
smaller than that of the data packet. Then, if any neighbours are interested in the
data packet, they will send back a request message to the sensor. Once the sensor
receives the request message, it will transfer the data packet to those neighbours,
which are interested in that packet.
Chang and Tassiulas [CT04] designed a shortest cost path routing algorithm,
which uses link costs that reflect both the communication energy consumption rates
and the residual energy levels between the two end nodes. Their algorithm takes
the energy consumption at the receivers during reception into consideration, which
is overlooked in previous work. As a result, the network lifetime derived by their
algorithm is very close to the optimal network lifetime obtained by solving the linear
programming problem. Later, Gatzianas and Georgiadis [GG08] studied the maximum lifetime routing in WSNs by taking mobile sinks into account, which received
less attention in current literature. By introducing mobile sinks, the network lifetime can be further increased, since the energy consumption on those sensor nodes,
which are close to the sinks and frequently work as relay nodes, can be reduced due
to sinks changing positions.
Rogers et al. [RDJ05] devised an energy-aware self-organised routing algorithm
for WSNs. Their algorithm enables individual sensors to follow locally selfish strategies, which, in turn, result in a self-organisation of a routing network with desirable
global properties. In addition, the algorithm can adaptively deal with the changing
sensor numbers and network topology.
Huang et al. [HZF08] developed a distributed robust routing protocol in mobile WSNs, where sensors work cooperatively to enhance the robustness of routing against path breakage. Their research actually focused on how sensors could
cooperatively prevent an established path from breaking between a source and a
destination. In addition, their protocol requires the WSNs to be densely deployed
to guarantee that each sensor has sufficient neighbours.
Heo et al. [HHC09] proposed an energy aware routing protocol for wireless
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industrial sensor networks. Under their protocol, sensors can estimate the expected
values of the energy cost, delay and reliability of a path to the the sink node. These
values are acquired from only neighbouring nodes. Based on these values, sensors
select a path that requires low energy, low delay and high reliability for packets
transmission.
To solve the unreachability problem, i.e., void problem, resulting from greedy
routing algorithms, Liu and Feng [LF09] presented a three-dimensional greedy antivoid routing protocol to solve the 3D void problem by exploiting the boundary
finding technique for a unit ball graph. Their protocol can guarantee the delivery
of packets from the source to the destination.
Beraldi et al. [BBP10] studied the lowest latency path problem and then devised
a forwarding protocol based on biased random walks, where sensors use only local
information about their neighbours and their next active period to make forwarding decisions. Specifically, their protocol, i.e., lukewarm potato, is a compromise
between the shortest path forwarding and hot potato forwarding. Hot potato forwarding is a greedy approach to fast propagation of a message toward the sink: a
node, on receiving a message, forwards the message to the neighbour that is the first
to become active.
Li et al. [LHF10] developed a routing algorithm for WSNs in home automation.
The algorithm uses a greedy forwarding method, based on the smallest Euclidean
distance, to minimise the number of hops for data packet transmission and thus
to conserve energy. The route can also be automatically adjusted by using an A*
heuristic algorithm, when unpredictable topological changes occur.
Mao et al. [MTX+ 11] proposed an energy-efficient opportunistic routing strategy. Their strategy can improve the network throughput by allowing sensors, which
overhear the transmission and are closer to the destination, to participate in forwarding packets, i.e., in a forwarder list, so as to minimise energy consumption,
packet loss ratio and average delivery delay.
Quang and Kim [QK12] devised a gradient routing algorithm, which uses twohop information for industrial WSNs to enhance real-time performance with energy
efficiency. The routing algorithm is based on the number of hops to the sink instead
of distance. Specifically, the routing algorithm applied the two-hop velocity-based
routing [LCS+ 09] to a gradient-based WSNs so as to reduce both energy consumption and end-to-end delay.
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Hierarchical routing approaches

Hierarchical or cluster-based routing approaches, originally proposed in wired networks, are well-known techniques with special advantages related to efficient communication. Thereby, the concept of hierarchical routing is also utilised to perform
energy-efficient routing in WSNs. In a hierarchical architecture, high energy sensors
can be used to process and transmit information, whereas low energy sensors can
be employed to perform sensing tasks in the proximity of the target. Hierarchical routing is mainly a two-layer routing approach, where one layer is composed of
cluster heads and the other layer consists of cluster members. Cluster members are
responsible for sensing tasks, while cluster heads are used to aggregate packets and
transmit the aggregated packets to the sink node. Since the size of aggregated packets is much less than that of raw packets, the energy consumption used on packets
transmission can be significantly reduced and thus, the overall network lifetime can
be prolonged.
The most famous hierarchical routing protocol is LEACH (Low Energy Adaptive
Clustering Hierarchy) [HCB00]. LEACH randomly selects a few sensor nodes as
cluster heads and rotates this role to evenly distribute the energy load among the
sensors in the network. In LEACH, cluster heads compress packets arriving from
cluster members, which belong to the respective clusters, and send aggregate packets
to a sink in order to reduce the amount of packets that must be transmitted to the
sink.
In [LR02], an enhancement over the LEACH protocol was proposed, i.e., PowerEfficient Gathering in Sensor Information Systems (PEGASIS). PEGASIS is a near
optimal chain-based protocol. The basic idea is that in order to extend network
lifetime, sensor nodes need to communicate only with their closest neighbours, and
these neighbours take turns in communicating with the sink. Unlike LEACH, PEGASIS avoids cluster formation and uses only one sensor node in a chain to transmit
the sink instead of multiple nodes.
Muruganathan et al. [MMBF05] developed a centralised and clustering-based
routing protocol named Based-Station Controlled Dynamic Clustering Protocol (BCDCP), which uses a high-energy base station to set up clusters and routing paths, to
perform randomised rotation of cluster heads, and to carry out other energy-intensive
tasks. In this manner, the energy dissipation can be evenly distributed among all
sensor nodes to improve overall network lifetime.
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The routing protocol proposed in [DGXC07] was designed for heterogeneous sensor networks. The protocol in [DGXC07] takes both security and efficiency issues
into account, whereas other routing protocols usually considers efficiency issue only. Thus, the protocol in [DGXC07] can defend typical attacks against the sensor
routing. The security schemes are executed by utilising powerful high-end sensors,
so this protocol is centralised in nature.
Yu et al. [YLM07] proposed a dynamic clustering and energy efficient routing
technique. Under their routing technique, each node estimates the number of active
nodes in a real-time manner and computes its optimal probability of becoming
a cluster head by monitoring the received signal power from its neighbours. In
addition, unlike LEACH where cluster heads can directly send packets to the sink
node, Yu et al.’s routing technique employed a multi-hop algorithm for packets
transmission from cluster heads to the sink node, which is necessary for large-scale
WSNs.
Tsai [Tsa07] presented a coverage-preserving routing protocol, which was a modified version of LEACH. The aim of his protocol is to preserve sensing coverage when
some sensor nodes are no longer available, e.g., energy used up, while most other
routing protocols do not take the sensing coverage issue into consideration. Tsai
considered that only increasing the lifetime of sensor nodes might not automatically
achieve a good sensing coverage. Thus, unlike LEACH, Tsai’s protocol considered
not only energy consumption but also sensing coverage when clusters were formed.
Valentini et al. [VAVA10] devised a non-donimated algorithm to improve a simple hybrid routing protocol (SHRP) [VOCA09] in choosing the best route towards
the sink node. Their algorithm allows simultaneous analysis of energy and latency related metrics to generate a Pareto-optimal solution, which has a better time
convergence and reliability than SHRP.
Mottola and Picco [MP11] developed an adaptive energy-aware routing protocol,
which was expressly designed for many-to-many communication, i.e., simultaneously
routing from multiple sources to multiple sinks. To increase network lifetime, their
protocol minimises the number of nodes involved in many-to-many routing and
balances forwarding load, reduces the amount of redundant information flowing in
the network, and decreases contention on the wireless medium and packet collisions.
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Location-based routing approaches

In this kind of routing (also known as geographic routing), sensor nodes are addressed in terms of their locations. The distance between neighbouring nodes can
be estimated on the basis of incoming signal strengths. Relative coordinates of
neighbouring nodes can be obtained by exchanging information between neighbours.
Alternatively, the location of sensor nodes may be achieved directly by communicating with a satellite using GPS if each node is equipped with a small low-power
GPS receiver.
GAF (Geographic Adaptive Fidelity) [XHE01] is an energy-aware location-based
routing algorithm designed primarily for mobile ad hoc networks, but may be applicable to WSNs as well. In GAF, the network area is first divided into fixed zones.
These zones then form a virtual grid. Inside each zone, nodes collaborate with
each other to play different roles, and each node uses its GPS-indicated location to
associate itself with a point in the virtual grid.
Yu et al.’s protocol [YEG01], i.e., GEAR (Geographic and Energy Aware Routing), uses energy-aware and geographically informed neighbour selection heuristics
to route a packet toward the destination region. The key idea is to restrict the
number of messages in directed diffusion by considering only a certain region rather
than sending the messages to the whole network. Thus, the energy for transmission
can be conserved.
Kuhn et al. [KWZ08] developed an algorithmic approach to geographic routing
in WSNs. Their approach is based on the synthesis of the greedy forwarding and face
routing approaches. Unlike greedy routing approaches, their approach can guarantee
that packets always reach the destination with a reasonable complexity.
Wei et al. [WZFL09] devised an efficient and energy conservative unicast routing
technique for multi-hop WSNs over Rayleigh fading channels. During the sourcedestination transmission, a sensor forwards the packets stream through a sequence
of nodes, and each route is divided into several disjoint segments. The authors then
used a model to characterise the energy consumption for each node in one segment,
and employed a method to select the optimal number of nodes in one transmission
segment so as to minimise average energy consumption.
Zhang and Shen [ZS10] introduced an online routing scheme, which could provide
loop-free, fully stateless, energy-efficient sensor-to-sink routing at a low communication overhead without the help of prior neighbourhood knowledge. Specifically, each
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node firstly calculates its ideal next-hop relay position on the straight line toward
the sink based on the energy-optimal forwarding distance, and then each forwarder
selects the neighbour closest to its ideal next-hop relay position as the next-hop relay
by using the Request-To-Send/Clear-To-Send (RTS/CTS) handshaking mechanism.
Huang et al. [HHYZ11] presented an energy-aware and interference-sensitive
geographic routing protocol, which focuses on minimising the total network energy
consumption and reducing interference. Their routing protocol adaptively uses an
anchor list to guide packets delivery, and selects the minimum-interference link from
energy-optimal relay region for packets delivery.
Awad et al. [AGD11] proposed the Virtual Cord Protocol (VCP), which exploits
virtual coordinates to provide efficient and failure tolerant routing and packets management in sensor networks. Specifically, VCP uses two mechanisms to find paths to
nodes and associated packets items. First, it relies on the virtual cord that always
provides a path toward the destination. Second, locally available neighbourhood
information is exploited for greedy routing.

2.4.4

Advantages and disadvantages of current routing approaches

Routing approaches belonging to each of the above three categories have advantages
and disadvantages. Under flat routing approaches, all sensors play the same role,
and each sensor could be a source node or a relay node. Hence, the routing delay
could be minimised, if the routing algorithm is carefully designed. However, the energy consumption is an outstanding problem compared with the routing approaches
belonging to other two categories, because sensors lack the knowledge of the global
network and thus, broadcast is often required or data have to be repeatedly transfered in the network. Hierarchical routing approaches aim at clustering sensor nodes
so that cluster heads can do some aggregation and reduction of data, which will then
be transmitted to the sink node, in order to save energy. Because packets transmission is the most energy expensive task [PHL+ 05], reduction of packets is vital for
the overall network. Nevertheless, the packet routing delay will be lengthened, as
cluster heads have to wait for a period for sensors in their clusters to transfer packets to them for aggregation. Location-based routing approaches use the position
information to relay the packets to the desired regions rather than the whole network, so these approaches have good scalability, since the information of the whole
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network is not required. Nonetheless, such location-based approaches often need a
device, e.g., GPS, to provide the necessary position information, and the cost and
weight of a sensor will be increased if each sensor is equipped with such a device.
Although several researchers suggested to use a virtual-coordinate to provide the
position information [TYLH09], it would incur extra energy consumption due to the
communication process, which is necessary for acquiring such position information.
In addition, to obtain such virtual-coordinate based position information, global
information has to be used more or less, e.g., the maximum ID among all sensors
with the maximum hop distance from a specific node. It is a common sense that
it is nearly impossible to design a routing approach, which could overcome all the
limitations of current approaches, because some design criteria are contradictory,
e.g., energy saving versus route or information discovery.
Against this background, in this thesis, a self-organisation mechanism is presented in Chapter 6, which is independent of current routing approaches and can be
used to assist and enhance many current routing approaches.

2.5

Summary

In this chapter, related studies with regard to the research concerns of this thesis
were thoroughly reviewed. Specifically, the review concentrated on related studies
on self-organisation mechanisms in MASs, coalition formation methods in MASs,
evolution of cooperation strategies, and packet routing approaches in WSNs. In
addition, the advantages and disadvantages of related studies were also summarised
at the end of each subsection, and meanwhile, the solutions, proposed in this thesis,
against each research concern and its strengths were outlined as well.

Chapter 3
An Integrative Self-organisation
Mechanism
In this chapter, an integrative self-organisation mechanism is described. This mechanism integrates the three aspects of self-organising systems, which involve
cloning/spawning, resource exchange and relation adaptation.

3.1

Model Description

The model used in this thesis consists of four elements, i.e., hA, N, T, Γi. Each
element is described as follows.
• A is a set of collaborative agents in the network, i.e., A = {a1 , ..., an }.
• N = {N1 , ..., Nn }, where Ni demonstrates the neighbours of agent ai .
• T = {t1 , ..., tm } is a set of task types.
• Γ = {γ1 , ..., γl } is a set of resource types, which exist in the network.
The neighbour set, Ni , of agent ai consists of three different types of neighbours,
i.e., peer, subordinate and superior, which are formed by two relations, given by
Definition 3.1 and Definition 3.2.
µ

µ

Definition 3.1. (peer-to-peer ). A peer-to-peer relation, denoted as “∼” (∼⊆
A × A), is a Compatible Relation, which is reflexive and symmetric, such that ∀ai ∈
µij

µii

µji

A : ai ∼ ai and ∀ai , aj ∈ A : ai ∼ aj ⇒ aj ∼ ai , where µij = µji .
Definition 3.2. (subordinate-superior ). A subordinate-superior relation, written
µ

µ

as “≺” (≺⊆ A × A), is a Strict Partial Ordering Relation, which is irreflexive,
µii

µij

asymmetric and transitive, such that ∀ai ∈ A : ¬(ai ≺ ai ), ∀ai , aj ∈ A : ai ≺ aj ⇒
µji

µjk

µij

¬(aj ≺ ai ) and ∀ai , aj , ak ∈ A : ai ≺ aj ∧ aj ≺ ak ⇒ ai ≺ ak .
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Definition 3.3. (relation strength). Relation strength, denoted as µij , indicates
how strong the relation is between agents ai and aj . µij is ranged from (0, 1], where
larger value means a stronger relation.
Thus, the neighbour set Ni can be further divided into three subsets, i.e., Ni =
Ni≺

∪ Ni∼ ∪ Ni , where Ni≺ , Ni∼ and Ni represent agent ai ’s superior neighbours,

peer neighbours and subordinate neighbours, respectively.
A task type defines the requested resource types and the quantity of each type
of resources. Additionally, a task type also dictates the task benefit, the task service
time and the task maximum waiting time before being executed. If a task cannot be
completed before the deadline of its service time, the benefit of this task decreases
gradually as time progresses.
At each time step, a task arrives at the agent network with a particular probability, and is given to a randomly selected agent. Then, this agent starts the task
allocation process, which will be described later. Each task Φ randomly corresponds
to a task type in T . Φ can be divided into several subtasks and each subtask, ϕi ,
requires a particular type of resource and a specific amount of this type of resources.
Moreover, each subtask also has a duration time, an expiry time, and a corresponding benefit. For example, a subtask, ϕi = h2, 8, 10, 5 : 00pm, 16i, denotes that this
subtask requires No. 2 resource type and the required amount of such type of resources is 8, and in addition, this subtask needs a 10 time step duration and it has
to be finished before 5 : 00pm, and finally, the benefit of this subtask is 16. If the
deadline, i.e., 5 : 00pm, is past and this subtask has not been finished, the benefit
will be reduced by 1 with every time step progressing until the subtask is finished or
the benefit reaches 0. In this thesis, a time step is simply modeled as a microsecond
and the benefit of a subtask is simply as double as the amount of resources required
to complete the subtask. We use the term “time step” instead of “microsecond”,
because we want to make our mechanism general. Then, when this mechanism is
utilised in real applications, a time step could represent different time lengths, e.g.,
a microsecond, a millisecond, a second, and so on. Xu et al. [XSY+ 05] have shown
that token-based mechanisms can collect as much information as broadcast mechanisms while using much less bandwidth. Hence, here, a subtask ϕi is modeled as a
token ∆i , which can be passed in the network to find a suitable agent to complete.
Each token consists of not only the information about the resource requirement of
the corresponding subtask, but also the information about the token traveling path.
Here, the token traveling path is composed of the agents that the token has passed
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through. Such information is useful for relation adaptation, which will be described
in detail later. Here is an example. Agent 1 sends a token, which passes through
Agent 2, Agent 3, and finally reaches Agent 4. Agent 4 then knows that this token
was originally from Agent 1 and forwarded by Agents 2 and 3. When Agent 4 evaluates the reward about whether having Agent 1 as its neighbour, Agent 4 considers
that if Agent 1 becomes its neighbour, the communication cost on Agents 2 and 3
can be reduced, since they do not need to relay tokens between Agents 1 and 4 any
more.
During the allocation of a subtask, an agent, say ai , always tries to execute the
subtask by itself if it has the adequate resource. Otherwise, ai will generate a token
for the subtask and pass the token to one of its subordinates, which contains the
expected resource. If ai does not find a suitable subordinate (i.e., no subordinate
contains the expected resource), it will try to pass the token to its peer s. In the
case that no peer is capable of the subtask, ai will pass the token back to one of its
superior s, which will attempt to find some other subordinates or peer s for delegation.
When more than one agent are able to accept the token, ai always passes the token
to the agent, which has a stronger relation strength with ai . Since the token may be
passed several steps before it reaches an adequate agent, a delegation chain could
be formed. Here, it should be emphasised again that our focus is not on distributed
task allocation. Instead, it is on the development of an integrative self-organisation
mechanism in multi-agent systems for optimising the efficiency of task completion.
Thus, our work is independent of specific task allocation algorithms that the agents
may employ.

3.2

The Integrative Self-organisation Mechanism

This mechanism consists of three components, i.e., cloning/spawning, resource exchange and relation adaptation. Before describing them, it is necessary to introduce
an evaluation method to estimate the profit of the agent network. Towards this
goal, three evaluation indices are introduced, which include cost, benefit and profit
of an agent and the network.
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Network profit evaluation

The cost, benefit and profit of the network are calculated after allocating a predefined number of tasks. The cost of the network consists of four attributes, i.e.,
communication cost, computation time consumed by agents to complete assigned
subtasks, management cost for maintaining subtasks and resources, and management cost for keeping relations with other agents. We now depict the calculation of
each of these four attributes.
Communication cost
Communication cost relies on how many tokens being transmitted during task allocation process and it can be calculated by using Equation 3.1.

CommN ET =

|A|
X
(C∼ · ci∼ + C · ci + C≺ · ci≺ ),

(3.1)

i=1

where A is the set of agents in the network, ci∼ , ci and ci≺ are the numbers
of tokens that agent ai passed to its peer s, subordinates and superior s, respectively.
Correspondingly, C∼ , C and C≺ are the communication cost coefficients for separately transmitting tokens to peer s, subordinates and superior s, respectively. It is
assumed that C < C∼ < C≺ , namely that passing tokens to subordinates needs the
least communication cost, while passing tokens to superior s requires the most communication cost. Therefore, agents always try to pass tokens to subordinates first,
then peer s, finally superior s, which matches the task allocation procedure described
in Section 3.1. As mentioned in Section 3.1, each subtask is modeled as a token.
Each subtask requires a particular resource type and a specific amount of this type
of resources. In the following experiment, we simply use two integers to represent
the resource type and the required amount of this type of resources, respectively. Therefore, the size of each token is the same. For simplicity, communication
cost is represented as the number of tokens transmitted. For communication cost
coefficients, it is considered that different relations have different impact on communication cost. Thus, the communication cost coefficients are used to represent
such different impact. This consideration is meaningful in some real applications.
For example, in sensor networks, for a sensor, transmitting a packet to different
neighbours requires different energy (i.e., communication cost) due to the different
distances between this sensor and its different neighbours.
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Computation time
Computation time is measured as the amount of time steps used by the agents for
completing the assigned subtasks as in Equation 3.2,
E

CompN ET =

|A| |Ti |
X
X

Compij ,

(3.2)

i=1 j=1

where Compij is the amount of time steps that agent ai consumes for executing
a subtask, and TiE is the set of subtasks, which have been executed by agent ai .
Management cost
Management cost consists of three types of costs.
The first management cost is management computation cost for maintaining
subtasks and resources. For each agent, there are two waiting lists. One list stores
the subtasks, owned by the agent, say ai , which have not yet been finished, written
as TiW1 , and another list records the subtasks, assigned by other agents to ai , written
as TiW2 . Additionally, there is a set Ri possessed by agent ai , which indicates the
resources that ai holds. Therefore, the management computation cost for agent ai
can be calculated by using Equation 3.3,
W2

W1

cost1i

= MT · (

X|

|Ti

|Ti

j=1

(1)
tij

+

X|

(2)
tij )

+ MΓ ·

j=1

|Ri |
X

(3)

tij ,

(3.3)

j=1

(1)

where tij demonstrates the number of time steps during which agent ai main(2)

tains one of its own subtasks in TiW1 before the subtask is completed, tij indicates
the number of time steps during which ai keeps one of the assigned subtasks in
(3)

TiW2 before the subtask is finished and likewise, tij is the number of time steps
during which ai maintains a resource γj in its resource set Ri . MT and MΓ are
the management computation coefficients for tasks and resources, respectively. The
management computation coefficients for tasks and resources, i.e., MT and MΓ , do
not have special meanings. They are used for formalising the value of management
computation cost in the same magnitude with the values of other indices, because
the profit of the entire network is yielded by summing up the values of these indices
(Equation 3.6).
The second management cost for an individual agent is the management relation
cost generated during keeping relations with other agents, which can be calculated
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by utilising Equation 3.4,
|Ni |

|Ni∼ |

cost2i

= M∼ ·

X

t∼
ij

+ M ·

X

j=1

|Ni≺ |

t
ij

+ M≺ ·

j=1

X

t≺
ij ,

(3.4)

j=1

where Ni∼ , Ni and Ni≺ are composed of ai ’s peer s, subordinates and superior s,

≺
respectively; t∼
ij , tij and tij are the number of time steps, which demonstrate the

time length that agent ai keeps the different relations with agent aj ; and M∼ , M
and M≺ are management relation coefficients for the relations peer, subordinate and
superior, respectively. It is assumed that M < M∼ < M≺ , namely that an agent maintaining the superior-subordinate relation needs the least management cost,
while maintaining the subordinate-superior relation requires the most management
cost. This assumption is reasonable in some real cases. For example, in human
social networks, a person usually has to pay much attention to keep a relation with
his/her superior while pay less attention to keep relations with his/her colleagues
(i.e., peers) and subordinates.
The benefit of each agent depends on how many subtasks that are completed
by the agent. As depicted in Section 3.1, each task Φ contains several subtasks,
ϕ1 , ϕ2 , ..., represented as tokens ∆1 , ∆2 ,..., and when a subtask ϕi is successfully
completed, the agent, which executed this subtask, can obtain the relevant benefit.
Therefore, the benefit of the network is the sum of the benefits that all the agents
obtain in the network (Equation 3.5),

Benef itN ET =

|A|
X

benef it(ai ),

(3.5)

i=1

where benef it(ai ) is the benefit that agent ai obtains for successfully completing
subtasks. In experiments, Benef itN ET is calculated after each simulation round
and each simulation round consists of 2000 tasks. In each round, when an agent
completes a subtask, it gets a corresponding benefit. When this round finishes,
each agent calculates how much benefit it has obtained in this round, and then
Benef itN ET is derived by summing up each agent’s benefit.
Finally, the profit of the network can be calculated by using Equation 3.6.
P rof itN ET = Benef itN ET − CommN ET −
CompN ET −

|A|
X
i=1

(cost1i + cost2i )

(3.6)
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The aim of this mechanism is to maximise the profit of the agent network. The
acute readers might point out that it is unreasonable to sum up indices with different units, e.g., CommN ET is measured as the number of tokens, while CompN ET is
measured as the amount of time steps. It is claimed that in this thesis, the profit
of the network, i.e., P rof itN ET , does not have a specific unit. P rof itN ET is used
to demonstrate the general situation of an agent network. In addition, to sum up
different indices, i.e., CommN ET , CompN ET , management costs and Benef itN ET ,
we employ coefficients, involving communication coefficients and management coefficients, to balance the values of such indices to a same magnitude. This research
focuses on theoretical study, so the issue regarding the unit of P rof itN ET is overlooked. In the future, when the proposed mechanism is applied in real applications,
this issue must be taken into account.
Furthermore, the concentration of this research is on theoretical research on selforganisation in multi-agent systems. We, therefore, attempt to devise a general
analytical evaluation tool, which could be potentially applicable in several applications instead of a specific application. Once we consider a specific application of
this research, existing analytical evaluation tools should be taken into consideration
because they may be more suitable for the specific application than our general
analytical evaluation tool.

3.2.2

Cloning/Spawning

When an agent is overloaded, the agent will create a new agent to take a part of its
work load. The agent has two options, namely cloning an agent or spawning off an
agent. As mentioned in the previous section, each subtask has an expiry time. An
agent may have several subtasks to complete, and it cannot execute these subtasks
simultaneously. Thus, some subtasks may not be finished before their expiry time.
This situation for an agent is called “overloaded”. On the other hand, if an agent
has too many neighbours (as double as the average number of neighbours of each
agent in the network), this situation is called “overloaded” as well.
Specifically, for a single agent, spawning is triggered when an agent cannot finish
the assigned tasks on time. In this situation, the agent spawns off a new agent and
assigns the most beneficial task and the corresponding resource to the new agent.
The spawned agent is a subordinate of the original agent, and the spawned agent
cannot establish relations with other agents. When the spawned agent finishes the
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assigned task, it is in an idle status. When the spawned agent keeps in an idle status
for a pre-defined period (20 time steps in this thesis), namely that no more such
subtasks need to be completed, the spawned agent will destroy itself to save the
original agent’s relation management cost (Equation 3.4).
On the other hand, cloning happens when an agent has too many neighbours (as
double as the average number of neighbours of each agent in the network), which
means that the agent has a heavy overhead for managing relations with other agents.
In this situation, to avoid possible communication congestion, the agent clones a new
agent, and assigns half of its neighbours to the cloned agent. The cloned agent has
the same resources as the original agent has, and keeps a peer relation with the
original agent. Different from the spawned agents, the cloned agent will not destroy
itself even if it keeps in an idle status. Instead, the original and cloned agents will
compose together, once the total number of neighbours of them is less than a predefined threshold (as 1.5 times as the average number of neighbours of each agent
in the network).

3.2.3

Resource exchange

As depicted in Section 3.2.1, agents incur management cost for maintaining their
resources. Hence, for a single agent, when a resource has not been used for a long
time, the agent will transfer the resource to a neighbouring agent, which really needs
this resource. Here, the “long time” duration is fixed at 20 time steps, obtained
through experimental attempt to achieve best results. In this thesis, for simplicity,
we use an integer to represent a resource, namely resource No. 1, resource No. 2
and so on. In real applications, e.g., human social networks, such a resource can be
considered as a tool, e.g., a hammer. If a person has a hammer but he/she has not
used it for a long time, he/she will give (or sell) the hammer to another person who
really needs it. Since this thesis considers a cooperative agent network, an agent just
directly gives, instead of sells, its unused resource to another agent. A policy search
algorithm is devised to handle the resource transfer problem (Algorithm 1). A policy
of an agent is a probability distribution over the agent’s available actions [AL08].
An action in this algorithm represents transferring a resource to a neighbour.
In Line 2, the function GetResource() returns the resources, which have not been
used by ai for a pre-defined period. Then, for each of the idle resources, ai initialises
the Q-value of each action to 0, namely transferring the resource to a neighbour. In
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Algorithm 1: Resource transfer according to ai
1 for each ai ∈ A do
2
Res ← GetResource();
3
for each resource γi ∈ Res do
4
ai initialises Q-values and π;
5
ai informs its neighbours;
6
neighbours respond to ai ;
7
r ← the reward vector for neighbours;
8
for each neighbour of ai , i.e., nj ∈ Ni do
9
Q(nj ) ← (1 − α1 )Q(nj ) + α1 · rj ;
10
end
P
11
r̄ ← |N1i | nj ∈Ni rj ;
12
for each neighbour of ai , i.e., nj ∈ Ni do
13
π(nj ) ← π(nj ) + ζ(Q(nj ) − r̄);
14
end
15
π← N ormalise(π);
16
ai selects a neighbour based on π;
17
end
18 end

addition, π is a vector, which demonstrates the probability with regard to selecting
each neighbour to transfer the resource, i.e., π= hπ(n1 ), ..., π(n|Ni | )i. For example,
if an agent ai has three neighbours, the probability vector π correspondingly has
three elements, say π=h0.2, 0.3, 0.5i, which means that ai has the probability 0.2 to
select the first neighbour, has the probability 0.3 to select the second neighbour, and
has the probability 0.5 to select the third neighbour, to transfer the resource. This
selection is like a roulette selection, where the neighbour with higher probability is
more likely to be selected. ai initially sets each element in π to

1
|Ni |

for simplicity.

After that, ai informs each of its neighbours that it has an idle resource to transfer,
and these neighbours respond to ai their rewards for taking that resource (Lines 5
and 6). Here, the reward of a neigbour, say aj , depends on the number of subtasks
(that were passed through aj and also required that resource) and the benefits
of these subtasks. Moreover, each neighbour also has to take into account the
management cost of that resource. Thus, the reward of aj can be calculated as
P
(3)
rj = m
k=1 benef it(∆k ) − MΓ · t̂ji , where m is the number of subtasks that were
(3)

passed through aj and also required the resource, say γi , and t̂ji is the expected
time length that aj will maintain the resource γi . Then, in Line 7, ai synthesises
the reward information received from its neighbours and generates a reward vector,
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r = hr1 , ..., r|Ni | i. Afterwards, in Lines 8-10, ai updates the Q-value of each action
based on each neighbour’s reward, rj , where α1 is the learning rate. ai averages
the rewards of its neighbours, and uses this average value and the newly created
Q-values to update the probability vector π, where ζ is the policy learning rate
(Lines 11-14). The update method of probability vector is developed by Zhang et
al. [ZLS09]. In Line 15, the function N ormalise() is used to constrain π to a valid
P|Ni |
probability distribution, i.e., i=1
π(ni ) = 1, and N ormalise(π) has the minimum
Euclidean distance to π. Finally, in Line 16, ai selects a neighbour to transfer the
resource based on the probability vector π.

3.2.4

Relation adaptation

Our relation adaptation approach is based on the past information of the individual
agents. Specifically, agents use the information regarding the past task allocation
processes to evaluate their relations with other agents. To make the problem clear,
let us consider a simple example.

Figure 3.1: A task allocation example
Figure 3.1 demonstrates an agent network. Consider that agent a1 receives a
task ϕ, which can only be executed by agent a6 . Then, the best option for agent
a1 is to forward task ϕ to its neighbor, agent a4 , which in turn forwards task ϕ to
agent a5 until task ϕ reaches agent a6 . Now, if this case occurs several times, one
would expect performance to improve if a1 adds a6 as one of its neighbors because
this will save an unnecessary overhead. Similarly, if a1 rarely sends any request
to its neighbor a2 , then removing neighbor a2 from a1 ’s neighbors will reduce the
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computational overhead associated with taking agent a2 into account whenever a1
is making a decision.
Before describing our relation adaptation algorithm, we first describe the actions,
which are used to adapt relations between agents. An action is defined as a decision
made by an agent to adapt a relation with another agent. There are seven different
atomic actions defined in our model, which are enh ∼, enh ≺, enh , wkn ∼,
wkn ≺, wkn  and no action. The explanation of each action and its reverse
action is described as follows. It should be noted that the meanings of actions enh
and wkn imply not only enhance and weaken a relation but also form and dissolve
a relation, respectively.
• Action: ai enh ≺ aj ; Meaning: ai enhances the subordinate relation with
aj , or ai becomes a subordinate of aj ; Reverse action: aj enh  ai .
• Action: ai enh ∼ aj ; Meaning: ai enhances the peer relation with aj , or ai
becomes a peer of aj ; Reverse action: aj enh ∼ ai .
• Action: ai enh  aj ; Meaning: ai enhances the superior relation with aj ,
or ai becomes a superior of aj ; Reverse action: aj enh ≺ ai .
• Action: ai wkn ≺ aj ; Meaning: ai weakens the subordinate relation with
aj , or ai dissolves a superior, aj ; Reverse action: aj wkn  ai .
• Action: ai wkn ∼ aj ; Meaning: ai weakens the peer relation with aj , or ai
dissolves a peer, aj ; Reverse action: aj wkn ∼ ai .
• Action: ai wkn  aj ; Meaning: ai weakens the superior relation with aj ,
or ai dissolves a subordinate, aj ; Reverse action: aj wkn ≺ ai .
• Action: ai no action aj ; Meaning: ai does not take any action with aj ;
Reverse action: aj no action ai .
In addition, the combinations of atomic actions include wkn ≺ +enh ∼,
wkn ≺+enh , wkn ∼ +enh ≺, wkn ∼ +enh , wkn  +enh ∼ and
wkn  +enh ≺. The meanings of these combination actions can be easily deduced from the explanation of atomic actions. For example, the combination,
wkn ≺ +enh ∼, which is taken by ai with aj , implies that ai first dissolves aj
from ai ’s superior and forms a peer relation with aj . It should be noticed that an
agent at different states might possess different available actions.
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The possible choices of actions available to agents in different situations are
illustrated as follows.
1. There is no relation between agents ai and aj . The possible choices of actions
include enh ∼, enh ≺, enh  and no action.
2. ai is a peer of aj , i.e., ai ∼ aj . The possible actions involve wkn ∼, wkn ∼
+enh ≺, wkn ∼ +enh  and no action.
3. ai is a subordinate of aj , i.e., ai ≺ aj . The possible actions include wkn ≺,
wkn ≺ +enh ∼, wkn ≺ +enh  and no action. These actions are based on ai ’s
perspective, while, in aj ’s view, aj needs to reverse these actions.
4. ai is a superior of aj , i.e., aj ≺ ai . This situation is just the reverse condition
of ai ≺ aj .
When an agent, ai , wants to adapt relations with other agents, there are two
problems, which have to be faced by ai . The first problem is determining with
whom ai should adapt relations, and the second one is determining how to adapt
relations with those selected agents. For the first problem, the selection process of
each agent is based not only on its own former task allocation process but also on
the integrated trust model. Through the trust model, an agent can get opinions
from other agents about candidate selection. For example, when ai is considering
aj as one of its candidates for adapting relations, ai will ask other agents, say ak
and al , for their opinions regarding whether aj is worthy to be a candidate. For the
second problem, i.e., how to adapt relations, a multi-agent Q-learning approach is
employed. The reason for choosing the Q-learning approach is that it provides a
simple and suitable methodology for representing our mechanism in terms of actions
and rewards.
Candidate selection
To assist each agent to select the most valuable candidates to adapt relations, we
present a trust model based on Dezert-Smarandache theory (DSmT) [SD04]. Many
researchers have made prominent efforts on trust and reputation models, such as
probabilistic theory-based trust models (Teacy et al. [TPJL06]), certified reputation model (Huynh et al. [HJS06]), and evidential trust models (Wang and Sun
[WS09]). In addition, a thorough survey of trust and reputation systems for online
service provision was also given by Josang et al [JIB07]. Briefly, trust models are
usually developed for identifying whether an agent is trustworthy or not. In this
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thesis, to the best of our knowledge, we originally use a trust model for candidate
selection in an agent network for relation adaptation and there is not an existing
quantitative comparison between different trust models for agent candidate selection. Thus, the criteria, based on which we opt for a trust model, are that whether
the trust model is suitable for candidate selection, whether it is easy to understand
by both the readers and us and whether it is easy to implement. The emphasis
of this thesis is not developing a new and efficient trust model. Instead, the trust
model is used only as a complementary part of our self-organization mechanism.
Through our investigation, Dezert-Smarandache theory is more suitable for our requirements than other trust models, because the theory has good expressiveness and
low computational complexity for trust representation, and is easy to implement.
We now introduce the key concepts of Dezert-Smarandache theory [SD04]. Let
T mean that the given agent considers a given correspondent to be trustworthy and
Θ = {T, ¬T } be the general framework of discernment. The hyper-power set of Θ
is represented as H Θ = {∅, {T }, {¬T }, {T ∩ ¬T }, Θ}. There is a general basic belief
assignment which is a function m : H Θ → [0, 1] where

m(∅) = 0,
P
B⊆H Θ m(B) = 1.

(3.7)

Thus, m({T }) + m({¬T }) + m({Θ}) + m({T ∩ ¬T }) = 1, as m(∅) = 0.
The trust model is defined as a tuple, Tji = hmij ({T }),
mij ({¬T }), mij ({Θ}), mij ({T ∩ ¬T })i, where i and j represent two different agents ai
and aj , separately. Each element in Tji is described as follows,
1. mij ({T }) means the degree of ai trusting aj ;
2. mij ({¬T }) indicates the degree of ai distrusting aj ;
3. mij ({Θ}) demonstrates the degree of uncertainty about the trustworthiness ai
to aj . This case happens when ai lacks evidence regarding aj . If ai has no evidence
at all, mij ({Θ}) = 1; otherwise, mij ({Θ}) < 1;
4. mij ({T ∩ ¬T }) depicts the degree of contradiction with regard to the trustworthiness ai to aj . This case is caused by the situation, for example, that ai trusts
aj but other agents, which provide ai their opinions, distrust aj . Thereby, ai gets
into contradiction.
Thus, initially, trust between any two agents is Tji = hmij ({T }) = 0, mij ({¬T }) =
0, mij ({Θ}) = 1, mij ({T ∩¬T }) = 0i. Trust is, then, acquired through task allocation

3.2. The Integrative Self-organisation Mechanism

55

between agents. Suppose that ai is evaluating the trust of aj and aj has completed
x subtasks for ai . ai uses the notion, QoS (Quality of Service), to express how it
is satisfied with aj ’s service of each subtask. Therefore, for x subtasks, there are x
QoS values. QoS is in the range of [0, 1], and its calculation depends on the time
spent to complete a subtask. For example, if aj can finish a subtask on time for
ai , ai ’s estimation on this subtask is QoS = 1; otherwise, the value of QoS will
be decreased over time. Based on QoS, ai ’s trust evaluation to aj can be obtained
through Equation 3.8.

P

mij ({T }) = QoS>Ω QoS



P
mij ({¬T }) = QoS<ω QoS



mi ({Θ}) = P
QoS
j

(3.8)

ω≤QoS≤Ω

where ω and Ω, 0 ≤ ω ≤ Ω ≤ 1, are lower and upper thresholds, respectively.
P
After calculation, the elements in Tji are then normalised to satisfy B⊆H Θ mij (B) =
1.
In addition, ai might ask one of its neighboring agents, say ak , for trust evaluation
to aj , and then combines ak ’s opinion with ai ’s own view to aj . This is trust
evaluation combination which can be computed as
Tji = Tji ⊕ Tjk ,
(3.9)
P
where mij (B1 ) = mij (B2 ) ⊕ mkj (B3 ) = (B1 ,B2 ,B3 ⊆H Θ )∧(B2 ∩B3 =B1 ) mij (B2 )mkj (B3 ).
Furthermore, there might be another case. ai asks ak ’s opinion of aj , but ak may
have no idea about aj . ak then inquires one of its neighbors, al ’s, opinion to aj .
This is trust transitivity which can be calculated as
Tjk = Tlk ⊗ Tjl ,

(3.10)

where mkj ({T }) = (mkl ({T })) + βmkl ({T ∩ ¬T }) · mlj ({T })
mkj ({¬T }) = (mkl ({¬T })) + βmkl ({T ∩ ¬T }) · mlj ({¬T })
mkj ({T ∩ ¬T }) = (mkl ({T ∩ ¬T })) + βmkl ({T ∩ ¬T }) · mlj ({T ∩ ¬T })
mkj ({Θ}) = 1 − mkj ({T }) − mkj ({¬T }) − mkj ({T ∩ ¬T }),
and β is a constant which is in the range (0, 1).
The candidates selection process is shown in Algorithm 2.
Firstly, in Line 2, after a period, ai should have some subtasks completed by other
agents. ai , then, evaluates the trust of those agents, which completed ai ’s subtasks by
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Algorithm 2: Candidates selection according to ai
1 Candidatesi ← ∅, T empCandsi ← ∅;
2 After predefined time steps, through Equation 3.8, ai evaluates the trust of
its neighbors and those agents that completed ai ’s subtasks but not ai ’s
neighbors;
3 T empCandsi ← all the agents mentioned in Line 2;
4 for each aj ∈ T empCandsi do
5
if mij ({T }) > ρ1 and aj 6∈ N eigi∼ ∨ N eigi ∨ N eigi≺ then
6
ai inquires other agent’s opinions;
7
else if mij ({¬T }) < ρ2 and aj ∈ N eigi∼ ∨ N eigi ∨ N eigi≺ then
8
ai inquires other agent’s opinions;
9
end
10 end
11 ai synthesises opinions via Equations 3.9 and 3.10;
12 for each aj ∈ T empCandsi do
13
if mij ({T }) > ρ1 and aj 6∈ N eigi∼ ∨ N eigi ∨ N eigi≺ then
14
Candidatesi ← aj ;
15
else if mij ({¬T }) < ρ2 and aj ∈ N eigi∼ ∨ N eigi ∨ N eigi≺ then
16
Candidatesi ← aj ;
17
end
18 end

using Equation 3.8. Meanwhile, ai also evaluates the trust of its neighboring agents,
as ai might want to weaken relations with those neighbors that cannot complete
ai ’s subtasks on time. In Lines 4-11, ai inquires other agents’ opinions about the
potential candidates in T empCandsi . Here, ρ1 and ρ2 are two thresholds ranged
in (0, 1). The inquiry process begins with ai initially contacting a neighbor. If this
neighbor cannot provide an answer to ai , it then gives ai a referral which designates
another agent. The process terminates in success when a trust value tuple, i.e.,
Tyx , is received and in failure when the depthLimit is reached or when the inquiry
arrives at an agent, which neither gives an answer nor a referral. Here, depthLimit
restricts the length of referral chains. Kautz et al. [KSM96] have proved that shorter
referral chains are more likely to be fruitful and accurate, so we set depthLimit as 2
in this thesis. Line 5 indicates that aj is not a neighbor of ai but aj could complete
ai ’s subtasks on time, while Line 6 demonstrates that aj is a neighbor of ai but
aj has a bad task completion record. After inquiry, ai synthesises other agents’
opinions and selects candidates again (Lines 11-18). After candidate selection, ai
will start the relation adaptation with those candidates, which is introduced in the
next subsection.
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Adapting relations
We consider a simple scenario with two agents, ai and aj , and three available actions
for each of them. The reward matrix of the two agents is displayed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1:
aj
HH
ai
HH
enh 
enh ∼
enh ≺

HH

Reward matrix of ai and aj
enh ≺

enh ∼

enh 

ri1,1 , rj1,1
ri2,1 , rj2,1
ri3,1 , rj3,1

ri1,2 , rj1,2
ri2,2 , rj2,2
ri3,2 , rj3,2

ri1,3 , rj1,3
ri2,3 , rj2,3
ri3,3 , rj3,3

Each cell (rix,y , rjx,y ) in Table 3.1 represents the reward received by the row agent
(ai ) and the column agent (aj ), respectively, if the row agent ai plays action x and the
column agent aj plays action y. The reward of each agent from adapting relations
is based on how much cost could be reduced on agent ai , how much cost could
be decreased on the intermediate agents, and how much potential benefit might
be obtained by agent ai in the future. Here, an intermediate agent is an agent,
which resides on a token traveling path. The following example describes how an
agent evaluates its reward when it wants to establish a relation with another agent.
Suppose that agent ai has no relation with agent aj , but ai has completed many
subtasks from aj . ai , then, makes the decision with regard to forming a relation
with aj . If ai would like to form the subordinate-superior relation with aj , i.e.,
performing the action enh ≺, (for aj , performing the reverse action enh ). The
cost reduction on ai is −M≺ · t̂≺
ij , as ai would maintain a new relationship with aj ,
where t̂≺
ij is the expected time length that ai will keep this relation with aj and the
negative sign represents an increase in the cost. However, other intermediate agents
between ai and aj are affected by ai ’s decision and would obtain rewards, because
they do not need to pass tokens between agents ai and aj any more. For one of
those intermediate agents, say ak , the reduced cost is C · ck , where ck is the number
of tokens that were passed by ak and received by ai in the past task allocation
round. The rewards obtained by those intermediate agents are accounted as ai ’s
rewards. For aj , it could save management computation cost, i.e., cost1j , since it can
directly pass tokens to ai without waiting for intermediate agents to relay tokens,
but aj also needs to maintain a new relationship with ai . The cost reduction on
P

aj , therefore, is M · m
k=1 |∆k .path| − M · t̂ij , where m is the number of tokens
passed from aj to ai , and |∆k .path| means the length of the path, through which
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∆k has passed. Since we assume that a token passing between two agents requires
one time step, |∆k .path| actually demonstrates the time steps of a token traveling
in the network. In addition, another cost has to be taken into account, i.e., the
re-organisation cost, which occurs once a relation adaptation happens between two
agents. The re-organisation cost is represented as a constant in this thesis.
The potential reward, which will be obtained by ai is evaluated on the basis of the benefit that ai gained for completing the subtasks assigned by aj , i.e.,
P
δ≺ ϕ.owner=aj ϕ.benef it, where δ≺ is a potential benefit coefficient. Analogically,
P
for aj , the potential benefit is δ ϕ.owner=ai ϕ.benef it. We suppose that δ≺ > 1,
δ∼ = 1 and δ < 1, namely that the action enh ≺, with ai as the subordinate and
aj as the superior, can make ai potentially receive more subtasks from aj so as to get
more benefits. Therefore, the reward of an agent can be calculated by adding cost
reduction with potential benefit.Algorithm 3 demonstrates our relation adaptation
algorithm in a pseudocode form.
Algorithm 3: Relation adaptation according to ai
1 for each aj ∈ Candidates do
2
Acti ← available actions(ai , aj );
3
Actj ← available actions(aj , ai );
4
for each x ∈ Acti , y ∈ Actj do
5
Initialise Qix and Qjy arbitrarily;
6
for k = 0 to a predefined integer do
7
calculate πix (k) and πjy (k);
P
8
Qix (k + 1) = Qix (k) + πix (k)α( y rix,y πjy (k) − Qix (k));
P
9
Qjy (k + 1) = Qjy (k) + πjy (k)α( x rjx,y πix (k) − Qix (k));
10
end
11
end
12
hxopti , yopti i ← argM axmatch(x,y) (Qix + Qjy );
13
ai , aj take actions xopti and yopti , respectively;
14
µij ← µij + (Nji /ρ3 − 1);
15
if µij > 1 then µij ← 1;
16
if µij < 0 then µij ← 0;
17
µji ← µij ;
18 end

After selecting candidates, ai and aj , firstly, estimate which actions are available
at the current state (Lines 2 and 3). Then, ai and aj learn the Q-value of each
available action, separately (Lines 4-11). In Line 5, the Q-value of each action is
initialized arbitrarily, while, in Line 7, πix indicates the probability regarding agent
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ai taking the action x. To calculate πix , we employ the -greedy exploration method
devised by Gomes and Kowalczyk [GK09] shown in Equation 3.11, where 0 <  < 1
is a small positive number and n is the number of available actions of ai . The reason
for choosing the -greedy exploration method is that it has been justified through
many applications, for example Galstyan et al. [GCL04] applied the method to
develop a decentralized resource allocation mechanism.

(1 − ) + ( /n), if Qix is the highest
πix =
 /n , otherwise

(3.11)

Furthermore, in Line 8, Qix is the Q-value of action x taken by agent ai . In Lines
8 and 9, 0 < α < 1 is the learning rate.
When finishing learning Q-values, ai and aj (Line 12) cooperate to find the
optimal actions for both of them, where match(x, y) is a function which is used
to test whether the actions x and y taken by ai and aj , respectively, are matched.
An action is only matched by its reverse action. Therefore, ai and aj have to
cooperate to find the actions, which can be matched together and maximize the
sum of their Q-values. Finally, ai and aj adjust their relation strength (Lines 14-17).
The adjustment depends on how many subtasks that aj completed for ai in the last
time steps, where the more subtasks completed by aj the higher relation strength
value achieved. In Line 14, Nji means the number of ai ’s subtasks completed by aj ,
and ρ3 is a threshold which is an integer.
After depicting each component/algorithm, another problem has to be dealt
with, namely that if the above four components/algorithms, i.e., cloning, spawning,
resource transferring and relation adaptation, are trigged simultaneously, in what
a sequence they should be executed. The four components/algorithms cannot be
executed in parallel, because it is very likely to incur conflicts. For example, at
a time step, an agent wants to transfer a resource to one of its neighbours, but
meanwhile, this agent is overloaded and has to clone itself. As described above,
the cloned agent should have the same resources as the original agent. However,
the original agent is transferring one of its resources to a neighbour, so the conflict
arises. Thus, we define a sequence to tackle such a conflict. If for an agent, the
four components are triggered simultaneously, the executed sequence is spawning,
resource transferring, relation adaptation, and cloning. The reason for defining such
a sequence can be explained as follows. Spawning is triggered when an agent cannot
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the assigned tasks on time. If the agent does not spawn immediately, it cannot
finish the tasks on time and thus, its benefits will be reduced. Because finishing
tasks on time is the most important thing for all agents, spawning has the highest
priority to be executed first. For an agent, resource transferring and cloning have
the same meaning with regard to reducing its overhead. However, transferring a
resource to a neighbour may help that neighbour to finish some tasks on time, so
resource transferring has higher priority than cloning. Again, finishing tasks on time
is the most important thing for all agents, so the priority of resource transferring is
higher than relation adaptation as well. Finally, for relation adaptation and cloning,
relation adaptation should be executed first. This is due to the triggering condition
of cloning, namely that cloning happens when an agent has too many neighbours.
Therefore, if relation adaptation could be executed first, some neighbours may be
removed from the agent’s neighbour set, and then, it may be unnecessary for cloning
to be executed.
According to the above description, it can be seen that each component in the
proposed mechanism is decentralised and operated based only on local information.
Hence, the mechanism is decentralised in nature and can be potentially applied in
distributed environments.

3.3

Experiments and Analysis

In order to objectively evaluate the performance of our mechanism, we ran an
experiment to compare our mechanism, simply written as Self-org., with three
other approaches. Because, to the best of our knowledge, there does not exist
a mechanism, which combines the three self-organisation principles together, i.e.,
cloning/spawning, resource exchange and relation adaptation, we select the most
efficient approach from each of the three research fields for comparison.
(1) Central : This is an ideal centralised task allocation approach, in which there
is an external omniscient central manager that maintains information about all the
agents and tasks in the network. The central manager is able to interact with all
the agents in the network without cost. This method is neither practical nor robust,
but it can be used as an upper bound of the performance in our experiment.
(2) Hybrid Model : For cloning/spawning, we select a famous model, developed
by Kamboj [Kam09]. Kamboj’s hybrid model consists of spawning and cloning. If
an agent is overloaded, it spawns off a new agent to handle part of its load. Then,
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if the task is too big and cannot be completed by a single agent, the task has to
be divided into subtasks, one or some of which are assigned to the newly spawned
agent. This approach is referred as breakup. On the other hand, if a task cannot
be broken up into smaller parts, the entire task will be assigned to the new agent.
This approach is referred as cloning. This hybrid model is better than those models,
which used only a single approach.
(3) MAL-Allocation: For resource exchange, we choose an efficient approach from
resource allocation research field. The selected resource allocation approach was
devised by Zhang et al. [ZLS09], which includes two multi-agent learning functions
for task allocation and transfer. Although Zhang et al.’s work is not the latest work
in the resource allocation research field, based on our investigation, it is the best one
suitable for resource exchange considered in this thesis, as their work was developed
in a cooperative and distributed environment and the transfered tasks did not need
to be returned back.
(4) K-Adapt: For relation adaptation, we opt for the latest and the most efficient
approach, i.e., K-Adapt, proposed by Kota et al. [KGJ10], which utilises a metareasoning approach to adapt the relation between two agents.
In the following subsections, experimental setup and results will be provided,
separately.

3.3.1

Experimental setup

In this experiment, the agent inter-connections in the task allocation network are
generated by using the Small World network [WS98], in which most neighbours of an
agent are connected to each other. Nonetheless, the approach presented in [WS98]
deals with only one relation between agents in the Small World network. We, thus,
modify the approach to accommodate multiple relations by randomly changing the
relation between two neighbouring agents. Moreover, in order to control the number
of resources that an agent can have, a parameter called Resource Probability (RP )
is employed, such that an agent is assigned a resource with probability RP. Hence,
with the increase of RP, agents could possess more resources. For simplicity, tasks
are created by randomly generating the required types of resources and the amount
of resources of each resource type. The task arrival time and task required time
are distributed according to Poisson and exponential distributions, separately, and
each task is randomly given to one of the agents in the network. Furthermore,
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as this thesis focuses on theoretical study, we just used a general programming
language, i.e., JAVA, to simulate the proposed mechanism. In this experiment, we
programmed a class, named ’agent’. Then, agents in the network are the objects
of this class. Thus, when an agent clones or spawns a new agent, a new object is
created, which contains the corresponding resources, and in the experiment, resource
types are simply represented as integers. Finally, two criteria are used to evaluate
these approaches. The first criterion is P rof itN ET (Equation 3.6), obtained by each
approach in a percentage format with the maximum network profit gained by the
Central approach. The second criterion is the number of tasks completed by each
agent with different approaches, which can be used to demonstrate load-balancing
situations in the system. For clarity, the values of parameters that are used in this
experiment and their meanings are listed in Table 3.2. These values were obtained
through attempts during the experimental period to yield the best results. For
the three competing approaches, i.e., Hybrid Model, MAL-Allocation and K-Adapt,
initially, their parameters were directly taken from the papers, which proposed these
approaches. Afterwards, we revised the parameters for these approaches to see
whether their performance could be improved in our experimental setting. Thus, the
experimental results presented in this thesis, regarding the competing approaches,
were also optimised by attempting the combination of different values of parameters.
Table 3.2: Parameters Setting
Para.s
n
deg
RP
m
C , C∼ , C≺
MT , MΓ
M  , M∼ , M≺
α1 , α2 , ζ

k
ρ1
ρ2 , ρ3

Values
100
6
0.3 and 0.8
2000
0.1, 0.12, 0.15
0.01, 0.015
0.01, 0.013, 0.021
0.3, 0.2, 0.2
0.4
100
6
5, 2

Explanations
The number of agents
The average number of neighbours
Resource Probability
The number of tasks in each round
Communication cost coefficients
Manage. comput. coefficients
Manage. relat. coefficients
Learning rate
Action selec. distrib. probab.
Learning rounds
Thres. for adapting relation strength
Thres. for choosing agents to adapt
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Figure 3.2: Performance of four approaches - Resource Probability (RP)=0.3

3.3.2

Experimental results and analysis

Figures 3.2 and 3.3 demonstrate the profit obtained by the four approaches with
different resource probabilities, i.e., Self-org., Hybrid Model, MAL-Allocation, KAdapt, in a percentage format compared with the upper bound approach, Central.
The x-axis represents the number of simulation runs and each simulation run consists of 2000 tasks. It can be seen that our Self-org. outperforms the other three
approaches in both situations. In Figure 3.2 (RP = 0.3), the difference between
Self-org. and other three approaches is gradually increasing. This is because that
when each agent has very few resources, agents have to allocate tasks to others.
Thus, an effective agent network structure could reduce agents’ communication cost
and management cost, and could raise the profit of the entire network. In this
case, a smarter approach could bring better performance through generating a more
effective network structure. With the increase of resource probability (Figure 3.3,
RP = 0.8), the profits obtained by all the four approaches are increased. This can
be explained by the fact that with higher resource probability, each agent would have
more resources and could fulfill more tasks by itself. Thus, each agent would have
less tasks to be allocated to other agents. This can decrease the communication cost
between agents, which incurs the increase of each agent’s profit. It should be noted
that the increase of profit under MAL-Allocation is relatively limited compared to
the other three approaches. This is due to the fact that when agents become more
homogeneous, each of them has less opportunity to require resources from others.
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Figure 3.3: Performance of four approaches - Resource Probability (RP)=0.8
Therefore, resource exchange approach is not very helpful in this situation. Additionally, agents under Hybrid Model may spawn off new agents in order to complete
tasks efficiently. Thereby, as time progresses, more and more agents will exist in the
network (although some useless cloned or spawned agents will be dissolved). Because an increasing number of agents would be helpful for completing tasks on time,
the performance of the hybrid approach could also be improved as time progresses.
Likewise, agents under K-Adapt can adapt relations among them to achieve an effective network structure. An effective agent network structure is helpful for efficient
task allocation by reducing agents’ communication cost and management cost, and
then can raise the profit of the entire network. Consequently, as time progresses,
the profit of the network, under K-Adapt, is increased as well. Figure 3.4 exhibits
the performance of the four approaches in different network scales, i.e., the number
of agents in the network varies from 25 to 250. With the growing number of agents
in the network, the four approaches present a same trend, namely that the profits
obtained by them first rise, then keep relatively steady and finally decline. This can
be explained by the fact that when the number of agents is very few (less than 75),
nearly every agent is overloaded, because each agent has to deal with many tasks.
Hence, the performance is relatively poor. When the number of agents increases, the
performance becomes better, since the burden on each agent can be shared by more
other agents. However, when the number of agents is very large (i.e., more than
175), the performance becomes worse. This is because that when a large number
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Figure 3.4: Performance of four approaches - different number of agents
of agents exist in the network, with the fixed average number of neighbours of each
agent, each agent has to form a long delegation chain to allocate its tasks, which
will incur more communication cost and management cost for maintaining tasks. It
should also be noticed that Self-org. and Hybrid Model outperform the other two
approaches notably when the number of agents is very few (i.e., less than 75). This
is owing to the fact that agents under Self-org. and Hybrid Model can clone or
spawn off new agents when they are overloaded, which could reduce the burden of
each agent in some extent and thus, the performance is improved.

Figure 3.5: Load-balancing of four approaches - after Round 1
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Figure 3.6: Load-balancing of four approaches - after Round 3
Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 reveal the situations of load-balancing of the four approaches after different simulation runs (i.e., Round 1, Round 3 and Round 6). Here,
load-balancing is used only as a test item, and it is not the focus of this thesis to
devise a good load-balancing algorithm. To measure load-balancing, we evaluated
that how many agents completed a specific number of subtasks. The x-axis demonstrates the different number of subtasks and the y-axis indicates how many agents
complete a specific number of subtasks under different approaches. Initially (in
Figure 3.5), the load distribution among agents under the four approaches exhibits
randomicity, but after three rounds (in Figure 3.6), the load distribution starts to
converge, i.e., the number of agents, which complete 50 ∼ 140 subtasks, increases.
Then, after six rounds (in Figure 3.7), this situation proceeds further, namely that
the agents, which complete 80 ∼ 140 subtasks, become the major part in the network. Although the four approaches have a similar trend on load-balancing, some
issues have to be pointed out. In Figure 3.7, it can be seen that Self-org. and Hybrid
Model limit the number of subtasks, completed by most agents, in a narrower range
(i.e., 80 ∼ 140) than MAL-Allocation and K-Adapt do (i.e., 50 ∼ 140). A narrower range implies that more agents complete the equal number of subtasks, so the
load-balancing performance of Self-org. and Hybrid Model is considered better. For
MAL-Allocation and K-Adapt, in Figure 3.7, we can also find that the load-balancing
of MAL-Allocation is better than that of K-Adapt deduced from the same theory.
Thereby, it can be concluded that cloning/spawning (Hybrid Model ) is an excellent
approach for load-balancing and resource re-distribution (MAL-Allocation) is also
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Figure 3.7: Load-balancing of four approaches - after Round 6
good at load-balancing in some extent, while relation adaptation (K-Adapt) seems
not doing very well for load-balancing. This can be ascribed to the fact that for relation adaptation (K-Adapt), the task waiting and allocation time can be shortened
but because agents do not exchange resources and no new agents are generated,
the number of subtasks completed by each agent is not affected very much, i.e., the
load cannot be balanced well in the network. Finally, as Self-org. combines the
advantages of the three other approaches, it achieves the best result.

Figure 3.8: Time consumption of four approaches
Figure 3.8 denotes the time consumption to finish each simulation run under the
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four approaches. It can be seen that initially, Self-org. consumes more time than
the other three approaches. This is because that initially the network structure is
ineffective, so each approach has to be operated frequently. Because Self-org. has
three components, it inevitably costs the most overhead. As time progresses, each
approach gradually converges to a stable state. It can be found that Self-org. converges faster than the other three approaches, and finally, the time consumption
under Self-org. is less than the time consumption under the other three approaches. This is also due to the fact that Self-org. has three components. When the
three components collaboratively work together, Self-org. can finish the network
restructuring process more quickly than the other three approaches. Additionally,
it is demonstrated that effectively combining the three components together can
eventually yield a better result than using only one component.
Overall, our approach can achieve around 85% ∼ 92% performance of the upper
bound centralised approach and is better than the other three approaches in all the
evaluated aspects. Moreover, the experiment also demonstrates that which approach
is good at which aspect. For example, K-Adapt can improve the overall network
profit better than Hybrid Model and MAL-Allocation; Hybrid Model is very good
at load-balancing; the general performance of MAL-Allocation is decent in all these
evaluated aspects except the one where the value of resource probability is quite
large.

3.4

Summary

This chapter presented an integrative self-organisation mechanism, which considered
three principles, i.e., cloning/spawning, resource exchange and relation adaptation,
while each current related study considered only one principle. In addition, for
relation adaptation, the integrative self-organisation mechanism involves three elements. The first element is that, for candidate selection, a trust model is integrated
to enable agents to use not only their own experience but also other agents opinions
to select candidates, which can make agents select the most valuable candidates to
adapt relations. In comparison, currently developed relation adaption mechanisms
oversimplified the candidate selection process, because under these mechanisms, agents use only their own experience to select candidates. The second element is that,
as this thesis takes multiple types of relations into account, a multi-agent Q-learning
algorithm is developed for adapting multiple relations, while most related studies
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considered only one type of relations. Kota et al.’s [KGJ10] algorithm can also deal
with multiple types of relations. The main difference between our algorithm and
theirs is that (i) our algorithm can handle weighted relations, while Kota et al.’s
algorithm was designed for crisp relations only; (ii) our algorithm can balance the
exploration and exploitation, whereas Kota et al.’s algorithm overlooked this balance
and always chose the most beneficial action at each step. This may let their algorithm converge to a suboptimal state, as stated by Kaelbling et al.[KLM96]. The third
element is that, in contrast with current related approaches, which consider only
crisp relations, weighted relations are introduced in this thesis. The introduction of
weighted relations can improve the performance of our self-organisation mechanism
and make the mechanism more suitable in dynamic environments.

Chapter 4
A Self-adaptation Based Dynamic
Coalition Formation Mechanism
In this chapter, a dynamic coalition formation mechanism is devised. This mechanism takes into account the existence of a neighbourhood network structure among agents for coalition formation. In addition, by introducing the notion of
self-organisation, this mechanism not only allow agents to join multiple coalitions,
but also allow agents to dynamically change their degrees of involvement in multiple
coalitions and to join new coalitions at anytime if necessary. Thus, agents can have
autonomy and flexibility when they execute tasks.

4.1

Agent Network Model

To cope with the issue of coalition formation in a structured agent network, we first
give the formal definition of the agent network.
Definition 4.1. (Agent Network ). An agent network consists of a set of interdependent agents, namely A = {a1 , ..., an }, and a Compatible Relation R, R ⊆ A × A.
The meaning of R is “a neighbour of ”, so we denote an ordered couple hai , aj i ∈ R
if and only if aj is a neighbour of ai . Since R is a Compatible Relation, namely that
R is reflexive and symmetric, it can be achieved that ∀ai : ai ∈ A ⇒ hai , ai i ∈ R
and ∀ai , aj ∈ A : hai , aj i ∈ R ⇒ haj , ai i ∈ R.
The definition of the reflexive and symmetric relation R is to indicate that the
connection between two agents is bidirectional. This definition is necessary, because when an agent wants another agent to join the former’s coalition, there is a
negotiation between them.
Each agent a ∈ A is composed of three tuples hra , N eig(a), State(a)i, where, ra is
the resource, which agent a contains, N eig(a) is a set, which contains the neighbours
of agent a, and State(a) demonstrates the state of agent a. Each agent a ∈ A has
70
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a single fixed resource1 , ra ∈ [1, ε], where ε is the number of different resources
that are present in the agent network. Before describing the states of an agent, we
provide the definition of three roles, i.e., Initiator, Participant and Mediator.
Definition 4.2. (Initiator ), (Participant) and (Mediator ). In an agent network,
the agent, which initialises a task allocation is called Initiator; the agent, which
accepts the announced task is called Participant; and the agent that receives another
agent’s commitments for assistance to find Participants is called Mediator.
It should be noted that the roles, i.e., Initiator, Participant and Mediator, do
not imply any architecture in a coalition. Instead, different roles are used only to
distinguish different responsibilities of agents.
Definition 4.3. (States). There are two states of agents in the network, i.e.,
States = {IDLE, BU SY }, and an agent can be only in one of the two states at
any time step. When an agent is an Initiator, Participant or Mediator the state of
an agent is BUSY. An agent in IDLE state is available and has not been assigned
or committed to any task.
In this thesis, it is supposed that only an IDLE agent can be assigned to a new
task as an Initiator ; both IDLE and BUSY agents can join partially fulfilled tasks
as Participants or be committed to partially fulfilled tasks as Mediator s. A partially
fulfilled task is a task, for which a full coalition is in the formation procedure and
has not yet formed.
Suppose there is a set of tasks Θ = {θ1 , ..., θm } arriving at the agent network.
Each task θ ∈ Θ consists of four tuples, namely hAT (θ), DL(θ), P D(θ), R(θ)i. AT (θ)
is the arrival time of task θ, DL(θ) indicates the latest start time of task θ, P D(θ)
indicates that how long it will take to finish the task θ and R(θ) = {rθ1 , ..., rθj } is a set
that dictates the resources, which are needed for successfully completing the task.
Therefore, for each task, the Initiator has to find appropriate agents, which have
the required resources, to form a coalition to handle the task. The term coalition is
defined as follows.
Definition 4.4. (Coalition). A coalition c is a set of agents, i.e., c ⊆ A, which
cooperate together in order to complete a complex task θ ∈ Θ. Each coalition is
associated with a task, and then there is a set of coalitions C = {c1 , ..., ch }, which
are associated with tasks, θ1 , ..., θh , respectively. A valid coalition should satisfy
the situation that the resources of agents in the coalition should cover the required
1

This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4.3.
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a∈cj

ra ⊇ R(θj ).

To form a coalition, the Initiator of a task needs to make a contract with each
Participant. The details of contracts will be described later in Section 4.2.1. It
should be noted that, in this thesis, each agent is allowed to join multiple coalitions.
Thus, the term, “degree of involvement”, is also needed.
Definition 4.5. Degree of Involvement (DoI) 2 . A degree of involvement indicates
the extent that an agent belongs to a coalition. The value of DoI is ranged in (0, 1],
where a higher value means that an agent belongs to a coalition in a larger extent.
The sum of DoI values of an agent in different coalitions should be equal to or less
than 1.
A degree of involvement in a coalition has an effect on the cost of an agent to
complete a task. The initial DoI value of an agent joining a coalition is determined
by a contract, which is achieved through negotiation between the Initiator and the
Participant. The DoI value of an agent can be adjusted at any time in the future by
paying penalty to the counterpart. Thus, it can be seen that a coalition is formed
via making contracts between the Initiator and Participants.
After formalising the agent network, the principle of our coalition formation
mechanism will be depicted.

4.2

Coalition Formation Mechanism

In an agent network, agents make decisions based only on local information about the
system, and the decision making process of agents is autonomous without external
control. Hence, we need to define another set P = {P1 , ..., Pn }. P is defined as
a partition of the Compatible Relation R, which has been described in Definition
S
4.1. Accordingly, it can be obtained that 1≤i≤n Pi = R and ∀Pi , Pj ∈ P : i 6= j ⇒
Pi ∩ Pj = ∅. The set P can be generated by using Algorithm 4.
From Algorithm 4, it can be found that Pi is composed of ordered couples,
and each ordered couple dictates an agent, which is a neighbour of ai . Pi and
N eig(ai ) look like having the same meaning, but, actually, they are used for different
purposes. Pi represents not only neighbours of agent ai but also other agents,
which have indirect connections with ai established during future task allocation
2

The concept of “degree of involvement” was originally mentioned in operation research field,
e.g. [Str67, Aub81], where such a concept described the participation level of a person to an
organisation, e.g., how much time or how many resources a person uses in an organisation. In this
thesis, this concept is borrowed for our problem.
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Algorithm 4: Create a partition P on relation R
1 for each ai , ai ∈ A, in sequential order do
2
if ∃aj ∈ A : hai , aj i ∈ R then
3
Pi ← Pi ∪ {hai , aj i};
4
end
5 end

processes, although Pi initially denotes only neighbours of agent ai . On the other
hand, N eig(ai ) stores only directly linked neighbouring agents of agent ai . The
coalition formation mechanism, used by an Initiator to find appropriate agents to
form a coalition, is illustrated in Algorithm 5 as follows.
Algorithm 5: Coalition formation process
1 Call Algorithm 4 to generate P ;
2 for each θi , θi ∈ Θ, in sequential order do
3
randomly select an IDLE agent, ai ∈ A, as Initiator ;
4
State(ai ) ← BU SY ;
5
while t < DL(θi ) do
// t is the real time
6
for each aj ∈ A : hai , aj i ∈ Pi do
7
if ∃rθl i ∈ R(θi ) : rθl i = raj and rθl i is unsatisfied then
8
Negotiate(ai , aj );
9
end
10
end
11
if ∀rθl i ∈ R(θi ) : rθl i is satisfied then
12
break;
13
else
14
select ak as Mediator based on the number of ak ’s neighbours,
where hai , ak i ∈ Pi ;
15
State(ak ) ← BU SY ;
16
Pi ← P i ◦ Pk ;
17
end
18
end
19 end

For each task θi , in Line 3, an IDLE agent is randomly selected to be an Initiator,
denoted as ai . In this thesis, tasks come from outside of the agent network. A
new task can arrive at each time step with a specific probability, and is given to
a randomly selected IDLE agent. Then, before the deadline of task θi (Line 5),
ai checks whether the resources of its neighbours, including itself, can satisfy any
resource requirements of task θi . If any neighbouring agent can satisfy any one of

4.2. Coalition Formation Mechanism

74

the resource requirements, ai will negotiate with this agent regarding the degree of
involvement of this agent in ai ’s coalition (Lines 6 − 10). The negotiation protocol
(Line 8), adopted to make a contract between an Initiator and a Participant, will
be described later. It should be noted that, in Line 6, ai selects coalition members
only from the set Pi , which consists of ai ’s neighbours (and mediators’ neighbours if
any). Thus, our coalition formation mechanism takes the communication constraint
into account. Thereafter, in Lines 11 − 13, if all the resource requirements of task
θi are satisfied, the coalition has been formed and the task can be started. It
should be noted that, for a single resource requirement, ai has to make several
temporary agreements, i.e., temporary contracts, with several different agents, (one
temporary agreement with one distinct agent), because agents may cancel temporary
agreements before final agreements are made and leave the Initiator ai very little
time to find an alternative. Thus, multiple temporary agreements are used to reduce
the possibility of an Initiator ’s failure to form a coalition. However, making too
many temporary agreements for a single resource will incur much communication
cost to the Initiator. Hence, there is a trade-off with regard to the number of
temporary agreements for a single resource. In this thesis, the number of temporary
agreements for a single resource is set to two, which is obtained through experiments
to achieve the best results. Here, a temporary agreement means that when an agent,
say aj , decides to join the Initiator ai ’s partial formed coalition, where some task
resource requirements have not been satisfied, the agreement between ai and aj
is a temporary agreement. A temporary agreement can be canceled by either the
Initiator or the Participant at any time without paying penalty. Once the coalition
becomes a full coalition, namely that all the task resource requirements are satisfied,
those uncanceled temporary agreements will automatically become final agreements
and cannot be canceled by either party of the agreements. For the clarity purpose,
such details of temporary agreements are not demonstrated in Algorithm 5. On
the other hand, if any resource requirement is not satisfied, in Line 14, ai selects
one of the agents in the set Pi as Mediator, say ak , and commits task θi to ak .
Then, ak will be responsible for ai to find available coalition members from ak ’s
neighbours. The Mediator selection is based on the number of neighbours that each
neighbour of ai has. The more neighbours an agent has, the higher probability that
agent could be selected as a Mediator. In the case that ak ’s neighbours still cannot
fulfill the resource requirements of task θi , ak chooses one of its neighbours as a
new Mediator and commits task θi to the new Mediator. This process will continue
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untill the deadline of task θi is reached. In Line 16, the notation “◦” is relational
composition. The meaning of this notation is that ∀ hxi , yi i ∈ X, hyj , zj i ∈ Y :
yi = yj ⇒ hxi , zj i ∈ Z. In this thesis, relational composition is utilised to model
indirect connections between Initiator s and Participants via Mediator s. Through
this way, an Initiator can request not only its directly linked neighbours but also
other indirectly connected agents for help.

4.2.1

The negotiation protocol

In order to operate the coalition formation mechanism, we need another important
component, i.e., a negotiation protocol. The coalition formation problem can be
modeled as a negotiation process between an Initiator and a Participant, where an
Initiator acts as a buyer and a Participant plays as a seller. The negotiation focuses
on a single issue, i.e., the degree of involvement of a Participant into a coalition,
which is being formed by an Initiator. Two constraints are listed as follows, with
which each agent should comply.
1. The degree of involvement of an Initiator in its initiated coalition is postulated to be 1 and cannot be adapted3 . Other agents, which are not Initiator s, can
dynamically join multiple coalitions with different degrees of involvement.
2. Both Initiator s and Participants cannot cancel final agreements. Participants
can adapt the degrees of involvement in their joined coalitions by paying penalty to
Initiator s, and Participants can join other new coalitions if necessary. Temporary
agreements can be canceled by either Initiator s or Participants without paying
penalty.
The negotiation protocol employed in this thesis extends the alternating offers
protocol [Rub82] by allowing an agent to make multiple agreements with other
agents and to cancel temporary agreements without paying penalty. The alternating
offers protocol [Rub82] has been widely used for bilateral bargaining (e.g., An et al.
[ALIZ]). Other more complex negotiation protocols may be also available for our
problem, e.g., [AL11, ALS11], but based on our investigation, the alternating offers
protocol is powerful enough for our problem and it is easy to implement. It should
be noted that the main contribution of this mechanism is the idea of integrating the
self-adaptation notion into dynamic coalition formation rather than this negotiation
3

This postulation is set, because it is conceived that an Initiator usually has to negotiate with
many other agents to form a coalition, and thus, it usually does not have enough energy and time
to finish other Initiator s’ tasks.
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protocol used only for realising the self-adaptation notion.
There are four possible actions that a buyer (Initiator ) and a seller (Participant)
can take.
• of f er[o], where o is buyer ’s offer to a seller. An offer is determined by four
factors, which are the pressure of deadline, the payment of the resource paid by the
buyer to the seller, the duration of using the resource, and the demand/supply ratio
of the buyer ’s required resource.
• accept[o]. When a seller receives an offer o, it can accept the offer, which
results in a temporary agreement made with the buyer.
• counter of f er[o0 ]. If a seller is not happy with an offer o, it can send back a
counter-offer o0 for its available resource. A counter-offer o0 is determined by three
aspects, which include the current state of the seller, e.g., whether it has joined
other coalitions and the degrees of involvement into those coalitions, the payment
received by the seller from the buyer, and the demand/supply ratio of the seller ’s
available resource.
• cancel[o]. After a temporary agreement is achieved by a buyer and a seller,
any one of them can cancel the temporary agreement without paying penalty. A
final agreement, however, cannot be canceled by either a buyer or a seller.
The negotiation protocol, displayed in Line 8 of Algorithm 5, is shown in Algorithm 6 as follows.
During a predefined negotiation period, in Line 2, the buyer ai first generates
an offer o and sends the offer to the seller aj , where o = hpay, DoIu , DoIl , pe, pdi.
Each element in o is calculated by using the following equations.

p(ra ) t−AT (θ) , if AT (ai ) = ∅
j DL(θ)−AT (θ)
pay =
p(r
 aj ) t−AT (θ) , otherwise

(4.1)

|AT (ai )| DL(θ)−AT (θ)

DoIu = 1 −

pay
p(raj )

(4.2)

DoIu
τ

(4.3)

pe = α · pay

(4.4)

pd = P D(θ)

(4.5)

DoIl =
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Algorithm 6: Negotiate(ai , aj )
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

// ai is the buyer and aj is the seller
while t <a predefined period do
ai generates an offer o to aj ;
if aj accepts o then
AT (ai ) ← AT (ai ) ∪ {o};
AT (aj ) ← AT (aj ) ∪ {o};
State(aj ) ← BU SY ;
return;
else
aj generates a counter-offer o0 to ai ;
if ai accepts o0 then
AT (ai ) ← AT (ai ) ∪ {o0 };
AT (aj ) ← AT (aj ) ∪ {o0 };
State(aj ) ← BU SY ;
return;
else
continue;
end
end
end

// t is the real time

In Equation 4.1, pay is the intended payment made by ai to aj , p(raj ) is the
maximum payment that ai can endure for the required resource raj , AT (ai ) is the
set of temporary agreements achieved by ai for the resource raj , and |AT (ai )| denotes
the number of temporary agreements in the set AT (ai ). An Initiator can get benefit
from the task if and only if all the subtasks of the task are completed, while a
Participant can obtain the relevant payment when it finishes the assigned subtask.
Here, a subtask corresponds to a resource requirement of a task.
In Equation 4.2, DoIu is the upper bound degree of involvement in the coalition,
which ai wants aj to join for task θ. It can be found that ai ’s expected DoIu value
of aj in ai ’s coalition decreases with the increase of payment from ai to aj , which
seems somewhat weird. This is caused by ai ’s concession strategy, as ai ’s deadline
is approaching. Such time-dependent concession strategies have been broadly used
in the literature (e.g., Faratin et al. [FSJ98]).
In Equation 4.3, DoIl is the lower bound degree of involvement about aj in ai ’s
coalition, which means that aj cannot reduce its DoI value in ai ’s coalition less than
DoIl . τ is a coefficient, which is a positive integer. Thus, if aj accepts an offer from

4.2. Coalition Formation Mechanism

78

ai , its original degree of involvement in ai ’coalition is DoIu . aj is able to decrease
its DoI value in ai ’ coalition later, but the DoI value must not be less than DoIl .
In Equation 4.4, α, where 0 < α < 1, is a coefficient and pe is the total penalty
if aj wants to reduce the degree of involvement in ai ’s coalition from the upper
bound to the lower bound, i.e., from DoIu to DoIl . The exact penalty aj should
pay to ai , recorded as pej→i , is based on the extent that aj wants to lessen the
degree of involvement in ai ’s coalition. Specifically, pej→i can be calculated by
using Equation 4.6, where DoI 0 is the current degree of involvement and DoI 00 is
the intended degree of involvement to which aj wants to adjust. For example, aj ’s
original DoI value in ai ’s coalition is 1, i.e., DoIu = 1 and the lower bound is 0.33,
i.e., DoIl = 0.33 (suppose τ = 3). Its current DoI value in ai ’s coalition is 0.8,
i.e., DoI 0 = 0.8 (suppose that aj has changed its DoI value in ai ’s coalition in
order to join another coalition with DoI value 0.2). Now, an agent, say ak , also
wants aj to join its coalition with DoI value 0.3. Then, aj may reduce the DoI
value in ai ’s coalition again from 0.8 to 0.5, i.e., DoI 00 = 0.5, by paying the penalty,
pej→i =

pe
1−0.33

· (0.8 − 0.5), to ai , and simultaneously join ak ’s coalition with DoI

value 0.3, (recall that the sum of DoI values of aj should not be greater than 1).
aj never wants to increase its DoI value in any coalition, as this will not bring any
revenue to aj but will even incur an extra cost to aj .
pe
· (DoI 0 − DoI 00 )
(4.6)
DoIu − DoIl
In Equation 4.5, pd indicates the period, during which the required resource is
pej→i =

needed.
After receiving an offer o from ai , in Line 3, aj evaluates whether the offer o is
acceptable. This evaluation is based on how much revenue aj could get (Equation
4.7). In Equation 4.7, the cost of aj depends on its degree of involvement in ai ’s
coalition and how long its resource will be used by ai . The notation pej→k means
the penalty that aj has to pay other Initiator s if aj wants to lower its DoI values
in their coalitions.

pay − cost, if AT (aj ) = ∅
rv =
pay − cost − pe , otherwise

(4.7)

j→k

If rv is greater than a predefined threshold, aj will accept the offer o and a
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temporary agreement is achieved (Lines 4 and 5). Otherwise, aj generates a counteroffer o0 to ai (Line 9). The elements, which consist of a counter-offer o0 , are the same
as those in an offer o. Since the negotiation issue is only the degree of involvement
as described earlier, aj will adjust only its DoI value in o to meet its predefined
threshold revenue via Equation 4.7 and will create a counter-offer o0 with the newly
calculated DoI value. ai then will evaluate the counter-offer o0 by comparing the
DoI value in o0 with its reserved DoI value. If the DoI value in o0 is greater than its
reserved DoI value, o0 is acceptable and a temporary agreement is achieved (Lines
11 and 12). Otherwise, ai continues to go to the next negotiation round (Line 16)
untill the predefined negotiation period is reached.
When all the resource requirements are satisfied, the Initiator, i.e., the buyer, ai
will select the most valuable (the least payment) temporary agreement and cancel
other temporary agreements. For the Participant, i.e., the seller, aj can execute
several tasks simultaneously with the summation of DoI values equal to or less than
1.

4.2.2

How does an agent adjust DoI values?

There is another problem in the coalition formation process, which has to be solved,
i.e., how can an agent adjust its DoI values in current coalitions in order to minimise
its penalty when it joins a new coalition? Here is an example to illustrate the
problem. An agent has joined three coalitions with DoI values 0.2, 0.3 and 0.5,
respectively. After negotiation, this agent decides to join a new coalition with DoI
value 0.4. Now, the agent has to decide how to adjust the DoI values in the three
current coalitions, as the sum of the DoI values in the current three coalitions should
be at most 0.6 (derived from 1 − 0.4) and this agent has to minimise its penalty
(remember that reducing DoI value in a coalition will incur penalty). We first
formulate the problem and then provide an algorithm to solve this problem.
Let us suppose that an agent, say aj , has joined n coalitions. The sum of DoI
P
values in these n coalitions is 1, i.e., 1≤i≤n DoIi = 1. Now another agent also wants
aj to join its coalition with the degree of involvement DoIn+1 . If aj is interested
in the new offer, i.e., DoIn+1 , it has to calculate the minimal penalty it will pay to
the n coalition leaders. It is assumed that aj reduces ∆DoIi in ith coalition, where
0 ≤ ∆DoIi ≤ DoIi − DoIli . The question for aj is how to select each ∆DoIi in order
P
P
i
to minimise 1≤i≤n DoI ipe−DoI
i ∆DoIi , given
1≤i≤n (DoIi − ∆DoIi ) + DoIn+1 = 1,
u

l
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where pei is the total penalty if aj wants to reduce the degree of involvement in ai ’s
coalition from the upper bound to the lower bound. For convenience, we denote
pei
,
DoIui −DoIli

peRatei =

whose value is known by aj . Likewise, the given condition
P
P
can be written as another form 1≤i≤n ∆DoIi = C and C = 1≤i≤n+1 DoIi − 1.
Since each DoIi (1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1) is known by aj , the value of C is known by aj as
well. The question now can be represented as how to select each ∆DoIi in order to
P
P
minimise 1≤i≤n peRatei · ∆DoIi , given 1≤i≤n ∆DoIi = C. Algorithm 7 can be
used to derive the optimal ∆DoIi .
Algorithm 7: Adjusting DoI values
// Suppose
that agent aj attempts to adjust n DoI values
P
1 if
(DoIi − DoIli ) < C then
1≤i≤n
2
3

break;
in this case, the offer is unacceptable
P // no solution
i
else if
(DoIi − DoIl ) = C then
1≤i≤n

4
5
6
7

for each ∆DoIi , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
∆DoIi ← DoIi − DoIli ;
end
P
else //
(DoIi − DoIli ) > C
1≤i≤n

8
9

ranking peRatei , such that peRate1 ≤ ... P
≤ peRaten ;
find an integer k, 1 ≤ k < n, such that
(DoIi − DoIli ) < C and
1≤i<k
P
(DoIi − DoIli ) ≥ C;
1≤i≤k

10
11
12
13
14

for 1 ≤ i < k do
∆DoIi ← DoIi − DoIli ;
end
for i = k do
P
∆DoIi ← C −
(DoIi − DoIli );
1≤i<k

15
16
17
18
19

end
for k < i ≤ n do
∆DoIi ← 0;
end
end
The proof of validity of Algorithm 7 is provided as follows.

P
Proposition 4.2.1 The result derived from Algorithm 7 can minimise 1≤i≤n peRatei ·
P
∆DoIi , given 1≤i≤n ∆DoIi = C.
P
P
Proof: For cases 1 and 2, i.e.,
(DoIi − DoIli ) < C and
(DoIi − DoIli ) = C,
1≤i≤n

1≤i≤n
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the validity of the algorithm is obvious. Thus, our proof focuses on case 3, i.e.,
P
(DoIi − DoIli ) > C.
1≤i≤n
P
According to Algorithm 7, in case 3, it is easy to deduce that
∆DoIi = C,
1≤i≤n
0
∆DoI1 , ..., ∆DoIn0 ,

so the condition can be satisfied. We arbitrarily select
where
P
0
i
0
each ∆DoIi ∈ [0, DoIi − DoIl ] and
∆DoIi = C. What we need to do now is
1≤i≤n
P
P
to prove
peRatei · ∆DoIi0 ≥
peRatei · ∆DoIi . It is easy to achieve that
1≤i≤n

1≤i≤n


∆DoI 0 ≤ ∆DoIi = DoIi − DoI i , 1 ≤ i < k;
i
l
∆DoI 0 ≥ ∆DoI = 0, k < i ≤ n.
i
i
P
P
P
If ∆DoIk0 ≥ ∆DoIk ,4 because
(∆DoIk0 −∆DoIk ) =
∆DoIk0 −
∆DoIk =
1≤i≤n
1≤i≤n
1≤i≤n
P
P
C −C = 0, we thus have
−(∆DoIk0 −∆DoIk ) =
(∆DoIk0 −∆DoIk ). There1≤i<k

k≤i≤n

fore, from peRate1 ≤ ... ≤ peRaten , we can deduce that
P
peRatei · ∆DoIi0 −
peRatei · ∆DoIi
1≤i≤n
1≤i≤n
P
peRatei · (∆DoIk0 − ∆DoIk )
=
1≤i≤n
P
P
peRatei · (∆DoIk0 − ∆DoIk )
=
−peRatei · −(∆DoIk0 − ∆DoIk ) +
k≤i≤n
1≤i<k
P
P
peRatek · (∆DoIk0 − ∆DoIk )
≥
−peRatek−1 · −(∆DoIk0 − ∆DoIk ) +
k≤i≤n
1≤i<k
P
P
(∆DoIk0 − ∆DoIk )
= −peRatek−1 ·
−(∆DoIk0 − ∆DoIk ) + peRatek ·
k≤i≤n
1≤i<k
P
P
(∆DoIk0 − ∆DoIk )
= −peRatek−1 ·
(∆DoIk0 − ∆DoIk ) + peRatek ·
k≤i≤n
k≤i≤n
P
= (peRatek − peRatek−1 ) ·
(∆DoIk0 − ∆DoIk ) ≥ 0.
P

k≤i≤n

Then, this result indicates that ∆DoI1 , ..., ∆DoIn derived from Algorithm 7 can
P
P
minimise 1≤i≤n peRatei · ∆DoIi , given 1≤i≤n ∆DoIi = C.
After illustrating our self-adaptation based coalition formation mechanism, in
the next section, we will demonstrate its performance in a simulated agent network
in comparison with other coalition formation mechanisms.

4.3

Experiments and Analysis

In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed coalition formation mechanism,
a set of simulation experiments are conducted. In these experiments, an agent
network is initialised by using the random geometric graphs [DC02], which can be
constructed to have a wide range of densities, i.e., the varying average number of
4

For the case that ∆DoIk0 < ∆DoIk , the deducing process is the same.
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neighbours. We first describe the experimental setup and thereafter present the
experimental results and analysis.

4.3.1

Experimental setup

To objectively exhibit the effectiveness of our coalition formation mechanism, named
Self-Adaptation Coalition Formation (SACF ), we compare our mechanism with
three other mechanisms, i.e., Centralised mechanism, Classic Coalition Formation
(CCF ) [GSS08] mechanism and Flexible Coalition Formation (FCF ) mechanism.
1. Centralised mechanism (CM ): This is an ideal centralised coalition formation
mechanism, in which there is an external omniscient central manager that maintains
information about all the agents and tasks. The central manager is able to interact
with all the agents in the network without cost. When an agent has a complex
task to be completed, it simply requests the central manager to seek for the most
suitable agents in the network, which could fulfill the task and form coalitions with
those agents. This method is not practical or robust, but it can be used as an upper
bound of the performance in our experiment.
2. Classic Coalition Formation mechanism (CCF ): This mechanism was proposed by Glinton et al. [GSS08], which does not enable agents to either dynamically adjust their degrees of involvement in a coalition or autonomously join multiple
coalitions. These two behaviours, i.e., adjusting degrees of involvement and joining
multiple coalitions, are self-organising behaviours. Thus, it can be conceived that
CCF does not integrate self-adaptation5 . Through the comparison with CCF, the
significance of integrating self-adaptation into coalition formation could be revealed.
3. Flexible Coalition Formation mechanism (FCF ): This mechanism is created by
us, which is a simplified version of SACF. This mechanism allows agents to breach a
contract and leave a coalition by paying penalty to the coalition leader, i.e., Initiator.
Agents, however, cannot partially breach a contract. Therefore, agents can join only
one coalition at any time step. By comparing with this mechanism, the importance
of the notion, i.e., the degree of involvement, can be exposed.
In the agent network, each agent is randomly assigned a single resource ra ∈
5

Glinton et al. enabled the agent network structure to be changed, namely that each agent can
remove its current neighbours and establish connections with other agents as its new neighbours.
This agent network structure adaptation process was called self-adaptation in their paper. The
aim of their paper is to investigate whether limiting the number of neighbours of each agent has
impact on the coalition formation result. For the CCF algorithm itself, i.e., the coalition formation
algorithm employed in their paper, no self-adaptation concept was introduced.
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[1, ε]. For simplicity, tasks are created by randomly generating resource requirements
(R(θ)). The number of resources required for a given task is chosen uniformly from
[1, ε], as a result |R(θ)| ≤ ε. Then, each rθl ∈ R(θ) is selected randomly from [1, ε].
In addition, at each time step, a task arrives at the agent network with a probability
λ. The required time to complete a task (P D(θ)) is a random positive integer and
the latest start time of a task (DL(θ)) is also a random positive integer, which must
be greater than the task arrival time (AT (θ)). The task is then randomly assigned
to an IDLE agent for allocation as described in Section 4.2. Finally, the evaluation
criteria consists of P rof itN et , which is the summation of each individual agent’s
profit, and time consumed by these mechanisms. P rof itN et can be calculated by
using Equation 4.8.

P rof itN et =

|A|
X

(rewardi + recP enaltyi − penaltyi )

(4.8)

i=1

In Equation 4.8, each agent’s profit is the difference between its income and
payout. An agent’s, say ai ’s, income consists of the reward, which is obtained when it
completes tasks (rewardi ), and the penalty, which is received from other agents when
they change their degrees of involvement in that agent’s coalition (recP enaltyi ). An
agent’s payout is the penalty it pays to the coalition leaders, i.e., the Initiator s, when
it changes its degrees of involvement in their coalitions (penaltyi ). |A| denotes the
number of agents in the network. As this thesis mainly focuses on theoretical study,
we just use a general programming language, i.e., JAVA, to simulate the proposed
mechanism. In the experiment, ’agent’ is initially programmed as a class and then all
agents are the objects of this class, and resources are simply represented as integers.
Moreover, the experiment is run on Windows XP SP3 operating system with Intel
Core 2 Duo 3GHz CPU and 2GB RAM. The experimental results are obtained by
averaging 100 runs.
For clarity, the values of parameters, which are exploited in these experiments
and their meanings are listed in Table 4.1. These values were chosen experimentally
to provide the best results.

4.3.2

Experimental results and analysis

Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrate the relative percentage profits obtained by
SACF, CCF and FCF, respectively, compared with the maximum profit, which is
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Table 4.1: Parameters Setting
Para.
Values
Explanations
n
200 ∼ 400
The number of agents

10
The number of resource types
deg
4 ∼ 12
The average number of neighbours
m
50000
The number of time steps
α
0.2
The ratio to calculate penalty from payment
τ
3
The ratio of upper bound to lower bound DoI values
λ
0.1 ∼ 0.9
The probability with which tasks are introduced
gained by the Centralised mechanism (CM ). It can be seen that SACF performs
consistently better than CCF and FCF in all situations. This is because that SACF
allows an agent to dynamically join more than one coalitions by adapting its degree
of involvement in each coalition and this mechanism can potentially make each agent
get more profit.

Figure 4.1: Profit on different average degrees relative to CM
In Figure 4.1, (where the number of agents is 300 and task arrival probability
is 0.5), with the increasing average number of neighbours, the profits obtained by
agents under SACF, CCF and FCF are gradually ascending. This is because that
when each agent has more neighbours, an Initiator can form coalitions for more
tasks in a predefined period because it does not always need to commit tasks to
other agents. In other words, each agent having more neighbours can accelerate
coalition formation process and make more tasks to be completed in the predefined
period. It should also be noted in Figure 4.1 that the profit obtained by agents under
CCF rises much more sharply than that under SACF and FCF, which means that
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CCF depends heavily on the density (average number of neighbours) of a network.

Figure 4.2: Profit on different number of agents relative to CM
In Figure 4.2, (where the average number of neighbours is 8 and task arrival
probability is 0.5), when more agents form a network, the profit obtained by agents
under CCF decreases steeply but that under both SACF and FCF keeps relatively
steady. This can be explained by the fact that when the number of agents increases
but the average number of neighbours of each agent is fixed, each task is potentially
to be allocated through a longer commitment chain and thus, in a predefined period,
less tasks can be allocated. Under SACF, however, an agent can dynamically join
multiple coalitions to execute more than one tasks and therefore can obtain extra
profit. Likewise, under FCF, an agent has the flexibility to leave a coalition and join
another coalition. Thereby, this flexibility encourages agents to join more profitable
coalitions, and this flexibility can bring extra profits to agents.
In Figure 4.3, (where the number of agents is 300 and the average number of
neighbours is 8), when, at each time step, a task arrives more possibly, the profit
obtained by agents under CCF reduces remarkably, while, in comparison, the profit
obtained by agents under SACF and FCF drops only a little. This can be ascribed
to the fact that when tasks arrive with a low probability, which results in a small
number of tasks in the agent network, Initiator s relatively have low possibilities
to encounter BUSY agents during their task allocation processes, so all the three
mechanisms, SACF, CCF and FCF, can obtain decent performance. Nevertheless,
once tasks arrive with a very high probability, i.e., a large number of tasks in the
network, Initiator s are very likely to meet BUSY agents during their task allocation
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Figure 4.3: Profit on different task arrival probabilities relative to CM
processes. Initiator s under the CCF mechanism then have to give up the BUSY agents and try to find other IDLE agents, which decreases the possibility of successful
coalition formation. Under SACF and FCF, even if Initiator s meet BUSY agents,
these Initiator s still have the chance to establish coalitions with those BUSY agents.
Thus, agents are more possible to achieve more profits. The acute readers might
consider that, under the FCF mechanism, once an agent breaches a contract, i.e.,
leaving a coalition, and joining another coalition, the number of successfully formed
coalitions does not increase compared with the CCF mechanism. This consideration
is reasonable. However, under the FCF mechanism, when an agent leaves a coalition, it has to pay penalty to the coalition leader, i.e, the Initiator. This penalty is
counted as a profit of the Initiator, so the overall profit of the entire agent network
still rises.

Figure 4.4: Time consumption of different mechanisms
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In Figure 4.4, (where the number of agents is 300 and task arrival probability
is 0.5), the average time consumption of each task is displayed, which exhibits that
the three mechanisms spent almost the same time length to finish each simulation
run (which consists of 50000 time steps). This is due to the fact that when an
Initiator, under CCF, meets a BUSY agent, the Initiator has to bypass this BUSY
agent and tries to find an IDLE agent, but an Initiator, under SACF and FCF, can
also negotiate with the BUSY agent and the BUSY agent may join the Initiator ’s
coalition. Thereby, agents under SACF and FCF need to negotiate with Initiators
regarding their participation and this negotiation obviously costs some extra time.
On the other hand, agents under CCF have to bypass some BUSY agents when
allocating tasks and bypassing BUSY agents to find suitable IDLE agents also needs
some additional time. Furthermore, it can be found that the time consumption of
FCF is a little less than that of SACF. This is because that under FCF, when an
agent decides to breach a contract, it does not need to adjust its DoI values, since
it can join only one coalition. However, under SACF, an agent, which joins a new
coalition, has to use Algorithm 7 to adjust the degree of involvement values in its
currently participating coalitions.
In the previous sections, we assumed that an agent has only one type of resources
and an agent cannot leave a coalition once that coalition is formed. Now, we relax
these two assumptions and test whether the assumptions have an impact on the
performance of the mechanism. To relax the first assumption, we introduce another
notion, Resource Probability (RP ), in range (0, 1), which means that an agent is
assigned each type of resources with the probability RP 6 . For the second assumption,
we just need to set each DoIli = 0, namely that an agent’s lower bound of the degree
of involvement in each coalition is 0. This revised SACF mechanism is recorded as
SACF-revised. In addition, the number of agents in the network is set to 300, the
average number of neighbours is fixed at 8 and the task arrival probability is 0.5.
It can be seen from Figure 4.5 that SACF, SACF-revised and FCF have the same
trend of performance that the profit grows steadily with the increase of the resource
probability. However, under CCF, the profit soars up steeply with the increase of
the resource probability. This is owing to the fact that the profit obtained by agents
under CCF heavily depends on how many resources each agent has. If each agent
averagely has more resources, each agent has the potential to complete more subtasks
6

It has to be guaranteed that an agent has at least one type of resource.
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Figure 4.5: Profit on different resource probabilities relative to CM
of a task and then the task allocation chain would be shortened, which implies that
a coalition for a task is more likely to be successfully formed. Therefore, more
profits can be obtained by agents overall. Under SACF, SACF-revised and FCF, the
resource probability does not have much impact on them, because these mechanisms
enable an agent to simultaneously join multiple coalitions, which means that an
agent’s resources can be utilised by several coalitions simultaneously. Specifically,
it can be found that the profit obtained by agents under SACF is consistently
greater than that under SACF-revised, which means that restricting agents to leave
coalitions is more profitable for the entire network. This is due to the fact that when
an agent leaves a coalition, the coalition leader has to find another agent to replace
the leaving agent. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find another suitable agent for an
uncompleted task. With time elapse, both the benefit of a task and the rest time
of completing the task are reducing, so obviously, it is difficult to find an agent to
finish a task in a limited time with a relatively low benefit. The Initiator will then
lose the benefit of the task, since one of its subtasks cannot be completed, (recall
the statement in Section 4.2.1 that an Initiator can get benefit from the task if and
only if all the subtasks of a task are completed).
Overall, the performance of our SACF is around 85% ∼ 95% of the upper bound,
i.e., the performance of the centralised mechanism, and on average 10% ∼ 15%
better than CCF with nearly the same time consumption. Compared to the other
two revised version of SACF, i.e., FCF and SACF-revised, SACF outperforms them
as well. This result demonstrates that the effect of incorperating self-adaptation
into coalition formation is significant and the assumption, not allowing agents to

4.4. Summary

89

leave formed coalitions, is reasonable and profitable.

4.4

Summary

This chapter proposed a self-adaptation based dynamic coalition formation mechanism. The design of this mechanism follows the studies done in [Gd05, Gd08, GSS08],
which took into account the existence of a neighbourhood network structure among
agents for coalition formation. Thus, this mechanism is different from most of the
current related studies, which overlooked the existence of such a network structure.
In addition, this mechanism not only allows agents to join multiple coalitions, but
also allows agents to dynamically change their degrees of involvement in multiple
coalitions and to join new coalitions at anytime if necessary. Therefore, agents can
have autonomy and flexibility when they execute tasks. It should be noted that although this mechanism uses the notion, “degree of involvement”, it is different from
those studies regarding overlapping and fuzzy coalition formation [Mar00, CEM+ 10],
which also uses the notion, “degree of involvement”. The studies regarding overlapping and fuzzy coalition formation overlooked the agent network structure, which is
taken into account in this mechanism. Moreover, in those studies, the degree of involvement of an agent in a coalition cannot be dynamically adapted once a coalition
is formed, while in this mechanism, an agent can autonomously adapt its degrees of
involvement in different coalitions and join new coalitions.
Some other studies are also somewhat similar to ours. For example, the studies
done by Smith [Smi80] and Sandholm and Lesser [SL01] also allowed agents to
be freed from a contract by paying penalty to the coalition leader. Their studies,
however, are significantly different from ours in the following three aspects.
1. Their studies focused on agent negotiation rather than coalition formation,
which is the topic of this research.
2. Their studies did not consider the underlying network structures among agents,
which are taken into account in this research.
3. In their studies, agents can only choose to decommit or not decommit a contract, while in this research, the decommitment is quantified and agents can
partially decommit a contract, i.e., decreasing their degrees of involvement in
coalitions.

Chapter 5
A Self-organisation Based Strategy for
Evolution of Cooperation
In this chapter, a self-organisation based evolution of cooperation strategy is proposed. This strategy embodies currently developed strategies into each player’s
knowledge base. Then, in each round, each player autonomously selects one strategy to update its action and plays with its neighbours. In this way, each player has
autonomy to organise its own behaviour. Moreover, we theoretically find a general
phenomenon that is, in static networks, the final proportion of cooperators evolved
by any deterministic strategies, including W SLS, fluctuates cyclically irrespective
of the initial proportion of cooperators.

5.1

The Description of the Game

There are four varieties of a game, which are a simultaneous game, a strictly alternating game, a randomly alternating game and a random game. Most current
research regarding the evolution of cooperation focused on a simultaneous game due
to its simplicity. Thus, we start by describing the simultaneous Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) game1 . In the iterated PD game, in each round, the two players have the
options to play C (i.e., to cooperate) or to play D (i.e., to defect). In the simultaneous PD game, two players make their decisions simultaneously. In any given round,
the two players receive a Reward payoff R if both cooperate with each other, and
a Punishment payoff P if both defect against each other; but if one player chooses
cooperation whereas another player uses defection, the defector gets a Temptation
1

It has to be mentioned that many different games exist in current literature, e.g., the Snow
Drift game and the Stag Hunt game, which have been summarised by Szabo and Fath in [SF07].
Because the PD game is the leading metaphor in current related research, we study the evolution
of cooperation also in the PD game. The study on the evolution of cooperation in other games is
one of our future studies.
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payoff T while the cooperator gains only a Sucker payoff S, where T > R > P > S
and 2R > T + S. This payoff, according to evolutionary game dynamics, is assumed
to be an increment in fitness or reproductive success. The following example is a
two-player simultaneous PD game.
(i)The two-player simultaneous PD game
Player 1: C C D D D ...
Player 2: C D D C D ...
Although simultaneous games are dominant in current research on the evolution
of cooperation, asynchronous situations do exist in the real-world. Examples from
biology include baboons [Pac77, Tri71] and vampire bats [Wil84], where reciprocal
altruism based on alternating moves of the individuals has been observed. In the
former case, two young male baboons alternate the roles of one distracting the
attention of a dominant male while the other having the opportunity of mounting
an oestrous female. In the latter case, well-fed vampire bats regurgitate some blood
to feed their hungry fellow bats, and next time, their roles may be alternated.
Therefore, several researchers focused their study on the evolution of cooperation in
asynchronous games, e.g., [Fre94, NS94, HS98, KBS06]. An asynchronous game, also
known as an alternating game, was further divided into two categories by Nowak and
Sigmund [NS94], which are a strictly alternating game and a randomly alternating
game. The difference between the two games will be described later.
In the alternating PD game, the symmetry between the two players is broken.
In each single round, one of the players is the “leader”, who is able to decide what
the outcome is going to be. Similar to the simultaneous PD game, the leader has
to choose between two options, which are denoted again by C and D. The payoff
elements, however, need to be revised as follows. Option C means that the leader
receives a payoff a and the other player gets a payoff b. Option D means that the
leader receives a payoff c and the other player gets a payoff d. Such payoff values
can be negative, as in the case of a vampire bat feeding another. Similar to the
simultaneous PD game, two constraints of the four payoff values have to be set:
c > a and c − a < b − d. The first constraint, c > a, means that in a single round,
option D is better than C for the leader. The second constraint, c − a < b − d,
means that the cost occurring to the leader by altruistically playing C is less than
the benefit to the other player. The two constraints satisfy the situation that a
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well-fed bat shares part of its meal with a starving fellow bat.
In order to describe the alternating PD game easily, the term “unit” is introduced. In a two-player alternating game, a unit consists of two consecutive rounds
(while in a n-player alternating game, a unit consists of n consecutive rounds). Thus,
in the two-player alternating PD game, in one unit, if both players opt for C, both
earn the payoff a + b; if both play D, both earn c + d. If one player uses C and the
other chooses D, then the cooperator obtains a+d and the defector gets b+c. These
payoff values in one unit are like those in one round of the simultaneous PD game.
Thus, to match the simultaneous and alternating PD games together, we have only
to set: R = a + b, P = c + d, T = c + b and S = a + d. The inequality c > a
implies T > R and P > S, whereas the inequality c − a < b − d implies R > P and
2R > T + S.
In the strictly alternating PD game, the role of leader is fixed, which means that
in each unit, a player is always the leader and the other is always the follower. In
the randomly alternating PD game, this fixation is relaxed, so that in each unit, any
one of the two players can be the leader. The following two examples depict the two
alternating PD games, respectively.
(ii) The two-player strictly alternating PD game
Player 1: C
Player 2: C

C

D

D

D

D

D ...

C

D ...

(iii) The two-player randomly alternating PD game
Player 1: C
Player 2: C D

C

D D
D

C

D ...
D ...

The alternating PD game still has a limitation that in each round, one of the
players must make a decision. Nevertheless, in the real-world, e.g., political science
[MES06], there are no such restrictions that players have to make decisions in an
alternating manner and in each round, one of them must make a decision. Instead,
the players are autonomous and each player probably makes a decision in any round
based on his/her own strategies. Hence, in this thesis, we also study the evolution of
cooperation in the random PD game, where in each round, each player may or may
not make a decision. In the random PD game, it no longer makes sense to divide
the game into “units” of two rounds each (or n rounds each for a n-player game).
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The following example demonstrates the random PD game.
(ii) The two-player random PD game
Player 1: C C
Player 2:

CD

DDD

...

D C D ...

In the following sections, our self-organisation based strategy for the evolution
of cooperation will be illustrated, and will then be evaluated in the four varieties of
the PD game.

5.2

The Self-organisation Based Strategy

Before the self-organisation based strategy is described, we first depict the network
model and the iterated PD game in networks. The player interactions can be modeled as an undirected graph (or a network) G = (V, E), where V = {v1 , ..., vn }
is a set of n nodes (or players) and E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges. Two players vi and vj are neighbours if (vi , vj ) ∈ E. Neighbours can play with each other.
Ni = {vj |hvi , vj i ∈ E} indicates a player vi ’s neighbour set, while Ni+ = Ni ∪ {vi } is
the neighour set including vi itself. In an iterated PD game in a network, there are
n players, which form the nodes of the graph, and the game progresses in rounds. In
each round, there are two phases. First, in the game playing phase, the players play
the game with all their neighbours and compute their total payoffs. Second, in the
action update phase, each player updates its action, i.e., cooperation or defection,
according to a strategy.
The proposed self-organisation based strategy used by each player for action update can be described as follows. The essence of the self-organisation based strategy
is that it embodies currently developed strategies into each player’s knowledge base.
Then, in each round, each player autonomously selects one strategy to update its
action and plays with its neighbours. The knowledge of a player, say player j, is
represented as Sj = hs1 , ..., sm i, where each si ∈ Sj is a currently developed strategy.
Sj is also called the strategy set of player j. One of the merits of this strategy is
that, in the future, if a new strategy is developed, it can also be embodied into
each player’s knowledge base. Thus, the proposed self-organisation based strategy
is extendable. A Q-learning algorithm is developed to realise the self-organisation
based strategy, which consists of the following three steps.
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(i) In each round, each player autonomously selects a strategy from its strategy
set based on the probability distribution over these strategies. Then, each player
uses its selected strategy to adapt its action to play in the current round.
(ii) When the current round is finished, each player adjusts the probability distribution over the strategies based on the payoffs that it receives and its neighbours
receive in the current round. The adjustment of the probability on each strategy is
executed by using the following equations in sequence (taking player j for example).
Q(si ) ← (1 − α) · Q(si ) + α · pj

(5.1)

π(si ) ← π(si ) + β · (Q(si ) − γ · p¯j )

(5.2)

Π ← N ormalise(Π)

(5.3)

In Equation 5.1, Q(si ) is the Q-value of a strategy si , which is a real number
and is used to calculate the probability of selecting si (see Equation 5.2); pj is the
player j’s payoff received in the current round; and α is the learning rate, which
is in the range of (0, 1). In Equation 5.2, π(si ) is the probability of selecting a
strategy si ; p¯j is the average payoff of a player j’s neighbours (excluding j itself),
which is derived by the total payoff of j’s neighbours divided by the number of j’s
neighbours; β is the probability (policy) adaptation rate, which is in the range of
(0, 1); γ indicates how important a player’s neighbours’ average payoff is for that
player’s probability adaptation, and γ is in the range of [0, 1]. In Equation 5.3, Π =
hπ(s1 ), ..., π(sm )i demonstrates a probability distribution over the strategies, and
the function N ormalise() is used to constrain Π to a legal probability distribution,
P
i.e., 1≤i≤m π(si ) = 1, and the result of N ormalise(Π) has the minimum Euclidean
distance to Π.
Initially, the probability for each strategy is equal, namely that each strategy
has an equal opportunity to be selected, and all the Q-values are set to 0.
(iii) The above two steps are iterated untill the game ends.
This learning algorithm is simple but powerful enough for our problem. A more
efficient learning algorithm might enable the proposed strategy to achieve better
results, and we leave this as one of our future studies. It should be claimed that the
contribution of this strategy is the idea of integrating currently developed strategies
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into each player’s knowledge base and enabling each player, in each round, to autonomously choose a strategy to update its action, i.e., to self-organise its behaviour,
rather than this learning algorithm. Readers might suggest that in each round, each
player just simply chooses the strategy with the highest Q-value from its strategy
set. Nevertheless, Kaelbling et al. [KLM96] stated that players, who always choose
the highest Q-values actions, (called strategies in this thesis), can lead a system to
a suboptimal status.

5.3

Experiments and Analysis

After the proposed strategy is described, the experimental results are presented. In
this experiment, to implement the proposed self-organisation based strategy, three
strategies are selected to be embodied into each player’s knowledge base. The three
selected strategies are IBN , W SLS and IBS, which have been depicted in Chapter
2. A W SLS (Win-Stay, Lose-Shift) player maintains its action (which is cooperation or defection), only if its current payoff is at least as high as in the former round
[MS93]. A IBN (Imitate-Best-Neighbour) player imitates the action of the player
(including itself), which achieves the most payoff in the former round [NM92]. A
IBS (Imitate-Best-Strategy) player sums the payoffs of all cooperating neighbours
and the payoffs of all defecting neighbours (including itself) in the former round,
and copies the action, which achieves the greater total payoff [HCS11]. The reason
for selecting the three strategies is that IBN and W SLS are classical and very
famous, while IBS is a relatively new strategy. Certainly, other strategies, even
those strategies developed in the future, could also be embodied into each player’s
knowledge base, and additionally, different players could even have different knowledge, i.e., different strategy sets. In this thesis, since the aim of this experiment is
to provide readers with a general insight into the operation and performance of the
proposed self-organisation based strategy, the strategy set, i.e., knowledge, of players is simplified, which contains only three currently developed strategies, namely
IBN , W SLS and IBS, and each player’s strategy set is set to be identical. The
performance of a strategy, s1 , is considered to be better than another strategy, s2 ,
if s1 derives a higher final proportion of cooperators than s2 does.
The experiments were conducted in two different networks: a scale-free network
and a small-world network. In a scale-free network, a couple of players have many
neighbours while many other players have only a small number of neighbours [BA99].
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In a small-world network, most neighbours of a player are also connected to each
other [WS98]. The parameters, which are used in the experiment, are set as follows,
T = 3, R = 2, P = 0, S = −1, a = 1, b = 1, c = 2, d = −2, α = 0.2, β = 0.3
and γ = 0.85. In addition, each network consists of 1000 players and the average
degree of each player is set to 4. For each strategy, in the simultaneous PD game,
one running is composed of 500 rounds, while in the strictly alternating, randomly
alternating and random PD games, one running consists of 2000 rounds.

5.3.1

Experimental results in the simultaneous PD game

Figure 5.1: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the simultaneous PD game (Scale-Free, fc=0.2)
The experimental results in the simultaneous PD game are displayed in Figures
5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, where in all the four figures, the x-axis indicates rounds of the
iterated game, and the y-axis demonstrates the proportion of cooperators. Figures
5.1 and 5.2 exhibit the evolution of cooperation in a scale-free network with the
initial proportions of cooperators 0.2 and 0.7, respectively. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show
the evolution of cooperation in a small-world network with the initial proportions
of cooperators 0.2 and 0.7, separately. In the simultaneous PD game, it can be seen
that the proposed self-organisation based strategy outperforms other three strategies under different conditions. Specifically, in Figures 5.1 and 5.3, the proportion
of cooperators cannot be increased by using IBN and IBS. This phenomenon can
be explained as follows. If a player, especially a high degree player, defects, it can
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Figure 5.2: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the simultaneous PD game (Scale-Free, fc=0.7)
exploit all its neighbouring cooperators and gain a high payoff. Then the strategies,
i.e., imitating the best neighbour (IBN ) or the best strategy (IBS), encourage the
defecting player’s neighbours to switch to defection. In Figures 5.1 and 5.3, the
initial proportion of cooperators is set to a very low value (0.2), so it is not likely
that defectors can find a wealthy neighbouring cooperator and then imitate the cooperator’s action, because cooperators surrounded by many defectors cannot obtain
high payoffs. This situation is improved when the initial proportion of cooperators
is increased. This is because that when the initial proportion of cooperators is very
high (0.7), wealthy cooperators are quite likely to exist and then the few defecting
neighbours will switch to cooperation, i.e., imitate the wealthy cooperators’ action.
However, under W SLS, the situation is reversed. In Figures 5.2 and 5.4, when the
initial proportion of cooperators is very high (0.7), the proportion of cooperators
cannot be increased by using W SLS. This is due to the fact that the update of a
player’s action is based only on its own payoff over time irrespective of its neighbours’ actions or payoffs. Thus, even if a cooperating player has many cooperating
neighbours, once one of the cooperating neighours defects, the cooperating player
will switch to defection in the next round. Hence, under W SLS, a high initial proportion of cooperators cannot guarantee the promotion of proportion of cooperators.
However, when the initial proportion of cooperators is very low (0.2), a defector can
turn to be a cooperator, once any one of its defecting neighbours switches to cooperation. Thereby, a low initial proportion of cooperators is somewhat helpful for the
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Figure 5.3: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the simultaneous PD game (Small-World, fc=0.2)
evolution of cooperation. These results demonstrate that each strategy, i.e., IBN ,
W SLS and IBS, has limitations. However, in all these situations, the proposed selforganisation based strategy can promote the proportion of cooperators. This can be
explained by the fact that players, using the proposed strategy, can benefit from the
strengths and can avoid the weaknesses of each currently developed strategy. When
a strategy brings a player a very low payoff, this strategy will be correspondingly
assigned a low Q-value by the player (Equation 5.1) and the probability of selecting
this strategy in the next round will also be reduced, especially when the average
payoff of the player’s neighbours is high (Equation 5.2). It is conceived that when
the average payoff of a player’s neighbours is high, the player is very likely to be
exploited by its defecting neighbours. Thus, the strategy used by this player is not
good in such a situation and has to be assigned a low probability for selection in the
next round.

5.3.2

Experimental results in the asynchronous PD games

The experimental results in the strictly alternating PD game are shown in Figures
5.5,5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. The experimental results in the randomly alternating PD game
are displayed in Figures 5.9, 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12. The experimental results in the
random PD game are demonstrated in Figures 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16. We firstly
analyse the results in the strictly alternating PD game, then discuss the results in
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Figure 5.4: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the simultaneous PD game (Small-World, fc=0.7)
the randomly alternating PD game, and finally investigate the results in the random
PD game.
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 exhibit the evolution of cooperation in a scale-free network
with the initial proportions of cooperators 0.2 and 0.7, respectively. Figures 5.7
and 5.8 demonstrate the evolution of cooperation in a small-world network with the
initial proportions of cooperators 0.2 and 0.7, separately. It can be seen that the
experimental results are quite different from those in the simultaneous PD game.
In Figure 5.5, the proportion of cooperators is increased by using both IBN and
IBS, while in the simultaneous PD game, under the same setting, both IBN and
IBS failed to augment the the proportion of cooperators (cf. Figure 5.1). This is
because that in the strictly alternating PD game, the evolution heavily depends on
the playing order of the players. For example, there are three players in the network,
say Player 1, Player 2 and Player 3, and each of them is the neighbour of the other
two. It is supposed that initially, Player 1 is set to be a cooperator whereas Players
2 and 3 are set to be defectors, and that their initial payoff is 0. It is also assumed
that the playing order is: Player 1 → Player 2 → Player 3. Because Player 1 is the
leader and a cooperator, Player 1 gets the payoff 2a, while both Player 2 and Player
3 earn the payoff b. Then, in the next round, i.e., Player 2’s turn, since Player 1
is richer than both Players 2 and 3, Player 2 will imitate Player 1’s action, i.e.,
cooperation, (under both IBN and IBS). Likewise, Player 3 will also switch to a
cooperator. Moreover, if Player 1 has more neighbours, it will get more payoff (as
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Figure 5.5: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the strictly
alternating PD game (Scale-Free, fc=0.2)
it can obtain a payoff a from each neighbour) and it will be more dominant in the
network (under both IBN and IBS). Hence, it can be found that if the leader is a
cooperator, its neighbours are easy to become cooperators as well even if they are
initially set to be defectors. However, if Player 1 is a defector and also the leader,
then both Player 2 and Player 3 will be assimilated to defectors, no matter which
character they are initially set to be. It can be concluded from this example that in
the alternating PD game, a cooperative leader is helpful for increasing the proportion
of cooperators (under both IBN and IBS), especially when the leader has a high
degree. In the scale-free network, there are some high degree players. Based on the
above analysis, if these players are cooperative leaders, other players are very likely
to become cooperators, even though the initial proportion of cooperators is very
low, i.e., 0.2 (Figure 5.5). In contrast, in Figure 5.7, in the small-world network,
the proportion of cooperators cannot be increased by using both IBN and IBS in
a low initial proportion of cooperators situation. This can be explained by the fact
that in the small-world network, due to the feature of the network structure, there
are not such high-degree players, so each player has nearly the same impact in the
network. In addition, because the cooperators are initially very few, the leader is
a defector with high possibility. As discussed above, a defecting leader would lead
other players in the network to be defectors.
Furthermore, there is another interesting phenomenon in the strictly alternating
PD game. In the small-world network (Figures 5.7 and 5.8), the proportion of
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Figure 5.6: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the strictly
alternating PD game (Scale-Free, fc=0.7)
cooperators under W SLS keeps relatively steady as the game progresses. Unlike
IBN and IBS, under W SLS, a cooperating leader cannot make its neighbours
become cooperators, and likewise, a defecting leader cannot make its neighbours
become defectors either. Let us still use the above three-player example to explain,
where initially, Player 1 is a cooperator while Player 2 and Player 3 are defectors.
Player 1 is the leader. After the first round, Player 1 gets the payoff 2a, while
both Players 2 and 3 obtain the payoff b. In the second round, i.e., Player 2’s turn,
because Player 2’s initial payoff is 0 and in the last round its payoff is b (b > 0 in
our experiment), based on W SLS, Player 2 keeps its current action, i.e., defection,
in this round. Then, Player 2 earns the payoff 2c, and both Player 1 and Player
3 obtain the payoff d. In the third round, i.e., Player 3’ turn, since in round 1,
Player 3 got the payoff b while in round 2, it only got the payoff d (b > d), Player 3
alters its current action, i.e., from a defector to a cooperator, in this round. Then,
Player 3 gets the payoff 2a and Players 1 and 2 get the payoff b. In round 4, Player
1’s turn, Player 1 obtained the payoffs d and b in rounds 2 and 3, respectively, so
Player 1 is still a cooperator in this round. Similarly, in round 5, Player 2 uses
defection, and in round 6, Player 3 opts for defection instead of cooperation, and so
on. It can be summarised from this example that after the odd units, i.e., rounds
1, 2, 3, rounds 7, 8, 9, ..., the proportion of cooperators is 32 , whereas after the even
units, i.e., rounds 4, 5, 6, rounds 10, 11, 12, ..., the proportion of cooperators is 31 .
Thus, it can be seen that in this simple example, under W SLS, the proportion of
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Figure 5.7: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the strictly
alternating PD game (Small-World, fc=0.2)
cooperators neither increases nor decreases, but fluctuates within a certain limit.
As the structure of the small-world network is akin to the network structure in this
example (recalling the description of a small-world network that most neighbors of
a player are also connected to each other), this example can explain the situation of
W SLS in Figures 5.7 and 5.6 in some extent. Again, the proposed self-oragnisation
based strategy achieves the best results.
Compared to the situations in the strictly alternating PD game, in the randomly
alternating PD game, some situations change. Such changes are mainly due to the
randomness of the game. For example, compared Figure 5.5 to Figure 5.9, it can
be found that in the randomly alternating PD game, both IBN and IBS cannot
advance the proportion of cooperators any more. This is owing to the fact that when
the initial proportion of cooperators is very low, it is very likely to select a defector
as a leader in each unit (because in the randomly alternating PD game, each player
has an equal chance to be a leader in each unit). Unfortunately, a defective leader
will make its neighbours defectors. Hence, as game progresses, defectors have much
higher probability to appear in the network than cooperators.
In the random PD game, some situations are different from those in the above
three games. There are two remarkable situations in the random PD game, which
did not occur in the above three games. The first one is that in Figure 5.13, the proportion of cooperators derived by both IBN and IBS reaches nearly 0. According
to the description in the previous paragraph, the proportion of cooperators under
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Figure 5.8: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the strictly
alternating PD game (Small-World, fc=0.7)
both IBN and IBS decreases in the randomly alternating PD game in the scale-free
network. In the random PD game, this situation gets worse. This is because that
even though a high-degree player is a cooperator, if it accidentally plays with a defective neighbour simultaneously, this high-degree player will get a very low payoff.
Then, in the next round, none of its neighbours will imitate its action. This is harmful for increasing the proportion of cooperators. The second remarkable situation
is that in Figure 5.15, the proportion of cooperators increases to a very high level
(around 80%). This is ascribed to the fact that in the small-world network, there
lack such high-degree players. Thus, even if a cooperator accidentally meets a defector, this case is not very harmful for the overall proportion of cooperators. When
two defectors accidentally meet, this case is not harmful for the overall proportion of
cooperators either, because both of the two defectors earn a low payoff and thereby,
in the next round their neighbours will not imitate their actions. On the other hand,
if two cooperators meet or a cooperator plays before a defector plays, both cases are
good for the overall proportion of cooperators. Only when a defector plays before
a cooperator plays, this case is harmful for the overall proportion of cooperators.
Therefore, based on probability theory, since in most cases, the proportion of cooperators can be increased, the final proportion of cooperators can increase to a high
level.
In summary, it can be seen that the self-organisation based strategy works very
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Figure 5.9: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the randomly
alternating PD game (Scale-Free, fc=0.2)
well in all the situations, while each of the three strategies embodied into the selforganisation based strategy has limitations. Thus, it is a promising idea to combine
current strategies into a single strategy set and let each player autonomously select
a strategy to adapt its action in each round, because in this manner, the limitations
of each strategy can be avoided and the strengths of each strategy can be utilised.

5.4

A Theoretical Finding

Hofmann et al. [HCS11] found an interesting phenomenon regarding W SLS, that
W SLS can lead to the same final proportion of cooperators irrespective of the
initial proportion of cooperators. Hofmann et al. left the theoretical investigation
about this phenomenon as one of their future studies. Motivated by Hofmann et
al.’s empirical finding about W SLS [HCS11], we made further investigation. We
theoretically found that (i) in both simultaneous and strictly alternating games, the
final proportion of cooperators evolved by any deterministic strategies, including
W SLS, fluctuates cyclically; (ii) in both randomly alternating and random games,
if the final proportion of cooperators fluctuates cyclically, the cyclic period is 1.
This theoretical finding is independent of the initial proportion of cooperators, the
topology of a network (e.g., a small-world network or a scale-free network), and the
specific game (e.g., the Prisoners Dilemma game or the Snow Drift game). The
proof of this finding is provided as follows.
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Figure 5.10: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the randomly alternating PD game (Scale-Free, fc=0.7)
In a simultaneous game, in a single round, a player vi has two actions, i.e.,
cooperation (represented as 1) or defection (represented as 0). Thereby, the action
of a player vi , recorded as acti , is in {0, 1}. Let us format the payoff parameters,
i.e., T , R, P , S, to be a matrix as follows.
"

P T

#
(5.4)

S R
For convenience, we use the following matrix in place of the above matrix,
"
M=

m00 m01
m10 m11

#
(5.5)

where m00 = P , m01 = T , m10 = S and m11 = R. Then, if player vi plays against
vj , then vi ’s payoff is pij = macti ,actj and vj ’s payoff is pji = mactj ,acti . Hence, in a
P
single round, the total payoff of vi is pi = vj ∈Ni pij . Obviously, given a network
G = (V, E) and a payoff matrix M , the payoff vector of a network p = hp1 , ..., pn i is
determined only by the action vector of a network act = hact1 , ..., actn i. (Actually,
the phrase “determined by” means that there exists a mapping from the action
vector act to the payoff vector p, but for the readability purpose, we use natural
language to make the description.) It should be noted that an action vector indicates
a proportion of cooperators in a network.
Similarly, in an iterated game, in each round t, the payoff vector of a network
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Figure 5.11: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the randomly alternating PD game (Small-World, fc=0.2)
p(t) = hp1 (t), ..., pn (t)i is also determined only by the action vector of a network
act(t) = hact1 (t), ..., actn (t)i, if the network G and the payoff matrix M are fixed,
and the strategy, which each player uses to adapt its action, is fixed as well.
Definition 5.1 (A k-order Strategy) For a strategy, if there exists a minimum
positive integer k, such that the action vector of a network in round t, i.e., act(t),
where players use this strategy, is determined by the action vectors act(t − 1), ...,
act(t − k) or the payoff vectors p(t − 1), ..., p(t − k) of the network, then this
strategy is called a k-order strategy.
For example, the strategy W SLS is a 2-order strategy, because a W SLS player
adapts its action based on its current and former payoffs. The strategies IBN
and IBS are 1-order strategies, as players, using these two strategies, adapt their
actions based only on the current payoff. The definition of “k-order ” is somewhat
like the term “memory length”, which was often mentioned in current literature, e.g.,
[SF07]. However, there is a significant difference between “k-order ” and “memory
length”. “Memory length” describes only how many previous rounds are required
to determine an action vector in the current round, while the definition of “k-order ”
not only specifies how many previous rounds are required but also dictates that the
action vector in current round is determined only by the previous action vectors
and payoff vectors. For example, the strategy T F T is a 1-order strategy, and its
memory length is 1. Nonetheless, the memory length of the strategy GT F T is 1,
but it is not a 1-order strategy, because the current action vector is based not only

5.4. A Theoretical Finding

107

Figure 5.12: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the randomly alternating PD game (Small-World, fc=0.7)
on the former action vector but also on a certain probability, which contradicts with
Definition 5.1. It can also be deduced that if a strategy is k-order, it must be a
deterministic strategy.
Lemma 5.4.1 If a strategy is k-order, the action vector of a network in round t,
where players use this strategy, is determined only by the action vectors act(t − 1),
..., act(t − k).
Proof: As described above, in each round t, the payoff vector of a network p(t) is
determined only by the action vector of a network act(t). Therefore, each payoff
vector p(t − i), where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, is determined only by the action vector act(t − i),
where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, respectively. Thus, according to Definition 5.1, the action vector
of a network in round t, where players use a k-order strategy, is determined only by
the action vectors act(t − 1), ..., act(t − k).
Definition 5.2 (A Cyclic Game) For an iterated game in a network, if there
exists a minimum positive integer r, such that after a round t0 , the equation act(t)
= act(t + r) always holds, where t ≥ t0 , then this iterated game is called a cyclic
game, and the integer r is called the cyclic period of the game.
Theorem 5.4.2 In a simultaneous game, given a network G and a payoff matrix
M , if a strategy is k-order, then players in the network, using this strategy, will lead
an iterated game to be a cyclic game, and the upper bound of the cyclic period of the
game is 2kn , i.e., r ≤ 2kn , where n is the number of players in the network.
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Figure 5.13: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the random
PD game (Scale-Free, fc=0.2)
Proof:

In a network with n players, there are 2n different action vectors. If k

action vectors are selected from the 2n action vectors, the selection has 2kn different
compositions. Let the selected k action vectors be act(2kn + 1), ..., act(2kn + k).
Thus, the k action vectors, act(2kn + 1), ..., act(2kn + k), are equal to at least one
set of k sequential action vectors taken from act(1), ..., act(2kn ). Suppose that the
equal set of k sequential action vectors, taken from act(1), ..., act(2kn ), is act(t0 +1),
..., act(t0 + k). According to Lemma 5.4.1, in round t, act(t) is determined only by
act(t − 1), ..., act(t − k), so that act(t0 + k + 1) = act(2kn + k + 1), act(t0 + k + 2) =
act(2kn + k + 2), .... Let r0 = 2kn − t0 , when t > t0 , the equation act(t) = act(t + r0 )
always holds. Therefore, the game is cyclic and the upper bound of its cyclic period
is 2kn , as r ≤ r0 ≤ 2kn .
Based on the above description, the following two deductions can be obtained.
(i) The conclusion of Theorem 5.4.2 is independent of the initial proportion of
cooperators in a network, the topology of a network and a specific game, because in
the proof of Theorem 5.4.2, neither initial proportion of cooperators is set nor specific
network structures or orders of the parameters, T , R, P , S, are imposed. Thus, this
conclusion still holds in other games, e.g., Snowdrift game, where T > R > S > P ,
and Stag Hunt game, where R > T > P > S [SPL06].
(ii) A corollary can be derived from Theorem 5.4.2.
Corollary 5.4.3 In a network G, even if different players use different deterministic strategies, the iterated game is still a cyclic game and the upper bound of its cyclic
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Figure 5.14: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the random
PD game (Scale-Free, fc=0.7)
0

period is 2k n , where k 0 = M AX(k1 , ..., km ), m is the number of different strategies
used by players, and each ki demonstrates that the strategy si is a ki -order strategy.
Proof: The proof of this corollary is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.4.2 by altering
k to k 0 . If different players use different strategies, the action vector in round t is
determined by act(t − 1), ..., act(t − k 0 ). For example, in a network, a group of
players use a 2-order strategy (recorded as a 2-order group) and another group of
players use a 3-order strategy (recorded as a 3-order group). The action vector of
the 2-order group in round t is based on the action vectors of the 2-order group in
t − 1 and t − 2 rounds, while the action vector of the 3-order group in round t is
based on the action vectors of the 3-order group in t − 1, t − 2 and t − 3 rounds. It
is noted that the action vector of the 2-order group in round t − 1 is based on the
action vectors of the 2-order group in t − 2 and t − 3 rounds, so the action vector
of the 2-order group in round t can also be considered to be based on the action
vectors of the 2-order group in t − 1, t − 2 and t − 3. Hence, the situation has been
the same as that in Theorem 5.4.2.
Based on the proof made in a simultaneous game, the proof in the strictly alternating game can be similarly achieved.
Lemma 5.4.4 In a strictly alternating game, if players use a k-order strategy, the
action-vector sequence in unit i, namely act(i ∗ n + 1), ..., act(i ∗ n + n) (denoted by
M acti ), is determined only by the action-vector sequences M acti−1 , ..., M acti−h .
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Figure 5.15: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the random
PD game (Small-World, fc=0.2)
Here, h =

k
n

, where d xe means an integer that is larger than or equal to x, e.g.,

d3.14e = 4, d−3.14e = −3).
Proof:

Based on Lemma 5.4.1, it has been known that an action vector is deter-

mined only by its previous k action vectors. Here, in unit i, each action vector in
the action-vector sequence M acti is also determined only by its previous k action
vectors.
(i) k ≤ n, i.e., h =

k
n

= 1: In this case, the first action vector in M acti ,

namely act(i ∗ n + 1), is determined only by the k action vectors, act((i − 1) ∗ n + n),
..., act((i − 1) ∗ n + n − k). Due to k ≤ n, all the k action vectors, act((i − 1) ∗ n + n),
..., act((i − 1) ∗ n + n − k), belong to the action-vector sequence M acti−1 , i.e., the
sequence of unit i − 1. In other words, the first action vector in M acti , namely
act(i ∗ n + 1) is determined only by M acti−1 . Likewise, the second action vector in
M acti , namely act(i ∗ n + 2) is determined by the k action vectors, act(i ∗ n + 1),
act((i − 1) ∗ n + n), ..., act((i − 1) ∗ n + n − k + 1)). Because in these k action
vectors, act(i ∗ n + 1) is determined by M acti−1 , thus act(i ∗ n + 2) can also
be considered that it is determined by M acti−1 . Hence, as each action vector in
M acti is determined by M acti−1 , M acti is determined only by M acti−1 . In
Case (i), Lemma 5.4.4 holds.
(ii) k > n: In this case, the first action vector in M acti , namely act(i ∗ n + 1), is
also determined only by the previous k action vectors. Nevertheless, due to k > n,
 
the previous k action vectors belong to the previous nk action-vector sequences,
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Figure 5.16: The evolution of cooperation by using different strategies in the random
PD game (Small-World, fc=0.7)
i.e., M acti−1 , ..., M acti−h . Then, based on the same analysis in Case (i), it can be
concluded that M acti is determined only by M acti−1 , ..., M acti−h . Therefore,
in Case (ii), Lemma 5.4.4 holds as well.
Theorem 5.4.5 In a strictly alternating game, given a network G and a payoff
matrix M , if a strategy is k-order, then players in the network, using this strategy,
will lead an iterated game to be a cyclic game, and the upper bound of the cyclic
2

2

period of the game is 2hn , i.e., r ≤ 2hn , where n is the number of players in the
 
network and h = nk .
Proof:

In a strictly alternating game, during unit i, n action vectors can be ob-

tained in sequence, which are act(i ∗ n + 1), ..., act(i ∗ n + n). Let us use M acti
2

to denote this action-vector sequence. Then, there are totally 2n different such
sequences, because there are n × n elements in M acti , namely that M acti is a
 
n × n matrix. Let h = nk (obviously, h ≥ 1), then the h sequences M act2hn2 +1 ,
..., M act2hn2 +h are equal to at least one set of h sequential sequences taken from
M act1 , ..., M act2hn2 . Suppose that the equal set of h sequential sequences, taken from M act1 , ..., M act2hn2 , is M acti0 +1 , ..., M acti0 +h . According to Lemma
5.4.4, an action-vector sequence is determined only by its previous h action-vector se 
quences. Additionally, because hn = nk ∗n ≥ k, thus M acti0 +1+h =M act2hn2 +1+h ,
2

M acti0 +2+h =M act2hn2 +2+h , .... Let r0 = 2hn − i0 , when i > i0 , the equation
M acti =M acti+r0 always holds. Therefore, the game is cyclic and the upper bound
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2

of its cyclic period is 2hn , as r ≤ r0 ≤ 2hn .
Analogously, the following corollary can be also achieved.
Corollary 5.4.6 In a strictly alternating game, even if different players use different deterministic strategies, the game is still a cyclic game and the upper bound
 
 
0 2
of its cyclic period is 2h n , where h0 = M AX( kn1 , ..., knm ), m is the number of
different strategies used by players, and each ki demonstrates that the strategy si is
a ki -order strategy.
Proof:

The proof of this corollary is almost the same as that of Corollary 5.4.3

by changing “action vector” to “action-vector sequence” and changing “round” to
“unit”.
Finally, for the randomly alternating and random games, because the randomness is introduced, the two games are usually not cyclic. However, based on our
investigation, a general conclusion can be also obtained.
Theorem 5.4.7 If a randomly alternating game is cyclic, the cyclic period is 1,
i.e., r = 1.
Proof:

It is supposed that a randomly alternating game is cyclic and the cyclic

period r ≥ 2. Then, based on the definition of a cyclic game, there exists a round t0 ,
such that when t ≥ t0 , act(t)=act(i∗r+t) always holds, where i is a positive integer.
Furthermore, in the r sequential action vectors act(t0 ), ..., act(t0 + r − 1), there
exists at least one round t1 , where t0 ≤ t1 < t0 +r −1, such that act(t1 )6=act(t1 +1).
Without generality, it is assumed that this inequality, act(t1 )6=act(t1 + 1), is caused
by player j, i.e., actj (t1 ) 6= actj (t1 + 1). Then, it can be obtained that actj (t1 ) =
actj (i∗r+t1 ), actj (t1 +1) = actj (i∗r+t1 +1), ..., and actj (i∗r+t1 ) 6= actj (i∗r+t1 +1)
(due to the cyclic period r ≥ 2). The inequality actj (i ∗ r + t1 ) 6= actj (i ∗ r + t1 + 1)
demonstrates that in round i∗r+t1 +1, it is always player j’s turn to make a decision
(otherwise actj (i ∗ r + t1 ) 6= actj (i ∗ r + t1 + 1) does not hold). This conclusion,
however, contradicts the definition of a randomly alternating game, that in each
unit, the order of players is random. Thus, the cyclic period has to be 1.
Theorem 5.4.8 If a random game is cyclic, the cyclic period is 1, i.e., r = 1.
Proof:

It is supposed that a random game is cyclic and the cyclic period r ≥ 2.

Then, in r sequential action vectors act(t), ..., act(t + r − 1), there exist at least
two action vectors, act(t1 ) and act(t2 ) (where t ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ t + r − 1), such that
act(t1 )6=act(t2 ). However, in a random game, it is possible that from round t1 to
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round t2 , no player makes a decision, so in this situation, act(t1 )=act(t2 ). Hence,
the cyclic period has to be 1.

5.5

Summary

This chapter devised a self-organisation based strategy for the evolution of cooperation in networks. This strategy can employ the strengths of current developed
strategies and avoid their limitations. Moreover, following Hofmann et al.’s work,
after investigation, we theoretically proved that, in static networks, the final proportion of cooperators evolved by any deterministic strategies, including W SLS, fluctuates cyclically irrespective of the initial proportion of cooperators, the topologies
of networks and the specific games. This theoratical finding can support Hofmann
et al.’s empirical finding about W SLS (namely that W SLS can lead to the same
final proportion of cooperators irrespective of the initial proportion of cooperators),
because a uniform final proportion of cooperators can be considered that the period
of the cycle is 1.

Chapter 6
A Self-organisation Mechanism for Packet
Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks
In this chapter, a self-organisation mechanism for packet routing in WSNs is proposed, which can assist current routing approaches to improve their routing performance. This mechanism enables each sensor node to build a cooperation neighbour
set based on past routing experience, and such cooperation neighbours in turn can
help the sensor to effectively relay packets in the future. In addition, this selforganisation mechanism is independent of current routing approaches, so it can be
used to incorporate with many current routing approaches.
Specifically, this mechanism is based on the work done in Chapter 3. The integrative self-organisation mechanism described in Chapter 3 is illustrated by using
distributed task allocation, whereas in this chapter, the work done in Chapter 3 is
modified to suit the particular requirements of WSNs.

6.1

The Self-organisation Mechanism

In order to realise the self-organisation mechanism, a two-layer architecture is introduced, where the first layer is the wireless sensor network and the second layer is a
cooperation network as shown in Fig. 6.1.
In the first layer, i.e., wireless sensor network layer, sensors are connected by
some wireless medium, such as infrared devices or radio, which is represented as
the solid lines connecting two sensor nodes. The first layer is the physical network,
which really exists. In the second layer, sensors are linked by a cooperation relation,
represented as dashed lines. The second layer, namely cooperation network layer,
is an abstract network, which does not really exist. The cooperation network is
formed on the basis of the sensors past cooperation. For example, in Fig. 6.1, if
many packets sent from Sensor 1 have to be forwarded by Sensor 7, Sensor 1 may add
114
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Figure 6.1: A sample two-layer architecture
Sensor 7 as one of its cooperation neighbours. Then, in the future, if Sensor 1 has
packets to be sent, it first sends the packets to Sensor 7 and Sensor 7 then, forwards
the packets to the destinations for Sensor 1. For the process that Sensor 1 sends
packets to Sensor 7 and Sensor 7 forwards packets to the destinations, Sensors 1 and
7 can use any existing routing protocols. Thus, it can be seen that the cooperation
network layer is used only to guide the packet routing process in the wireless sensor
network layer in order to improve the routing efficiency, rather than becoming a
concrete routing protocol, which directly operates in the wireless sensor network
layer. Thus, in this case, many current routing protocols can be employed in the
wireless sensor network layer. The proposed self-organisation mechanism works on
the cooperation network layer, which enables each sensor to keep the most useful
cooperation neighbours and in turn, assists current routing protocols to achieve
better routing performance.
In this thesis, the sensor network is defined as a graph, G = (V, E), where V =
{v1 , ..., vn } is the set of n sensors in the network and E ⊆ V × V is a set of physical
links. Two sensors, vi and vj , are physical neighbours if (vi , vj ) ∈ E, and they can
directly transmit packets between each other. Ni = {vj |(vi , vj ) ∈ E} indicates a
sensor vi ’s physical neighbour set. Similarly, the cooperation network is defined as a
graph as well, G0 = (V, E 0 ), where V is the set of sensors and E 0 ⊆ V × V is a set of
cooperation links. Two sensors, vi0 and vj0 , are cooperation neighbours if (vi0 , vj0 ) ∈ E 0 ,
and it should be noted that cooperation neighbours cannot directly transmit packets
between each other. Ni0 = {vj0 |(vi0 , vj0 ) ∈ E 0 } indicates a sensor vi0 ’s cooperation

6.1. The Self-organisation Mechanism

116

neighbour set. It should also be noticed that physical neighbours are bidirectional,
i.e., if (vi , vj ) ∈ E, then (vj , vi ) ∈ E must holds, but cooperation neighbours are
unidirectional, i.e., if (vi0 , vj0 ) ∈ E 0 , then it is not necessary that (vj0 , vi0 ) ∈ E 0 . Initially,
each sensor’s physical neighbour set is identical to its cooperation neighbour set.
Before devising the self-organisation mechanism, it is necessary to introduce some
evaluation indices to estimate each sensor and further, the sensor network, which
include energy consumption, storage consumption and sensing coverage.

6.1.1

Energy consumption

Energy consumption relies on how many packets being transmitted and the transmission distance of each packet. For a single sensor, say vi , its energy consumption
for transmitting a k-bit message to a receiver, say vj , with a distance d away can be
calculated by using Equation 6.1 [HCB00].
EneTi (k, d) = k(Eelec + amp dβ ),

(6.1)

where Eelec represents the energy being dissipated to operate the transmitter or
receiver circuitry per bit, and amp denotes the energy dissipation of the transmitter
power amplifier for transmitting a bit to a receiver with a distance of d = 1 unit
away, and β is a constant coefficient, which denotes the path loss exponent.
For the receiver, vj , its energy consumption for receiving the k-bit message is:
EneRj (k) = kEelec .

(6.2)

Thus, for the whole sensor network, its energy consumption in a pre-defined
period is the sum of the energy consumption caused by sensor nodes transmitting
and receiving data packets in that period.

6.1.2

Storage consumption

Storage consumption involves two types of consumption. The first type of storage
consumption is for maintaining packets in sensors’ waiting list. For example, if a
sensor has several packets to send but in a time slot it can only send one packet, it
has to keep the rest packets in its waiting list and transmits them in the succeeding
time slots. Obviously, it is expected for a sensor to keep packets in its waiting list
as few and short as possible, because the sensor’s storage consumption can be saved

6.1. The Self-organisation Mechanism

117

and the packets transmission latency can be reduced. For a single sensor, vi , its
storage consumption for maintaining packets can be calculated by using Equation
6.3,
(1)
Stori

=S

(1)

|Wi |
X
(1)
·(
tij ),

(6.3)

j=1
(1)

where Wi denotes the waiting list of sensor vi , tij demonstrates the number of
time slots during which sensor vi maintains a packet j, and S (1) is a constant to
represent the storage coefficient for keeping packets.
The second type of storage consumption for an individual sensor is to keep (both
physical and cooperation) neighbours, which can be calculated by employing Equation 6.4,
0

(2)
Stori

|Ni |
|Ni |
X
X
(3)
(2)
(2)
til ),
=S ·(
tij +
j=1

where Ni and

Ni0

(6.4)

l=1

are the physical and cooperation neighbours of vi , respectively,
(2)

(3)

which have been described above; tij and til indicate the time slots during which
sensor vi keeps vj (vl ) as its physical (cooperation) neighbour; S (2) is a constant to
represent the storage coefficient for keeping neighbours.
Likewise, for the whole sensor network, the storage consumption is the sum of
each sensor’s storage consumption.

6.1.3

Sensing coverage

Sensing coverage is also an important property of a sensor network, although this
property was overlooked by many researchers. As described in [Tsa07], saving the
unnecessary power consumption can prolong the lifetime of sensor nodes, but does
not necessarily imply that a better sensing coverage can be achieved. Hence, it is
necessary to consider sensing coverage as a separate property.
In many applications, sensor nodes are deployed randomly over the entire desired
area. Thereby, the sensing areas of different nodes may partially overlap. When a
local area has a much higher node density than the average node density, a target
location in that area may be covered by multiple sensors. On the other hand, if the
node density of a local area is much lower than the average node density, a target
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location is more likely covered by only one sensor. The normalised effective sensing
area, η, of a sensor, vi , is calculated by using Equation 6.5 [Tsa07].
η = η0 +

∞
X

ηm
,
m+1
m=1

(6.5)

where η0 is percentage of vi ’s sensing area that is covered by vi only, and ηm
represents the percentage of vi ’s sensing area that is covered by vi and any other m
neighbouring nodes. The value of η is within (0, 1]. If the sensing area of a node is
not overlapped with that of any other nodes, the value of η is 1. On the other hand,
if the sensing area of a node is overlapped by multiple nodes, the value of η may be
much less than 1.
For the whole sensor network, the sensing coverage is the ratio between the
total sensing area covered by all sensor nodes and the target area. For example, if
the target is 1000m2 and all the sensors totally cover 900m2 (due to some sensors
failure), the sensing coverage of this sensor network now is 0.9.
It is now ready to describe the self-organisation mechanism.

6.1.4

Mechanism design

As depicted above, the self-organisation mechanism works in the cooperation network layer (see Fig. 6.1). The aim of the self-organisation mechanism is to improve
the overall routing performance of current routing approaches. Under this mechanism, each sensor can autonomously create a cooperation neighbour set and each
sensor can dynamically add or remove cooperation neighbours into or from its cooperation neighbour set. Afterwards, when a sensor has a packet to send, it forwards
the packet to one of its cooperation neighbours, and the cooperation neighbour then
relays the packet to one of the cooperation neighbour’s cooperation neighbours until
the packet reaches the sink node.
Cooperation neighbour set creation
The creation of cooperation neighbour set is based on sensors’ historical information. We use an example to describe the creation procedure. A sensor, vj , often
relays packets for vi . Then, vj may want itself to be vi ’s cooperation neighbour. vj
then sends a request message to vi to suggest vi add vj as one of vi ’s cooperation
neighbours. The request message includes the information regarding vj itself, such
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as the rest energy of vj , the normalised effective sensing area of vj , the distance
between vj to the sink node, and the average number of hops from vi to vj (which is
derived from the previously relayed packets). Once vi receives this request packet,
vi will evaluate the reward of adding vj as one of vi ’s cooperation neighbours. vi
estimates that if it adds vj as a cooperation neighbour, vi ’s storage consumption
may increase and vj ’s energy consumption may rise (because in the future, vi will
send packets to vj in a high priority). Such a consumption is a negative reward.
However, on the other hand, in the future, the packet routing delay could be reduced, because the routing procedure becomes more targeted, and consequently the
energy consumption of other sensors could be saved, since packets would be relayed
by less sensors. The storage and energy consumption can be estimated by using
Equations 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4. The estimation of packet routing delay is based on two
factors, i.e., the sensing radius of a sensor, r, and the distance between the sensor
node, vi , and the sink node, s, which is recorded as dvi →s . If there are more than
one sinks in the sensor network, such a distance demonstrates the shortest distance.
In this thesis, it is assumed that each sensor has the same sensing radius, r. The
distance between sensor nodes to the sink node can be obtained during the initialisation stage of a sensor network. Once the two factors, namely r and dvi →s , are
known, the estimation of packet routing delay can be yielded by using Equation 6.6,
where δ is a constant coefficient which is greater than 1.
dvi →s
,
(6.6)
r
Hence, if vi wants to add vj as one of its cooperation neighbours, the estimated
del = δ ·

(3)

(3)

increase of storage consumption is S (2) · t̂ij , where t̂ij indicates the intended time
slots during which vi keeps vj as one of its cooperation neighbours; the estimated
increase of energy consumption on vj is ζ · EneRj (k), where k denotes the total size
of messages (whose unit is bit) passed from vi to vj , and ζ is a coefficient which is
greater than 1; the estimated routing delay reduction is ζ · (deli − delj − hopi→j ),
where hopi→j is the average number of hops from vi to vj (which is embodied in the
request message sent from vj to vi ); the estimated reduction of energy consumption
on other sensor nodes is ζ ·hopi→j ·(EneT (k, rδ )+EneR (k)). After the estimation, the
reward of vi , namely Ri , is derived by summing up the four estimated values. Once
the reward value, Ri , is obtained, the sensor vi has to make a decision regarding
whether to add vj as one of its cooperation neighbours. A Q-learning algorithm is
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developed for this decision making process (see Algorithm 8).
Algorithm 8: Learning progress of a sensor vi
1 Initialise Q value for each available action arbitrarily;
2 for k = 0 to a predefined integer do
3
calculate π;
4
for each available action a ∈ AP
i do
5
Qk+1 (a) = Qk (a) + π(a)α1 ( a R(a)π(a) − Qk (a));
6
end
7 end
8 aopti ← argM ax(Q);
9 vi takes the action aopti ;
The sensor, vi , first, arbitrarily initialises the Q-value of each available action
(Line 1). There are two available actions for the sensor vi , i.e., whether or not to
add vj as one of its cooperation neighbours. Thereafter, vi launches the learning
process for Q-value of each available action (Lines 2-7). In Line 2, the number of
iterations is set to 30, which can yield adequate results. In Line 3, π is calculated
by using Equation 6.7 for each available action, a, which is the -greedy exploration
method [GK09], where 0 <  < 1 is a small positive number and n is the number of
available actions of a sensor.

(1 − ) + ( /n), if Q(a) is the highest value
π(a) =
 /n , otherwise

(6.7)

In Line 5, 0 < α1 < 1 is the learning rate and R(a) is the estimated reward
received by vi after taking action a. When finishing learning, vi executes the action,
which could maximise the Q-value (Lines 8-9). Finally, if vi decides to add vj as one
of its cooperation neighbours, vi will send an acknowledgment message back to vj
to let vj know that vj has been added to vi ’s cooperation neighbour set. Conversely,
if vi decides not to add vj as its cooperation neighbour, vi just ignores vj ’s request
message and does not send any message back in order to save energy consumption.
Similarly, if vj has been a cooperation neighbour of vi but vj seldom relays
packets for vi , then vi may remove vj from its cooperation neighbour set so as to
reduce vi computational overhead associated with taking vj into account whenever
vi transfers a packet. The decision making of vi , regarding removing vj from its
cooperation neighbour set, is analogous to the decision making process about adding
vj as a cooperation neighbour.
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The acute readers might point out that a sensor can directly choose an action,
which could maximise its reward and thus the learning process is not really necessary.
However, as stated by Kaelbling et al. [KLM96], this kind of algorithm, which always
takes the highest rewards action and overlooks the tradeoff between exploitation and
exploration, may converge to a sub-optimal state.
Selecting a cooperation neighbour for relaying
When a sensor, say vi , has a packet to transfer, it needs to decide which cooperation
neighbour is the best choice for relaying. The selection of cooperation neighbour is
based on each cooperation neighbour’s properties, which are included in the previous request message1 , i.e., the rest energy of vj , the normalised effective sensing area
of vj , the distance between vj to the sink node, and the average number of hops
from vi to vj . Generally, a sensor vi prefers to forward packets to a cooperation
neighbour, which has much rest energy (because such a cooperation neighbour is
not easy to be depleted), a small normalised effective sensing area (because even if
such a cooperation neighbour is depleted, the overall coverage area is not affected
heavily since the sensing area of that cooperation neighbour is overlapped by multiple sensors), a short distance from vj to the sink and a small number of hops from vi
to vj (since a short distance and a small number of hops usually imply little transmission delay). Therefore, for vi , there are different benefits for choosing different
cooperation neighbours to relay a packet. Such a benefit, e.g., for vi choosing vj ,
can be calculated by using Equation 6.8,
B(vj ) = γ1 · RestE ng(vj ) − γ2 · η(vj ) − γ3 · dvj →s − γ4 · hopi→j

(6.8)

where RestE ng(vj ) means the rest energy of vj , η(vj ) indicates the normalised
effective sensing area of vj , dvj →s is the distance from vj to the sink node, hopi→j
denotes the number of hops from vi to vj , and γ1 , γ2 , γ3 , γ4 are coefficients which
are used to normalise the four values in a same magnitude.
After calculation of the benefit for selecting each cooperation neighbour, the
sensor vi employs another Q-learning algorithm to select a cooperation neighbour
to forward the packet (Algorithm 9).
1

As time progresses, the information embodied in the request message may be outdated. Thus,
if a cooperation neighbour’s status significantly changes, it will send a new message to vi regarding
its current status.
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Algorithm 9: Choice of a cooperation neighbour for relaying
// according to vi ’s view
1 vi initialises Q-values and π;
0
2 for each cooperation neighbour of vi , i.e., vj ∈ Ni do
3
Q(vj ) ← (1 − α2 )Q(vj ) + α2 · B(vj );
4 end
P
1
5 B̄ ←
vj ∈Ni0 B(vj );
|Ni0 |
0
6 for each cooperation neighbour of vi , i.e., vj ∈ Ni do
7
π(vj ) ← π(vj ) + τ (Q(vj ) − B̄);
8 end
9 π← N ormalise(π);
10 vi selects a cooperation neighbour based on π;

In Line 1, vi initialises the Q-value of each cooperation neighbour as 0. π is a
vector which demonstrates the probability with regard to selecting each cooperation
neighbour to transfer the packet, i.e., π= hπ(v1 ), ..., π(v|Ni0 | )i. vi initially sets each
element in π to

1
|Ni0 |

for simplicity. Then, in Lines 2-4, vi updates the Q-value of each

cooperation neighbour based on the benefit of selecting each cooperation neighbour,
B(vj ), where α2 is the Q-learning rate. vi averages the benefits of selecting its
cooperation neighbours, and uses this average value and the newly created Q-values
to update the probability vector π, where τ is the policy learning rate (Lines 58). The probability vector update method is developed by Zhang et al. [ZLS09].
In Line 9, the function N ormalise() is used to constrain π to a legal probability
P|N 0 |
distribution, i.e., j=1i π(vj ) = 1, and N ormalise(π) has the minimum Euclidean
distance to π. Finally, in Line 10, vi selects a cooperation neighbour to transfer
the packet based on the probability vector π. This selection is akin to the Roulette,
namely that a cooperation neighbour vj with a large value of π(vj ) is more likely to
be selected.
The acute readers may find that under this mechanism, each sensor node in the
network has to have a global unique ID to distinguish different nodes in the network
(see Fig. 6.1). Although some addressing schemes, e.g., [ASSC02, SR02], can be
used to handle this problem, it is still sometimes difficult for each node to have a
global unique ID, especially in a large WSN. This is a drawback of this mechanism
and overcoming this drawback is one of our future studies.
After elaborating on the self-organisation mechanism, in the next section, the
simulation and analysis regarding the proposed self-organisation mechanism will be
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given.

6.2

Simulation and Analysis

As illustrated in the previous section, the proposed self-organisaion mechanism is
not a concrete routing approach but is a framework used to enhance current routing
approaches. Therefore, to assess the performance of the proposed self-organiation
mechanism, three current routing approaches are selected, and each routing approach belongs to each of the three categories described in Chapter 2. Specifically, the selected routing approaches are gossiping [HL88] (a flat routing approach),
LEACH-revised (a hierarchical routing approach), and GEAR [YEG01] (a locationbased routing approach). The reason for choosing the three routing approaches is
that they are classical and easy to implement. Although other routing approaches
could also be used in our simulation, using the three basic approaches is sufficient
for us to demonstrate the performance of the proposed self-organisation mechanism.
The three approaches are described in detail as follows.
1. Gossiping. Under Gossiping, a sensor node sends the packet to a randomly
selected neighbour, which picks another random neighbour to forward the
packet to and so on, until the expiry time of the packet or the destination is
reached, whichever comes first.
2. LEACH-Revised. LEACH [HCB00] randomly selects a pre-determined number of sensor nodes as cluster heads and rotates this role to evenly distribute
the energy load among the sensors in the network. The role rotation is depicted as below. A sensor node chooses a random number, r, between 0 and 1. If
this random number is less than a threshold value, T (n), the node becomes a
cluster head for the current round. The threshold value is calculated based on
an equation that incorporates the desired percentage, p, to become a cluster
head, the current round, and the set of nodes that have not been selected as a
cluster head in the last

1
p

rounds. Then, all elected cluster heads broadcast an

advertisement message to the rest of the nodes in the network that they are
the new cluster heads. However, the deficiency of LEACH is that it assumes
that the cluster heads can directly send packets to the sink node, which is
infeasible in large scale WSNs. Thus, we introduce Yu et al.’s multi-hop routing algorithm [YLM07] used by cluster heads to transfer packets to the sink
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node. Yu et al’s algorithm is based on the cost of each wireless link, which is
evaluated by using the remaining power of each node.
3. GEAR. There are two phases in GEAR. First, forwarding packets toward
the target region: Upon receiving a packet, a node relays the packet to the
neighbour, which is closer to the target region than itself. If there are more
than one neighbours, the nearest neighbour to the target region is selected.
However, if all the neighbours are further than the node itself, one of the
neighbours is picked based on their evaluated cost to the destination region.
Second, forwarding packets within the region: If the packet has arrived at
the target region, it is diffused in the region by either recursive geographic
forwarding or restricted flooding, until the packet reaches the sink node.

6.2.1

Simulation setup

The simulation is divided into two parts. One is in a stationary WSN and the
other is in a dynamic WSN. In the stationary WSN, the position of each sensor
node, including sink nodes, is fixed, namely that sensors cannot move, and the
WSN is closed, which means that no new sensors will join the network. On the
other hand, in the dynamic WSN, each sensor node, involving sink nodes, has a
pre-defined probability to move, and the WSN is open, which means that at each
time slot, with a pre-determined probability, a new sensor will join the network.
Performance is measured by the four quantitative metrics, namely average delivery
latency, successful delivery ratio, number of alive nodes, and total sensing coverage.
The meanings of the four metrics can be easily deduced from their names. For
packets delivery, it is supposed that a packet is transmitted and then received in
one time slot. The simulation is operated in a simulated 1000m × 1000m area,
and 200 sensor nodes and 5 sink nodes are deployed randomly in this area. The
communication radius, i.e., furthest delivery radius, of each sensor is 60m and the
sensing coverage radius of each sensor is 40m. The initial energy of each sensor is
set to 5J. The average size of a packet is 50 bytes, and the actual size of a packet
is based on normal distribution with variance equal to 10. At each time slot, each
node generates a packet based on a pre-defined probability, and the expiry time of a
packet is based on exponential distributions. Additionally, the values and meanings
of those parameters mentioned in the previous section are listed in Table 6.1. These
values were chosen experimentally to provide the best results.
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Table 6.1: Parameters Setting
Parameters
Values
Explanations
Eelec
50nJ/bit
Energy dissipation parameter
amp
0.1nJ/bit/unit
Energy dissipation parameter
β
2
Path loss exponent
S (1)
0.01
Storage coefficient for keeping packets
S (2)
0.0015
Storage coefficient for keeping neighbours
δ
2.5
Path length coefficient
ζ
2.2
Energy consumption coefficient
α1 ,α2 ,τ
0.1, 0.3, 0.2
Learning rate

0.4
Action selection distribution probability
k
20
Learning rounds
γ1 ,γ2 ,γ3 ,γ4 1.7, 8.2, 0.013, 1.5
Benefit coefficients

6.2.2

Simulation results and analysis: the stationary occasion

Figure 6.2: Average delivery latency of the routing approaches in a stationary WSN
Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 demonstrates the performance of the three routing
approaches and their self-organisation-based enhanced versions in a stationary WSN. The solid lines denote the performance variation of the three routing approaches,
while the dashed lines indicate that of their self-organisation-based counterparts. In
Fig. 6.2, initially, the delivery latency values under Gossiping and GEAR are less
than that under LEACH-Revised. However, as time progresses, LEACH-Revised
turns to be better than both Gossiping and GEAR. This can be explained as follows.
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Figure 6.3: Successful delivery ration (%) of the routing approaches in a stationary
WSN
Initially, under LEACH-Revised, the cluster heads usually have to wait for a period
for their cluster members to send packets to them, and then aggregate and condense
these packets to save transmission energy consumption. As time progresses, some
sensor nodes are depleted. Under Gossiping and GEAR, some pre-existing routing
paths will disappear, but under LEACH-Revised, the impact, caused by sensor nodes
failure, is much less than that under Gossiping and GEAR, because routing under
LEACH-Revised is based only on a few nodes, i.e., cluster heads, and even if these
cluster heads are exhausted, some other nodes can take their roles at once by using
the measure developed in LEACH. In Fig. 6.3, LEACH-Revised achieved the highest
successful delivery ratio. This is due to the fact that packets under LEACH-Revised
use the fewest hops from a source node to the sink node compared to Gossiping and
GEAR, because, as described above, routing under LEACH-Revised is based only
on cluster heads. Thus, it is more reliable for LEACH-Revised to successfully transmit a packet to the sink node than both Gossiping and GEAR. In Figs. 6.4 and 6.5,
it can be found that under Gossiping and LEACH-Revised, more sensor nodes can
be saved than that under Gossiping (Fig. 6.4), but under GEAR, the total sensing
coverage is larger than that under both Gossiping and LEACH-Revised (Fig. 6.5).
This finding confirms the argument in [Tsa07] that saving energy consumption can
prolong the lifetime of sensors but does not necessarily achieve better sensing coverage. This can be explained by the fact that GEAR’s transmission method is easy
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Figure 6.4: Number of alive nodes under the routing approaches in a stationary
WSN
to deplete the nodes, which are closer to the sink node, but Gossiping’s transmission method, randomly choosing a neighbour for transmission, can distribute the
energy consumption in a larger area than GEAR’s method does, so under Gossiping
less nodes are depleted compared to GEAR in a same time span. Likewise, under
LEACH-Revised, routing only relies on cluster heads, and the role of cluster head is
rotated among different sensor nodes. Thus, the lifetime of each sensor node under
LEACH-Revised could be further prolonged. However, due to the same reason, the
total sensing coverage under GEAR is larger than that under Gossiping, because
Gossiping’s transmission method consumes energy in a larger area, which implies
that depleted sensors are distributed in a larger area, so the total sensing coverage reduction is more than that under GEAR. Similarly, under LEACH-Revised,
the energy dissipation in the network is distributed more broadly than that under
Gossiping, because under LEACH-Revised, sensors are organised based on clusters,
which are broadly distributed in the network. Thereby, when sensors in different
clusters are depleted, the total sensing coverage will be decreased more than that
under Gossiping. Finally, it can be seen that the performance of the three routing
approaches is indeed improved by using the proposed self-organisation mechanism
measured by the four quantitative metrics. This is because that the self-organisation
mechanism enables each sensor to find the most useful cooperation neighbours and
therefore, the routing is more targeted. In addition, as described in the previous
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Figure 6.5: Total sensing coverage (%) of the routing approaches in a stationary
WSN
section, under the self-organisation mechanism, each sensor takes into account energy consumption, storage consumption, and sensing coverage, when it builds its
cooperation neighbour set. Thus, by using the self-organisation mechanism, the
performance of the three current routing approaches can be raised in all the four
quantitative metrics.

6.2.3

Simulation results and analysis: the dynamic occasion

Figure 6.6: Average delivery latency of the routing approaches in a dynamic WSN
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Figure 6.7: Successful delivery ration (%) of the routing approaches in a dynamic
WSN
In this part of simulation, at each time slot, each sensor has the probability,
0.05, to move from its current position to a random position, and at each time
slot, a new sensor will arrive at the network with the probability 0.2 at a random
position. For sensors movement, i.e., mobile sensors, it is realised that in practice,
the movement of a sensor is usually based on some purpose, so the sensor does not
move to a random position. In this simulation, the aim is just to demonstrate how
the proposed self-organisation mechanism works in a dynamic WSN, so we simplified
the movement of a sensor by setting its movement destination to a random position.
In the dynamic occasion, the main trend of simulation results is similar to that
in a stationary WSN, but the overall performance of the three routing approaches
and their self-organisation-based enhanced versions is improved compared to that
in a stationary WSN. This is owing to the fact that sensors movement can, in some
extent, balance the energy consumption in the network. In a stationary WSN, those
sensors, which are neighbours of the sink nodes, are very likely to be depleted, because they are the final hops to the sink nodes and all the packets have to be relayed
by them. Therefore, if sensors can move, those final hop nodes have the probability
to move away and likewise, other sensors have the probability to be the final hop
nodes, so the energy consumption can be balanced in some extent. Analogously,
if new sensors can join the network, the energy of whole network increases, which
is obviously good for the network in various aspects. There are still some specific
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Figure 6.8: Number of alive nodes under the routing approaches in a dynamic WSN
phenomena, which should be noted. In Fig. 6.6, the average delivery latency under LEACH-Revised in the final time slots, is longer (i.e., worse) than that under
Gossiping and GEAR, which is different from Fig. 6.2. This is ascribed to the
fact that routing under LEACH-Revised is based on cluster heads, so new sensors
joining or sensors movement cannot effectively shrink the routing path and thus,
the latency of packet routing cannot be improved very much. Due to the same
reason, the difference of the final performance, regarding successful delivery ratio
(Fig. 6.7), between LEACH-Revised and Gossiping is reduced compared to Fig.
6.3. On the other hand, in Fig. 6.8, the difference about the number of alive nodes
under LEACH-Revised and Gossiping in the final time slots is enlarged compared to
Fig. 6.4, which can reflect the fact that LEACH-Revised is quite good at balancing
energy-consumption. Finally, again, using the proposed self-organisation mechanism can improve the performance of all the three routing approaches in a dynamic
WSN, which can denote the effectiveness of this mechanism.
Overall, by using the proposed self-organisation mechanism, the performance of
the selected three routing approaches in both stationary and dynamic WNSs can be
improved around 10% ∼ 15% with ragard to the four quantitative metrics, which
demonstrates the potential usefulness of this mechanism.
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Figure 6.9: Total sensing coverage (%) of the routing approaches in a dynamic WSN

6.3

Summary

This chapter introduced a novel self-organisation mechanism, which is used for packet routing in WSNs. Since each current routing approach has advantages and disadvantages, it is more essential to develop an assistant tool to enhance current routing
approaches than to develop a new routing approach. The mechanism, proposed in
this chapter, is such an assistant tool that can integrate with current routing approaches to improve their performance. This mechanism is independent of current
routing approaches so that it can be used with many current routing approaches.
The proposed mechanism was simulated in both stationary and dynamic occasions
with three classical routing approaches. The experimental results demonstrated its
effectiveness.

Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Due to the increasing complexity of current systems, self-manageability, namely
autonomy, of these systems is highly desired in order to save the labour of human
managers and to adapt to dynamic environmental changes. In this context, selforganisation has been introduced into these systems. Self-organisation is not a
concrete method. Instead, it is a concept. Any system, which is able to self-adapt
its behaviour to suit a dynamic environment, can be called a self-organising system.
The primary objective of this thesis is to develop novel self-organisation mechanisms
in MASs. During the development, we focused on a general research problem, i.e.,
distributed task allocation, instead of a specific system, so the developed mechanisms
have the potential to be applied to various application domains, one of which was
described in Chapter 6. Moreover, the self-organisation concept was also integrated
into other research fields to investigate them through a distinct way. In the rest of
this chapter, the contributions of this thesis are summarised, and the future work is
outlined.

7.1

Contributions of The Thesis

1. A composite relation adaptation mechanism was developed.
This mechanism integrates a trust model, a multi-agent Q-learning algorithm and a weighted relation concept, which together resulted in good performance compared with another famous self-organisation mechanism, K-Adapt
[KGJ10]. According to this mechanism, pairs of agents are able to continuously and locally evaluate their inter-relations based on their past interactions.
Every pair of agents can calculate the reward of each possible relation between
them and cooperatively choose the one which can maximise the sum rewards
of them. In comparison with current related works, which mainly focused on
132
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how to adapt crisp relations between agnets, this mechanism originally integrates two notions into self-organisation, i.e., trust and weighted relation. A
trust model can be used by each agent to select the most valuable agents to
adapt relations, and a weighted relation is used to measure how strong the
relation is between two agents. Furthermore, for relation adaptation, most
current related algorithms considered only one type of relations, while our
relation adaptation algorithm can handle multiple types of relations.
2. An integrative self-organisation mechanism was devised.
This mechanism combines the three principles together, i.e., cloning/spawning,
resource exchange and relation adaptation, whereas related studies considered
only one of the three principles. Through combining the benefits of the three
principles, our mechanism outperforms state of the art approaches, each of
which focused only on a single principle. In order to realise this mechanism,
we do not simply take three existing approaches from current related studies,
regarding the three principles, to combine them together. Instead, for each
principle, we developed a novel and efficient approach, and the three novel
approaches can effectively work together as a whole. This is because each
existing approach was devised usually based on different purposes, different models and different environmental settings. Thus, there is no guarantee
that three existing approaches, against the three principles respectively, can
effectively work together as a whole. In addition, simply combining different
components together, especially those that are developed based on different
models, is very likely to incur conflicts.
3. A self-adaptation based dynamic coalition formation mechanism was
proposed.
This mechanism assumes that there is a network with explicit links between
the agents, such that only agents that are linked to each other (directly or indirectly) can form coalitions. Additionally, our coalition formation mechanism
incorporates the self-adaptation concept, which enables agents to dynamically
adjust their degrees of involvement in coalitions and to join new coalitions,
via negotiation, at any time if necessary. The process of self-adaptation in a
large-scale and distributed system is of key importance to the performance of
the system as a whole and it can be employed in agent networks to improve the
cooperative behaviours of agents. Compared with most related studies, which
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do not take a network structure into account, we consider the existence of an
underlying network structure. Compared with those related studies, which do
consider network structures, our mechanism, by integrating the self-adaptation
notion, enables agents to have autonomy and flexibility when agents execute
tasks.
4. A self-organisation based strategy was presented for the evolution
of cooperation.
This strategy aims to provide a good result for the evolution of cooperation
and can be independent of the initial proportion of cooperators, the variety of
the PD game, and the network type. This strategy embodies current strategies as players’ knowledge and enables each player to autonomously select a
strategy to update its action to play the game. Thereby, the proposed strategy
can avoid the flaws and can harness the advantages of each strategy. Furthermore, the proposed strategy is extendable, as in the future, a newly developed
strategy can also be included into the proposed strategy, which embodies the
new strategy as a new piece of knowledge into each player. Following Hofmann et al.’s work [HCS11], after study, we theoretically find a more general
phenomenon that is, in static networks, the final proportion of cooperators
evolved by any deterministic strategies, including W SLS, fluctuates cyclically
irrespective of the initial proportion of cooperators. This theoratical finding
can support Hofmann et al.’s empirical finding about W SLS, because a uniform final proportion of cooperators can be considered that the period of the
cycle is 1.
5. A self-organisation mechanism was proposed for packet routing in
WSNs.
This mechanism is used to assist and enhance current routing approaches.
The proposed mechanism is not a concrete routing approach but an assistant
method. Because the proposed mechanism is independent of current routing
approaches, it can be adopted by many current routing approaches. This mechanism is decentralised and operated based only on local information without
changing the network topology. In addition, this mechanism is also available
in mobile and open WSNs, where sensors are mobile and new sensors may join
or existing sensors may leave the network.
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Future Work

Although the mechanisms and the strategy, proposed in this thesis, outperformed
the state-of-the-art related approaches, there is still some room for the improvement
of the proposed mechanisms and strategy.
1. The composite relation adaptation mechanism
Because the trust model and learning algorithm are complementary parts of
this mechanism, a more effective trust model and a more efficient learning
algorithm could improve the performance of our mechanism. Thus, devising
impactful trust models and learning algorithms is a stream of the future work
to refine this mechanism. Specifically, we will quantitatively compare different
trust models for candidate selection to find which one is the best for our problem, and we will develop a new trust model based on the analysis of existing
trust models. Furthermore, we intend to enhance the self-organisation mechanism by enabling it to handle dynamic cases, where new types of resources
can be introduced into the agent network and some existing resources can be
phased out. It is also interesting to introduce the asymmetric relation strength
into the agent network model, e.g., an agent, say A, quite likes another agent,
say B, with a high degree, e.g., 0.7, but B likes A only with a low degree,
e.g., 0.3. It is believed that introducing such asymmetric relation strength will
make this mechanism more flexible and more suitable to real-world problems.
2. The integrative self-organisation mechanism
In the future, we intend to improve and evaluate this mechanism in an open
environment where agents can join and leave freely and new types of resources
may be dynamically introduced into the environment. It has to be mentioned
that cloning/spawning is not quite applicable in engineering applications, because in engineering applications, components are usually hardware. Thus,
these components cannot spawn or be cloned. However, in computer applications, cloning is applicable, as software is not difficult to be cloned. One
famous example about cloning in computer applications is computer viruses.
Computer viruses usually clone themselves as many as possible in order to
have more chance to survive and in order to damage the infected computer
system as heavily as possible.
3. The self-adaptation based dynamic coalition formation mechanism
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In the proposed coalition formation mechanism, a negotiation protocol is employed to make contracts between Initiator s and Participants. It is conceived
that a more efficient negotiation protocol would bring a better result of coalition formation. Thereby, we intend to develop a more efficient negotiation
protocol in the future. We are also interested in incorporating a network reorganisation mechanism, also known as network structure adaptation mechanism, with the proposed coalition formation mechanism to achieve better
results of coalition formation. For example, agent ai connects to agent aj , and
aj also links with another agent ak . If ai often needs help from ak , then ai
may want to directly connect to ak in order to save communication overhead
and time consumption. On the other hand, if ai rarely communicates with its
neighbour aj , then ai may want to disconnect with aj in order to save computation cost associated with taking aj into account whenever ai initialises a
coalition formation process. According to this example, it can be found that a
network re-organisation mechanism is helpful for a coalition formation mechanism to achieve better results compared with the one, which does not use a
re-organisation mechanism. Furthermore, we plan to extend this mechanism
to an open and mobile agent network, where new agents can join as well as
existing agents can leave the network, and agents can also have mobility to
travel in the network. In that case, another network re-organisation mechanism is necessary, because whenever new agents join or existing agents leave
or agents travel in the network, the network structure is inevitably changed.
4. The self-organisation based strategy for the evolution of cooperation
In the future, as mentioned in Chapter 5, we attempt to develop a more
complex and efficient learning algorithm to realise the self-organisation based
strategy. Furthermore, we intend to test the self-organisation based strategy
in different games, such as the aforementioned Snowdrift and Stag Hunt games
[SPL06]. We also want to test the proposed strategy in dynamic networks. In
this thesis, the performance of the proposed strategy in static networks was
evaluated. However, in many social systems, individuals are continuously creating or removing interactions according to the benefits of the interactions.
One example occurs in scientific collaboration networks [New01], where scientists usually work in small groups of collaborations, and the collaboration
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relationships of scientists evolve under performance and self-interest of the
individual members. Therefore, it is meaningful to evaluate the proposed strategy in dynamic networks, where players can remove existing interactions
with neighbours and establish new links with other players, although the study on the evolution of cooperation in dynamic networks received much less
attention than that in static networks [EB02, ZE05]. In addition, it is also
interesting to test the proposed strategy in an open network, where existing
players may leave the network and new players may join the network. On the
other hand, for the theoretical study, at the current stage, we determined only
the upper bound cyclic period of a game. In the future, we plan to determine
more precisely the cyclic period of a game, such as the precise spectrum of the
cyclic period of a game, and to investigate when the game gets into a cycle.
5. The self-organisation mechanism for packeting routing in WSNs
In the future, we first intend to overcome the drawback of the proposed mechanism, namely that an addressing scheme has to be used. As the learning
algorithms are complementary parts of this mechanism, more efficient learning
algorithms may derive better results. Thus, devising more impactful learning
algorithms is a stream of the future work to refine our mechanism. In addition, we are also interested in heterogeneous WSNs, where different sensors
have different sensing coverage and initial energy. Finally, when such studies
are finished, we intend to test this mechanism on a specific platform, e.g., NS2,
and further in a real-world environment.
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